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Abstract 
 
We have developed a remarkable understanding of how the political environment 
influences individual political thought and action, but we have not made as much progress in 
developing our knowledge of the individual predispositions that citizens bring with them into the 
political world.  In recent years, a novel research agenda has highlighted the role biological 
factors play in shaping political behavior.  At the same time, there has been a resurgence of 
interest in personality traits in political behavior research, made possible by the rise of the Big 
Five in trait psychology.  Though these streams (traditional environmental research, biology and 
politics, and personality and political behavior) have generally been viewed separately, the 
crucial next step for political behavior researchers will be to think about how they all fit together.  
In this dissertation I develop a framework for placing personality effects into a broader context.  
I argue that personality traits are stable, biologically-based dispositions and I demonstrate 
empirically that a substantial amount of the variance shared between traits and political behavior 
is heritable.  These findings comport well with a theory of influence in which personality traits 
act as a mediator between genes and politics.   
Moving forward from this insight, we can use personality dispositions to form a better 
understanding of heterogeneous environmental effects.  Personality traits interact with 
environmental stimuli to shape political behavior.  People experience the political world 
differently and the richest and most satisfying theories going forward will account for these 
individual differences without losing sight of the crucial role played by the environment.  Here, I 
show that personality traits play an important role in shaping political discussion behavior, but 
that role is subtle and conditional.  I also find that personality traits play an important role in 
influencing individual decision making, but that the environment activates considerations that 
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differ based on the personality characteristics of the individual.  Taken together, the theoretical 
and empirical advances outlined here demonstrate the importance of devising models of human 
behavior that take individual differences seriously without forgetting about the important role 
played by the environment. By integrating the biological, with the environmental, the immediate 
with the long-term, and the political with the general psychological, we can forge a much 
stronger understanding of how humans behave in the political world.  
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Chapter One:  Unifying Behavioral Inquiry1
 
 
If we were asked to explain the differences between our friends and relatives we would 
quickly move past objective features such as age and gender and explain variation using 
references to basic dispositions which summarize regularities in their behavior.  We might note 
that Brian is curious and argumentative while Emily is introspective and moody.  Recognizing 
these distinctions in people’s personalities help us to understand our own social world.  We can 
use this information to predict how our friends will behave in different situations.  We would be 
fairly certain that Emily would not enjoy going to a party full of people she does not know, just 
as we would be confident that Brian would like it and would probably get into a heated debate 
with someone he met.  These predictions are made intuitively but research in psychology has 
provided empirical support for a personality approach.  Given the broad applicability of 
personality traits for all kinds of behavior it only makes sense to imagine that traits will influence 
how people interact in the political domain as well. 
Despite the enormous intuitive appeal, and the long history of empirical findings linking 
personality to social behavior, there has been surprisingly little attention paid to personality in 
political science research.  Some of this can be attributed to theory and measurement challenges 
that personality research in psychology has only recently overcome.  Political scientists cannot 
be expected to integrate a concept like personality if psychologists cannot agree on what it is or 
how to measure it.  Even more than these practical challenges, the reason personality has not 
taken hold in political behavior research is because the idea of personality as an explanation does 
not fit with what political behavior scholars have traditionally seen as important.  When thinking 
about individual political behavior, scholars have been most interested in studying how the 
                                                 
1 Material from this chapter appears in Mondak, Jeffery J., Matthew V. Hibbing, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A. 
Seligson, and Mary R. Anderson. 2010. “Personality and Civic Engagement:  An Integrative Framework for the 
Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior.” American Political Science Review 104: 85-110. 
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political environment affects citizens.  This line of inquiry has sought to understand how 
effective various political stimuli (e.g. social networks, political advertising, election laws) are at 
changing how citizens think about politics or how they behave politically.   
The major limitation of this environmental approach is that it often implicitly treats all 
people as identical until they are differentiated by the political stimuli they encounter.  Work that 
has taken individual differences between citizens seriously has generally been focused on either 
demographic characteristics or political dispositions such as ideology, interest, or partisanship.  
The limitation of this kind of thinking is that demographics often provide little understanding of 
the mechanisms in play, and political dispositions are often difficult to disentangle from the 
dependent variables we are trying to explain.  It also leaves us with a very limited understanding 
of the root causes of our political dispositions.  Why are some people interested in politics and 
others not?  Education certainly correlates with political interest, but many highly educated 
people have no interest in the political world, and many uneducated people are extremely 
engaged politically.  Ideology and partisanship are also related to political interest, but it is 
entirely unclear whether interest causes ideology or the reverse. 
For many years, the prevailing view of the root causes of political attitudes and behavior 
was that parental socialization played the most important role (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; 
Jennings and Niemi 1968).  Parents were thought to be the most important players in shaping 
political citizens.  This view has recently been challenged by work suggesting that parents may 
still be the most important, but not because of the way they socialize children.  New research has 
sought to demonstrate that our political behavior is, to a substantial degree, shaped by our 
biology.  This new work has been quite successful in demonstrating that biology plays a role, but 
it has not yet provided a clear idea of how biology influences politics.  Genes are unlikely to 
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influence political behavior directly.  There is not a “liberal gene” or a “voting gene.”  Political 
attitudes and choices are too complex to be the result of any one, or even a handful, of genes.  
Many genes are likely to be involved, and biological influence is exerted indirectly.  An 
individual probably does not have a biological predisposition to vote, or attend a political rally.  
Instead, a biological predisposition towards pro-social behavior could interact with contextual 
factors to lead certain people to be more politically engaged.  In other words, biology is likely to 
exert an influence on general social dispositions, cognitive biases, and personality traits, which in 
turn influence political thinking and action (see Smith et al. 2011).    
The challenge presented by this research is to understand how the pieces of the puzzle fit 
together.  We know that the environment shapes political behavior to a substantial degree, but 
there is good reason to think that not everyone is affected in similar ways.  We know that 
demographics and political dispositions are important, but we do not have a strong basis for 
understanding the mechanisms at work or where political dispositions come from.  Finally, we 
now know that political behavior is largely rooted in biology, but we do not yet understand 
through what mechanisms biology shapes politics. 
Coming full circle, a personality approach can help us to address all of these problems.  
Personality traits are largely rooted in biology and they provide a logical intermediary 
mechanism between genes and politics.  In addition, personality traits are formed early in life 
and are quite stable over time, helping us to overcome concerns about the direction of causality.  
Finally, personality traits can be incorporated into theories of political behavior that focus on the 
interaction between basic individual dispositions and the political environment that we already 
know is important.  Over the course of this chapter, I will expand on each of these points in turn 
and build a case for the three empirical chapters that follow.  Incorporating personality into our 
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models of political behavior will not cure all ills, but it will provide an important step towards a 
more complete understanding of the factors that influence the attitudes and actions of citizens.  
 
The Political Environment 
 At the most immediately environmental level, scholars have explained political behavior 
with reference to the political context of the moment.  How the media covers a particular event 
can influence political attitudes surrounding that issue (e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007a; Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997 among a host of examples, see Chong and 
Druckman 2007b for a review).  Scholars have expended considerable energy seeking to identify 
framing and priming effects on political behavior, even as they worry that the effects identified 
will be short-lived or counter argued outside of the laboratory setting (Druckman and Nelson 
2003; Sniderman and Theriault 2004).   
A different strand of research is focused on the effects that negative campaign tone has 
on citizens (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Brooks and Geer 2007; Geer 2006; Mutz and 
Reeves 2005).  Both literatures seek to understand how citizens respond to politically relevant 
stimuli obtained through the mass media.  However, despite their similar concepts and methods, 
they have remained distinct literatures that rarely speak to one another.  Part of the reason for this 
is likely because, unlike the framing literature, which has focused on attitude change as a result 
of differential exposure to frames, the negative advertising literature has centered on what kind 
of ads provide the most information (e.g. Geer 2006) and whether negative ads demobilize the 
electorate (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, Geer 2006). 
Stepping back slightly from the immediate effects of the media on political behavior, 
scholars have also considered the potential influence of citizens’ social environments.  Building 
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on the foundation constructed by the Columbia researchers (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhree 
1954; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948), more recent research 
has called attention to the political significance of social interaction.  For example, Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1987) concluded that individuals have preferences and construct their discussion 
networks to reflect these preferences but that the individual’s ability to construct a likeminded 
network is constrained by the distribution of preferences in his or her social context.  This insight 
has been followed by a growing literature which finds that the characteristics of political 
discussion are mediated by the particular context, including:  neighborhoods (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1995), places of worship (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990), and the workplace (Mutz 
and Mondak 2006).  Features of the national political context also can influence the nature of 
political discussion (e.g. Anderson and Paskeviciute 2005; Mondak and Gearing 2003).  
Institutional factors also can shape political behavior.  Registration laws are hypothesized 
to decrease voter turnout by increasing the costs associated with voting (e.g. Nagler 1991; 
Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978), with earlier closing dates for registration further lowering 
turnout (Patterson and Caldeira 1983).  A host of other short-term institutional factors, such as 
party competition (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985), closeness of an election (Cox and 
Munger 1989) and get-out-the-vote campaigns (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber, Green, and 
Larimer 2008) have been shown to play a role in shaping political participation.  This review 
only scratches the surface of the sizable body of research which examines the way institutions 
influence individual citizens. 
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Individual Political Characteristics 
Clearly, work in political science over the last 60 years has done an impressive job of 
exploring the potential environmental influences on political behavior.  From transitory effects of 
media tone to the institutional constraints operating in elections, we know a great deal about how 
citizens’ environments shape their political judgments and behaviors.  Political behavior scholars 
have also actively investigated the role of the citizens themselves, although even research 
focused on the individual has tended to approach individual variation as the product of variation 
in the politically relevant environment.  For example, there is a venerable literature which seeks 
to understand political participation through the lens of individual demographic characteristics, 
with a particular focus on socioeconomic status variables like income and education (e.g. 
Leighley and Nagler 1992; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980).  This work has been tremendously valuable in illustrating the factors that 
help to enable or inhibit political activity.  However, demographic factors seem unlikely 
candidates for a causal role in political behavior, at least when used as one-size-fits-all 
explanations.  Education helps provide citizens with the necessary resources to participate 
(Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), and greater income means a greater stake in political 
debates, but that by itself does not tell us much about the mechanisms or motivations which drive 
political behavior.  For example, education is known to be positively associated with voter 
turnout, but why is this so?  Jackson (1995) examined several possible explanations (e.g. 
education instills a sense of civic duty; education increases political efficacy) and concluded that 
all of them played some part, but that educations greatest influence came from increasing 
political awareness and the likelihood of registering to vote.  More recently, Tenn (2007) tried to 
isolate the unique effect of education when accounting for unobserved, correlated factors.  Tenn 
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found that that an additional year of education had little marginal effect.  Education then is 
playing a part in a larger causal story, and it is a part that is more nuanced than it would initially 
appear.  It is also important to remember that variables like education and income are themselves 
products of complex causal stories involving both biological and environmental factors.   
Other scholars have constructed explanations of political attitudes and behavior using 
political variables such as strength of partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960), trust (Hetherington 
1999), and knowledge and sophistication (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Galston 2001; Zaller 
1992).  These political factors are undoubtedly important, but they present a challenge in terms 
of the causal logic.  For example, partisan attachment and political knowledge may lead a person 
to participate more, but through participation could then lead to greater levels of knowledge and 
stronger partisan attachment.  Again, the theoretical focus tells us a great deal about the various 
factors at play in political behavior, but they do not tell us much about the root causes of those 
behaviors.   
In the past, when political scientists have investigated the origins of attitudes and 
behaviors they have placed a special emphasis on family socialization.  This is in keeping with 
the general focus on environmental explanations discussed above.  Research on socialization is 
different from much of the work described earlier in that it seeks to understand the long-term 
influences that shape citizens before they encounter political stimuli as adults.  This work has 
noted high concordance on political views between parents and offspring and has attributed this 
concordance to family socialization and social learning (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings 
1984; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Niemi and Jennings 1991; 
Tedin 1974, 1980).  However, a recent surge of research investigating the genetic basis of 
political attitudes and behavior (e.g. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 
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2008; Hatemi et al. 2009a, 2009b, 2010) casts doubt on the assumption that high parent-child 
concordance is evidence of socialization.  These studies find that a significant portion of the 
variance (typically 40%-60%) in political attitudes and behavior can be attributed to genetic 
factors.  None of this means that socialization does not play an important role, or that our 
discipline’s focus on environmental factors is in any way incorrect.  It does mean that we must 
expand our explanations to account for the sizable contribution biology plans in influencing 
politics. 
One limitation of the early genetics and politics research is that, while it has shown that 
genes play a role in politics, it has been less successful at establishing how they do so.  As 
skeptics are quick to point out, it is silly to imagine that there is a gene “for” voting, or a gene 
“for” party identification.  Such a conception fails to comport with what we know about biology 
and what we know about politics.  The real pathways of genetic influence are likely to be 
complex, with multiple intermediary stages (see Smith et al. 2011 for a stylized illustration).  
Genes influence the coding of proteins, which form biological structures, which condition 
neurological responses to external stimuli, which manifest in deep-seated preferences for social 
life, which shape human interaction in a variety of contexts, including politics.  A full 
understanding of political behavior will require research at all of these stages, but political 
scientists would seem best suited to work closer to the end of the chain, where deep-seated 
preferences for social life meet the political context. 
We have developed a remarkable understanding of how the political environment 
influences individual political thought and action, but we have not made as much progress in 
developing our knowledge of the individual predispositions that citizens bring with them into the 
political world.  Future research should seek to address this asymmetry, but not by crafting a host 
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of studies focused only on individual predispositions.  Instead we should attempt to identify 
biologically rooted predispositions and consider how they interact with the political environment 
to affect politics.  We must acknowledge that citizens do not make political decisions in a 
vacuum, relying only on their predispositions.  At the same time, we must keep in mind that 
people are not political blank slates, homogenous until the environment breathes variety into 
them.  The newest generation of political behavior research should incorporate predispositions 
and environmental factors together and should be sensitive to interactions between the two. 
But how can we account for predispositions?  Undoubtedly, our answer to this question 
will evolve as we learn more, but here I focus on one particular class of predispositions that have 
already demonstrated their utility:  personality traits.  Personality traits provide us an excellent 
tool for studying political behavior because they have already been well established as 
biologically rooted predispositions that are relevant to politics.  Political scientists have long 
recognized the potential utility of studying personality, but only within the last few years have 
theoretical and methodological developments allowed personality to play a more central role in 
the study of political behavior. 
 
Early Work on Personality and Politics 
        In the past, when political scientists sought to incorporate personality into their 
research it was with a somewhat narrow focus.  Much of this work focused on political elites, 
particularly presidents (Barber 1992; George and George 1964; Greenstein 2003; Renshon 
1995).  These studies used detailed analyses of the words and deeds of presidents in order to 
assess the personality and character of that individual.  Although this type of research contributes 
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valuable insights, it is difficult to generalize the findings.  Indeed, only Barber made a concerted 
effort to create a typology that could be applied to multiple presidents.    
 The sort of in-depth analysis used to study elites would be impractical in research on 
mass politics, and, as a result, for many years there were only a handful of studies that attempted 
to understand the connection between personality and citizen behavior.  These studies were 
important but somewhat limited in their scope (but see Mussen and Wyszynski 1952 for a more 
general exception).  Adorno et al. (1950) focused on the idea of an authoritarian personality and 
its significance for political outcomes, and work on authoritarianism has continued in various 
forms up to the present day (e.g. Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; 
Hethington and Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005).  McClosky (1958, 1964) tried to understand the 
influence of personality on political ideology, and Sniderman (1975) used McClosky’s data to 
attempt to understand the role of self-esteem in mass politics.  Until the last few years, there had 
been a precipitous decline in political science research that attempted to apply concepts of 
personality to citizen behavior.  The most notable exception was the literature on political 
tolerance (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood 1995; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 
1982). 
The great concern with research on the role of personality in mass politics was that we 
would be unable to study the topic systematically (Greenstein 1992).  One reason for this 
concern was that, until recently, there had been little use of comprehensive models of personality 
in the study of political behavior.  The practice in the past had been to borrow ideas and concepts 
from the psychology literature as it suited the author’s immediate research agenda.  This kind of 
approach is problematic for two reasons.  First, it is difficult to accumulate knowledge when 
every scholar conceptualizes personality differently.  Second, if scholars are picking and 
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choosing which traits to use, the temptation would be to select traits closest in content to the 
dependent variable (Sniderman 1975).  While this approach can sometimes lead to interesting 
findings, it does not lend itself to the development of a unified literature on personality and its 
effects on politics.  If we are to ever have such a literature, we need to attempt to measure 
multiple traits that cover different elements of personality and we needed different research 
teams to focus on the same basic traits so that findings can be compared (Winter 2003).  
 
The Big Five 
The failure to incorporate comprehensive models of personality into political science was 
not entirely the fault of political scientists.  You cannot squeeze blood from a stone, and you 
cannot incorporate comprehensive models into your research if such models do not exist.  Within 
the field of psychology, there was fitful progress in the study of personality through the 1960’s 
and 1970’s (Digman 1990).  One of the major reasons for this lull in productive research was that 
there are countless possible attributes that could be incorporated into a model of personality and 
each scholar used somewhat different concepts and scales (John and Srivastava 1999).  The other 
major issue confronting personality research was the critique that individuals demonstrated little 
trans-situational consistency in their behavior.  Walter Mischel (1968) argued this position 
forcefully, and the debate between proponents of trait research and Mischel and his supporters 
set back research trait research for many years (Mondak 2010).   
The Big Five framework has its roots in early work that sought to identify the core factors 
of individual difference, but parsimonious models of personality traits were slow to develop.  
One can imagine numerous characteristics that could be considered core personality traits.  
Indeed, Allport and Odbert (1936) identified almost 18,000 potential trait terms by examining an 
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unabridged dictionary.  Recognizing that within this massive number of terms were a smaller 
number of core traits, Raymond Cattell used factor analysis to narrow Allport and Odbert’s list 
down to models that contained between twelve and sixteen factors (Cattell 1943, 1947, 1956).  
The number of factors was further narrowed by Tupes and Christal (Tupes 1957; Tupes and 
Christal 1958, 1961) in their work for the Air Force.  Tupes and Christal reported five-factor 
models that closely resembled the Big Five in their work on identifying the correlates of 
effective Air Force officers.   
After the Mischel debate calmed in the 1980s and 1990s, trait psychologists began to 
develop comprehensive frameworks of personality based on a limited number of dimensions.  It 
took years of accumulated research for the field of psychology to coalesce broadly around the 
conclusion that personality can be generally understood to exist along five dimensions:  openness 
to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability (there are 
a number of works which review this history including Digman 1990; John, Naumann, and Soto 
2008, and Mondak 2010).  Taken together, these five dimensions have come to be known as 
either the Big Five, or the Five-Factor model.  The Five Factor model (Costa and McCrae 1992; 
McCrae 1989; McCrae and Costa 1996; McCrae and Costa 2003) is based on respondents’ 
reports of behaviors.  On the other hand, the Big Five (Goldberg 1993; Goldbeg 1992; Goldberg 
1990; Saucier and Goldberg 2002; Saucier and Goldberg 1996) follows a lexical approach that 
uses everyday language (generally adjectives) to distinguish differences along the five 
dimensions.  There is growing agreement within psychology generally that the differences 
between the Big Five and the Five-Factor model are relatively insignificant (Digman 1996), and 
for the purposes of political science research they are virtually interchangeable.  Both models 
focus on the same five traits, and the empirical relationships identified are robust across the 
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different measurement approaches.  Most of my data follows Goldberg’s lexical approach, but I 
make use of both types of measures across the different datasets in this dissertation.  The five 
dimensions that make up the Big Five taxonomy have been the subject of a great deal of 
empirical scrutiny, and many new studies on the correlates of the Big Five are reported each 
year.  In brief, the essential features of the Big Five are as follows. 
Openness to Experience.  The newest member of the Big Five, openness to experience 
has also been called “intellect.”  This trait is associated with curiosity, open-mindedness, 
learning, and a willingness to consider new ideas (McCrae and Costa 1985).  Empirical research 
has linked openness to experience to risky behavior (Booth-Kewley and Vickers 1994), self-
efficacy (Mak and Tran 2001), and information seeking (Heinstrom 2003).  Conscientiousness.  
This trait is thought to be related to a sense of personal responsibility and reliability.  Individuals 
scoring high in conscientiousness are thought to be organized, dependable and hard-working, 
which leads to success in the workplace (Barrick and Mount 1991; Tett et al. 1991) and greater 
academic achievement (Wagerman and Funder 2007).  Conscientiousness has also been 
associated with risk-avoidance (Arthur and Graziano 1996; Kowert and Hermann 1997).  
Extraversion.  The most widely studied Big Five dimension, extraversion relates to how 
individuals interact with their environment.  Those scoring low in extraversion tend to be 
passive, shy and reflective, while extraverts are more active and social.  Extraversion has been 
linked to greater self-confidence (Pulford and Sohal 2006) and risk-taking (Markey et al. 2006; 
Malouff et al. 2006).  Agreeableness.  This trait deals with how individuals interact with others 
and handle conflictive situations.  People with high scores for agreeableness tend to work well 
with others (Barrick and Mount 1991), avoid conflicts (Jensen-Campbell and Graziano 2000) 
and avoid risky behaviors (Markey et al. 2006).  Emotional Stability.  Also sometimes known as 
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neuroticism, emotional stability has well-studied over the years.  The trait deals with anxiety, and 
emotional control.  Low levels of emotional stability are associated with feelings of stress, and 
depression (Matthews and Deary 1998).  High levels of emotional stability are also associated 
with risky behavior (Nicholson 2005) and feelings of self-efficacy (Thoms, Moore, and Scott 
1996). 
The Big Five presents us with an opportunity to conduct new research in political science 
which incorporates personality.  The parsimonious nature of the model means that a Big Five 
personality battery can easily be included in most surveys.  Though psychologists sometimes 
employ Big Five batteries with more than twenty items for each trait, several studies have 
demonstrated the adequacy of brief batteries using two or three items to measure each trait 
(Gosling et al. 2003; Mondak et al. 2010; Rammstedt and John 2007; Woods and Hampson 
2005).  In addition, we can use the Big Five to examine the robustness of pre-existing findings 
linking personality with political behavior.  The Big Five has shown consistency and replicability 
across language, culture, and content of adjectival markers.  This consistency makes it an ideal 
tool for applying personality to different areas of research (Ozer and Reise 1994) including 
comparative politics. 
All of this is not to suggest that the Big Five is the last word in personality research.   
Psychologists continue to work at revising and refining the specific dimensions of the Big Five 
and exploring traits that may not be fully captured by a Big Five framework.  For example, 
Saucier and Goldberg (1998) looked at a host of attributes (including clearly non-personality 
dimensions such as height, girth, and employment status) to see what potentially could be 
“beyond” the Big Five.  They found relatively few traits that were independent of the Big Five, 
with the most notable being religiousness, youthfulness, and negative valence (characterized by 
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extremely unfavorable descriptors such as “awful,” or “evil”).  The Big Five does not encompass 
everything, but given its broad scope and wide acceptance, any other traits studied should be 
placed in a context of the value they add above and beyond the Big Five.  A growing number of 
studies have already taken various Big Five dimensions into account and seen significant results.  
Marcus et al. (1995) found a link between emotional stability and political tolerance.  Kowert 
and Hermann (1997) used the Big Five in a study of foreign policy decision-making.  Caprara, 
Barbaranelli and Zimbardo (1999, 2002) compared elite personalities with public perceptions of 
those personalities and found that mass perceptions focus on extraversion and agreeableness and 
that elites and citizens of the same party converge in terms of personality attributes.  Mondak and 
Halperin (2008) was the first study to look for links between all five traits and a wide range of 
politically relevant dependent variables.  They found that different Big Five personality 
dimensions had significant effects for party identification, ideology, political participation and 
levels of political information.  The link between personality traits and ideology has been 
explored further, and the consistent findings are that conscientiousness is related to political 
conservatism and openness to experience is related to liberal views (e.g. Alford and Hibbing 
2007; Carney et al. 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008).  Gerber et al. (2010) 
expanded on this research and found that personality traits influence economic and social 
attitudes differently, and that contextual factors influence the relationship between traits and 
attitudes.  The link between personality traits and political participation has been explored both 
in the U.S. context (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010) and cross-nationally (Mondak et al. 
2010; Mondak et al. 2011).  Finally, the Big Five can also be studied at the elite level.  Dietrich 
et al. (2011) surveyed state legislators in three states and found that, as in the mass public, 
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openness to experience was linked to ideological liberalism and conscientiousness with 
conservative views. 
 
Next Steps 
Political behavior research has long been focused on the importance of the various 
environmental factors that shape citizens’ attitudes and actions.  In recent years, a novel research 
agenda has highlighted the role biological factors play.  At the same time, there has been a 
resurgence of interest in personality traits in political behavior research, made possible by the 
rise of the Big Five in trait psychology.  Though these streams (traditional environmental 
research, biology and politics, and personality and political behavior) have generally been 
viewed separately, the crucial next step for political behavior researchers will be to think about 
how they all fit together.   
Traditional research focusing on the uniform influence of environmental factors has no 
place in its causal story for biological influences of any sort, including personality.  Thus, in 
terms of the basic antecedents of political behavior, this work can be visualized in very simple 
terms, as demonstrated by Figure 1.1.  This is not to say that scholars operating within this 
framework hold such a simplistic notion of the causal forces shaping political behavior, but their 
empirical work can be reduced to these terms.  Similarly, work on the influence of genes on 
political behavior can be reduced to a simple causal story, visually represented in Figure 1.2.  
Early work on the heritability of political behavior was totally focused on establishing that genes 
played a role, but this work was less concerned with demonstrating what that role was.  With 
biology now clearly established as an important factor, we must work to understand just how 
genes exert their influence on political behavior.  Similarly, the personality research described 
   17 
above is undeniably useful, but without proper context it is unclear what we are to make of the 
results.  What does it mean when we find an effect for openness to experience on political 
engagement?  What can we do with that information?  Once again, early work on personality 
tells an overly simplistic causal story (depicted in Figure 1.3).  Each of these research strands is 
telling an important part of the story, but without some idea of how the different causal forces fit 
together, our accounts of political behavior will remain incomplete.  In order to make progress, 
we must think carefully about what personality effects really are, and what they can tell us about 
the role of biological predispositions and environmental factors in shaping behavior.   
My goal in this dissertation is to place the findings of personality research into this 
broader context.  Figure 1.4 provides a visual depiction of how I believe personality effects 
operate and how we should go about studying political behavior.  This figure takes each of the 
disconnected threads shown in Figure 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, and tries to show how the pieces fit 
together.  The bold lines represent the key factors at play when personality traits influence 
political behavior.  I will discuss each of these in greater detail, but in brief, personality traits are 
hypothesized to represent an important mediating factor between genes and political behavior.  
As discussed earlier, it is hard to imagine how biology could exert a direct influence on political 
behavior and so there is no direct path in Figure 1.1 between these two points.  Personality is 
likely a key mediator, and it is the focus of this research, but it is not the only mediating force 
between biology and political.  Figure 1.1 accounts for this by including a path to additional 
mediating factors which would include those biologically influenced forces that are not 
encompassed by the Big Five.  For example, cognitive ability (Denny and Doyle 2008) and 
physiological reactions to threatening stimuli (Oxley et al. 2008) have both been found to be 
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related to political behavior and both have some basis in biology, but they are not captured by 
any of the Big Five dimensions. 
Personality traits are hypothesized to mediate the effect of biology on politics, but the 
effects of personality traits are not operating in a vacuum.  As political scientists have known for 
years, the environment plays a crucial role.  Peoples’ personality traits interact with 
environmental factors to influence political behavior.  This interactive model captures the notion 
that an environmental stimulus will have different effects depending on the disposition of the 
individual being affected.  Of course, it is possible that there are homogeneous personality trait 
or environmental effects (hence the dashed lines in Figure 1.1 connecting both directly to 
political behavior), but I contend that such effects will be rare.  The vast majority of political 
behavior will result from the interaction between basic dispositions, and variation in the 
environment in which that behavior is situated.  The three empirical chapters of this dissertation 
seek to empirically test the theoretical framework represented in Figure 1.1, by examining each 
link represented by the bold lines.         
First, personality traits provide an important mechanism through which biology 
influences politics.  Using a variety of methods, researchers have consistently found that 
approximately 50% of the variance in personality traits across any given population will be 
attributable to genes (e.g Bouchard and Loehlin 2001; Matthews and Deary 1998).  Perhaps 
because of this substantial heritable component, the Big Five has been found to be remarkably 
stable in adulthood (Costa and McCrae 1988).  This stability lends support to the notion that 
links between personality traits and political behavior are indicative of an underlying causal 
relationship running from traits to politics.  It is difficult to imagine, given what we know about 
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the peripheral role played by politics in most peoples’ lives and the stability of personality traits, 
that the act of voting or putting up a yard sign is causing changes in a persons’ personalities. 
As work has accumulated demonstrating that ideology (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005) 
and political participation (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008) have strong heritable components, 
scholars have speculated that personality could provide a crucial intermediate link between genes 
and politics.  For example, Fowler, Baker, and Dawes stated that “an important area of research 
will study the extent to which the link between genes and participations can be explained by 
genetic variation in inherent personality traits” (2008, 244).  Mondak made a similar argument 
and he noted that up to this point “the claim that personality functions as a mechanism 
connecting genes and politics has been established only by inference” (2010, 188).  In the next 
chapter, I address this concern by studying the links between Big Five traits, political behavior, 
and genes within a single research design.  Drawing on a recent survey of twins focused on 
politics I am able to ascertain the degree to which correlations between traits and political 
variables are due to a shared genetic component.  In doing so, I can establish that personality 
traits are playing an important role as an intermediate step between genes and politics.   
Establishing personality traits as an important biologically-based disposition represents a 
key step, but as we investigate links between personality and politics it is important that we work 
to place new findings in context.  Early work on personality and politics has been content to 
explore direct relationships between traits and a variety of dependent variables.  This kind of 
study represents a useful first step, but it suffers from at least one major limitation.  Though 
personality traits remain extremely consistent over time, individuals are constantly being placed 
in different environmental circumstances.  A study of direct personality effects can tell us that 
extraverts will tend to behave socially, or that conscientious people will seek to meet their 
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responsibilities, but variation in the environment will dictate when extraverts can distinguish 
themselves from introverts (more so at parties, less so at funerals) or what the conscientious 
person sees as her responsibilities.  One of the great advantages of personality traits is that they 
provide the researcher with the ability to craft rich theories of behavior which have clear 
mechanisms linking individuals to their behavior under different environmental conditions.  
Studies of direct effects largely miss out on that opportunity. 
To demonstrate the importance of an approach that incorporates environmental factors, 
individual dispositions, and the interaction of the two (as represented in Figure 1.1), I incorporate 
personality traits into studies of two different research areas.  Chapter Three discusses the 
importance of personality for how people discuss politic and construct their social networks.  I 
demonstrate that personality traits affect how much people talk about politics and where they 
hold these discussions, and I also show that personality traits are important for understanding 
how citizens are in turn influenced by the political discussions they have.  Chapter Four 
incorporates personality traits into the study of rationality, decision making, and judgments of 
utility.  I show that people will behave more or less “rationally” based on the interaction between 
the circumstances of the decision and their personality traits.  The findings suggest that we 
should broaden our conception of utility to account for the notion that what factors into a utility 
judgment will vary substantially based on characteristics of the individual. 
These two research areas do not even scratch the surface of where a personality-
environment approach can be enlightening, but I believe they represent a good starting point.  
Both research agendas represent “tough tests” of the theory that personality plays an important 
role in shaping behavior in interaction with the environment.  The literature on political 
discussion has been overwhelmingly focused on the importance of the environment in 
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determining how much people talk politics and with whom.  Similarly, the literature on decision 
making has fairly narrow expectations about what constitutes “rational” utility judgments.  
Deviations from utility maximization have typically been seen as being the result of bounded 
rationality, where the deviation was the result of various constraints that produced a lack of 
understanding of the correct course of action.  I seek to demonstrate that many times when 
people deviate from the expectations of economists, they do so for reasons that perfectly comport 
with an economic view.  That is, people are behaving rationally, but what they want differs based 
on their individual characteristics. 
None of the three empirical chapters that follow represent the last word in their respective 
areas.  Instead, they are first steps that demonstrate the importance of devising models of human 
behavior that take individual differences seriously without forgetting about the important role 
played by the environment.  The richest and most satisfying theories going forward will 
incorporate both elements.  By integrating the biological, with the environmental, the immediate 
with the long-term, and the political with the general psychological, we can forge a much 
stronger understanding of how humans behave in the political world. 
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Chapter Two:  Genetic Covariation between the  
Big Five and Political Behavior 
 
 Some people never participate in politics.  No matter how much money candidates spend 
on advertising they will not turn out to vote.  No matter how passionately interest groups plead 
they will not sign a petition or donate to a cause.  They will stay home from rallies and change 
the channel to avoid watching televised debates.  At the other end of the spectrum are people 
who live and breathe politics.  These individuals volunteer their free time and their money to 
support causes and candidates.  They not only vote in every election, no matter how minor the 
office, but they might also offer to drive others to the polls to give their like-minded neighbors a 
chance to participate.  In between these two extremes are a host of people who strike a balance 
between political activity and other demands.  Such a citizen might always vote but stop at 
voting; or she might vote and donate money to her favorite candidates.  An individual’s political 
world is highly customizable. 
 Scholars of political behavior have scrutinized variation in participation closely and have 
identified a multitude of factors that influence participation, including individual-level 
demographic characteristics and psychological resources (e.g. Leighley and Nagler 1992; Plutzer 
2002; Stoker and Jennings 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), features of the 
institutional context such as the nature of the election laws or characteristics of the campaign 
(e.g. Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978), or social factors such as the 
political discussions people engage in, the neighborhood context, or political socialization (e.g. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2002).  All of these factors seem to influence participation, 
but they still only explain a limited portion of the variation.   
 Notably absent from the study of participation for many years was any acknowledgement 
of a possible role for biological factors.  Perhaps genetic predispositions could help to explain 
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why some people who the literature would predict to participate based on their resources 
(wealthy, well-educated, etc.) never engage in politics, while others who would seem to be 
unlikely participants become extremely active.  This possibility was proposed and tested by 
Fowler, Baker, and Dawes in their seminal 2008 article, which found that over 50% of the 
variation in political participation in two different surveys could be attributed to genetics.  This 
finding is important, but it also presents a whole new set of questions regarding the nature of 
genetic influence.  How can participation in politics be genetically heritable?  Mass politics is an 
extremely recent phenomenon in the scope of human history.  The ideas behind mass politics 
date back a couple of thousand years at most, and for the most part the practical opportunity to 
engage in the political world really only emerge over the last 200 years.  This reality makes it 
difficult for some to imagine how genes could play any role in shaping politics, which seem so 
dependent on social and institutional context.   
 However, just because there is no “voting gene” does not mean that genetics are 
irrelevant to politics.  The idea of a “gene for” anything misunderstands how genetics actually 
influence complex social behaviors (see Smith et al. 2011 for a discussion of this idea).  The 
actual influence of genetics is likely to be much more complicated.  At the end of their article, 
Fowler, Baker, and Dawes (2008) suggest that one possible means to understand the heritability 
of participation is through the genetic heritability of pro-social personality traits.  They speculate 
that “genes may influence voting and political participation because they influence a generalized 
tendency to engage in social behavior” (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008, 244).  This idea has 
tremendous intuitive appeal, but up until now it has gone untested.  But recent work investigating 
the influence of personality traits (particularly the Big Five framework) on political participation 
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provides me with a unique opportunity to expand our understanding of how genetics shape 
political behavior.    
 Research investigating the influence of personality traits on political behavior has taken 
off in the last few years.  Incorporation of the Big Five into our models has proven fruitful in 
helping to explain a wide range of political attitudes (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; 
Gerber et al. 2010) and behaviors (Gerber et al. N.D.; Gerber et al. 2011; Hibbing, Ritchie, and 
Anderson N.D.; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak et al. 2011).  As this work has 
demonstrated the importance of individual psychological predispositions, scholars working in 
this area have started to turn their attention to careful consideration of why political behavior 
scholars should care about personality traits.  A number of rationales for why we should care 
about personality traits present themselves. 
 First and most obviously, the studies listed above have found a host of significant 
relationships between the Big Five and the dependent variables that interest political scientists.  
Clearly, there is some connection between personality and political behavior.  This fact alone is 
not terribly persuasive.  We might, if we were for some reason possessed to look, find a 
correlation between voter turnout and preference for pancakes over waffles, but this correlation 
probably would not help us explain voting in any meaningful way.  A second, somewhat more 
persuasive reason for studying personality is that the link between individual psychological 
predispositions and political behavior makes a great deal of intuitive sense.  In our day-to-day 
lives, we frequently attribute all kinds of behaviors to personality traits.  If an introverted friend 
sits quietly at a party, we understand that this is a reflection of who he is and how he behaves in 
social situations.  If a different, extraverted friend were to exhibit the same behavior we would 
notice that she was not behaving in her usual way and wonder if something was wrong.  This 
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same logic can easily be applied to politically relevant situations.  We would not be surprised to 
learn that a curious and adventurous friend had attended a political rally and spoken her mind, or 
to observe a particularly agreeable family member shying away from a particularly contentious 
political discussion. 
 By itself, intuitive appeal would still fall short of a satisfying justification.  Intuition does 
not always hold up under scrutiny.  However, in this case the intuitive appeal of a link between 
personality traits and political behavior is representative of deeper theoretical advantages that 
attention to traits provides.  Specifically, traits are broad, stable psychological constructs.  The 
breadth of the Big Five should be evident when we consider the nature of traits.  Traits represent 
a general tendency to behave in a certain way that is consistent across different situations.  An 
emotionally stable person will remain calm in the face of deadlines at work and will stay 
composed when a cancelled flight disrupts the family vacation.  This does not mean that 
emotionally stable individuals never lose their cool but it does mean that those instances are the 
exception and not the rule.  The natural breadth of traits helps us be confident that when we 
study the links between traits and political behavior we have the causal order correct.  It is much 
easier to believe that extraversion inclines individuals to volunteer for a specific campaign, rather 
than thinking that volunteering for a campaign makes a person imagine themselves as 
extraverted.  For most people, politics simply does not play a prominent enough role to believe 
that traits are being driven by political behavior.   
 The other key feature of traits is that they are stable.  A great deal of research has 
investigated whether people are consistent over time in their personality self-assessments (e.g. 
Caspi 2000; Costa and McCrae 1988; McCrae and Costa 2003; Rantanen et al. 2007).  The 
repeated finding is that personality changes very little, especially after age 30, except for modest 
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changes as people age (Costa and McCrae 1994).  In part thanks to this considerable stability, a 
number of scholars have sought to determine the degree to which personality traits are 
genetically heritable.  This sizable body of research has consistently found approximately 50 
percent of the variance in personality traits are attributable to genetic influence (a detailed 
discussion of this literature can be found in the next section).  The substantial biological basis for 
personality traits places us on firmer ground in believing that broad, stable, traits like the Big 
Five are causally prior to the participatory behaviors we would like traits to explain, and provides 
us with a plausible mechanism for understanding how genes influence political behavior.  
 While research on the heritability of personality has been ongoing since the late 1960’s, 
work on the heritability of political behavior is a much more recent phenomenon.  There is a 
reasonable amount of work demonstrating the heritability of political attitudes and ideology 
(Martin et al. 1986; Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Hatemi et al. 2010), but thus far relatively 
little work has investigated the heritability of political participation.  The most notable work in 
this area is Fowler, Baker, and Dawes’ (2008) article in which they establish a strong heritable 
component for voter turnout as well as other forms of political participation.  The relative lack of 
studies of participation can be traced to data limitations.  Most twin studies used to investigate 
heritability are compiled by psychologists who generally have interest in many topics not related 
to politics.  This has forced scholars interested in the heritability of politics to make due with 
whatever political content happens to find its way onto a twin study. 
 In this chapter I pull together some of these disparate strands of research in order to paint 
a more complete picture of the relationship between personality and political behavior and the 
biological bases of each.  Psychologists have firmly established a biological basis for personality 
traits.  In recent years political scientists have generated significant evidence in support of the 
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notion that personality traits influence political behavior.  Finally, there is preliminary evidence 
to suggest that political behavior is to some degree genetically heritable.  The natural question 
then becomes:  to what degree is the heritability of political behavior a result of the heritability of 
the personality traits that we know influence behavior?  Thus far, scholars have suggested that 
personality traits might be a crucial intermediary between genes and political behavior (see 
Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008), but this supposition has 
been based on the indirect evidence summarized above.  In this chapter I make use of a new twin 
study that contains measures of the Big Five, as well as unprecedented political content.  This 
study allows me to examine all of these factors within a single research design.  If I can establish 
that there is substantial overlap between the heritability of personality traits and the heritability 
of political behavior that would provide a strong case for the importance of studying personality 
traits as evidence for biological effects.  In addition, this would provide a key link in the 
complicated causal chain between genes and politics.  The next sections of the chapter will 
describe in greater depth the disparate literatures which form the theoretical basis for this 
chapter.  Next I will introduce the dataset being used and present the results from several 
univariate ACE-models on the heritability of personality and political participation.  These 
results represent some of the first work on the heritability of participation to extend beyond 
voting.  Finally, I will present multivariate twin models which examine the heritability of 
participation and personality traits and the degree to which that heritability is shared before 
concluding with some comments on what the findings mean for political behavior research going 
forward. 
 
   28 
The Heritability of Personality 
 There are three features of the body of research on the heritability of personality that 
become apparent immediately.  First, the sheer volume of research is staggering.  To illustrate 
this, consider the following list of citations:  Bouchard (1993, 1997), Bouchard and Loehlin 
(2001), Loehlin (1992), Matthews and Deary (1998), McCrae and Costa (2003), Pervin (2003), 
Sherman et al. (1997).  This list constitutes only a partial review of the pieces which review the 
existing literature.  Clearly, there has been no shortage of effort in investigating the heritability 
of personality. 
 The second notable feature is the variety of methods and measurement strategies that 
have been utilized.  Studies of twins raised together constitute the most common method of 
studying the heritability of personality, with recent examples including:  Jang et al. (1998), 
Loehlin (1992), Loehlin et al. (1998), Riemann, Angleitner, and Strelau (1997), Waller (1999).  
In addition to conventional twin studies, scholars have studied twins separated at birth (Bouchard 
and McGue 1990; Tellegen et al. 1988) as well as utilizing non-twin methods such as adoption 
studies (Loehlin 1992; Martin et al. 2000; Plomin et al. 1998) and family designs (Ahern et al. 
1982; Loehlin, Horn, and Willerman 1981).  In addition to a variety of research designs, these 
studies have also measured personality traits using a number of different scales including 
Eysenck’s Personality Inventory and the Big Five.  A recent study which does not fit into the 
behavior genetics research paradigm examined the brain structure of different research 
participants to see if variation in self-reported personality traits correlated with differences in 
brain structure (DeYoung et al. 2010).  The authors’ hypothesized relationships were supported 
for four of the five dimensions of the Big Five.  So, for example, neuroticism was associated 
with greater volume in brain regions related to threat, punishment, and negative affect.  This 
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work is intriguing as it has the potential to help us to understand the biological basis of the Big 
Five. 
 The third and perhaps the most important feature of the literature on the heritability of 
personality is that these numerous studies utilizing different methods and measures have 
produced remarkably consistent results.  The broad consensus is that a moderate to sizable 
portion of variance in personality can be attributed to genetic factors (with heritability estimates 
usually hovering a little above or below 0.50).  Shared environment (all influences twins share 
because they grew up in the same family, e.g. values, parenting practices, household routines) 
plays little to no role in shaping personality, while unshared environment (a residual category 
including all environmental factors not shared as well as measurement error) accounts for the 
remainder of the variance.  Of course, there are questions around the margins regarding exactly 
how much should be attributed to genes.  Non-twin designs tend to report lower heritability 
estimates (generally yielding estimates closer to 0.30 than 0.50, see Bouchard and Loehlin 2001) 
than their twin-based counterparts.  On the other hand, several studies (Heath et al. 1992; 
McCrae et al. 2001; Riemann et al. 1997) have suggested that the conventional finding of 
heritability of 0.50 underestimates the actual influence of genes.  These studies use a variety of 
techniques, including supplementing self-reports of personality with peer-reports and correcting 
for method bias, to improve the reliability of their personality measures.  Riemann et al. (1997) 
report heritability estimates between 0.66 and 0.79 when using combined self and peer reports, 
and McCrae et al. (2001) find no evidence of five-factor structure in the unshared environment 
component of their data once they have accounted for measurement error.  Regardless of the 
exact heritability, the voluminous extant literature appears to demonstrate that genetic heritability 
is the most important systematic influence on individual personality traits. 
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Personality and Political Participation 
 Investigations of the role played by personality traits on political behavior have only 
recently emerged (but see Mussen and Wyszynski 1952 for an early exception).  Prior to this 
recent proliferation, political science research incorporating personality was usually narrowly 
focused on a particular facet of personality such as research on authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 
1950; Stenner 2005) or self-esteem (Sniderman 1975).  The only research that incorporated a 
trait approach based on the Big Five was work on political tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995) and 
this work generally focused on a limited number of traits.  There has also been some recent work 
by Denny and Doyle (2008) which examines the role played by predispositions such as 
personality and cognitive ability that, while not explicitly looking at the Big Five, does discuss 
how the measures and findings align with a Big Five approach. 
 The research which explicitly focuses on the role played by the Big Five in political 
participation has yielded notable results (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak et 
al. 2010).  Openness to experience and extraversion are the two traits most associated with 
political participation, with extraversion having its greatest effects on social forms of 
participation such as attending public meetings or contacting representatives.  Conscientiousness 
and neuroticism are not as strongly related to participation, but when significant relationships are 
uncovered they are generally negative.  Agreeableness appears to be mostly unrelated to 
participation.  Most of these findings are intuitive, with the possible exception of the negative 
results for conscientiousness.  Most people would probably expect individuals who are 
responsible, diligent, and dutiful to be active in public affairs.  It appears that the relationship 
between conscientiousness and participation is more complex than that.  On balance, more 
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conscientious individuals are less likely to participate in politics, but this pattern does not hold 
for those conscientious individuals who perceive campaign activity as important (Mondak et al. 
2010) or have high levels of external efficacy (Mondak 2010).  In those cases, conscientious 
individuals participate at rates that match or exceed less conscientious people. 
 Overall, there is solid evidence to suggest that personality traits contribute to political 
participation.  When this is combined with the research on the heritability of personality 
discussed above, it becomes possible to speculate that personality effects are evidence of a 
biological basis for political participation.  This argument has been advanced by Mondak and 
colleagues (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010).  The contention gains even greater support when 
we consider the final line of inquiry:  the heritability of political participation. 
 
The Heritability of Political Participation 
 The empirical record on this point is the thinnest of the three, but the one in-depth study 
in this area is strongly suggestive.  Fowler, Baker, and Dawes (2008) study validated voter 
turnout data from a twin registry in California as well as data from the National Longitudinal 
Study of Adolescent Health which allowed them to study the heritability of other participatory 
behaviors such as contributing money to a campaign or attending a political rally.  Across both 
datasets, Fowler and colleagues find that genetics account for over 50% of the variance.  Thus, 
all of the links in a causal chain are now well-established.  Both personality and political 
participation are substantially heritable, and there are clearly links between personality and 
participatory behavior. 
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Data, Measures, and Univariate Results 
 Before proceeding with an examination of how these different components fit together, I 
first replicate some of Fowler and company’s findings regarding the heritability of participation.  
I make use of a new study of twins drawn from the Minnesota Twin Family Registry.  This is the 
first study of twins to be focused on political attitudes and behavior.  The Minnesota Twin 
Family Registry contains approximately 8,000 twin pairs recruited in middle age between 1983 
and 1990 (see Lykken et al. 1990, and Krueger and Johnson 2002 for more information on the 
registry).  For this particular survey, twins born between 1947 and 1956 were used, meaning that 
all participants in the survey were between 53 and 61 years old at the time of the survey.  The 
bulk of the data were collected via web surveys conducted between July and December of 2008, 
with a supplemental data collection carried out between July and October of 2009.  From this 
effort, data from 1349 respondents were collected.  Of these 1192 were part of a matched twin 
pair, and the analyses were conducted on those 1192 respondents (see Funk et al. 2010 for more 
information on the data). 
 The measures of personality available in this dataset make use of the questionnaire item 
format.  This measurement approach, which has been championed by McCrae and Costa, 
provides respondents with statements and asks them to assess the degree to which they agree (or 
disagree) with those statements.  Response options follow the standard Likert-scale format.  
Examples of the statements used include:  “I really like most people I meet” (agreeableness), and 
“I have a very active imagination” (openness to experience).  The dataset contains 10 items for 
openness to experience (alpha=0.82), 9 for conscientiousness (alpha=0.76), 9 for agreeableness 
(alpha=0.74) and 8 each for extraversion (alpha=0.86) and neuroticism (alpha=0.83). 
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 In order to estimate the genetic heritability of these traits it is standard practice to make 
use of the classical twin design.  This method relies on the known genetic differences between 
monozygotic (MZ) twins who are genetically identical and dizygotic (DZ) twins who, on average 
share 50% of their genes.  The logic of the twin design is straightforward and is based on just a 
handful of key assumptions.  Perhaps the most important is the assumption that all twin pairs 
raised together, regardless whether they are MZ or DZ, share a set of common environmental 
influences (e.g. same parents, same socio-economic status, same broader cultural influences).  If 
these sort of environmental influences are thus held equal and MZs are more similar than DZs on 
a given trait, that similarity must be due to genetic rather than environmental influences.  This 
“equal environments assumption” has been the source of some recent controversy (Alford, Funk, 
and Hibbing 2008; Beckwith and Morris 2008; Charney 2008; Hannagan and Hatemi 2008).  A 
key point of the equal environments assumption (EEA) is that it does not require that MZ and 
DZ twins have identical environmental experiences.  It is well established that MZ twins are 
more likely to be dressed alike or to share the same bedroom (Loehlin and Nichols 1976).  These 
violations of the EEA are only problematic if they lead to greater co-twin similarity on the trait 
of interest.  Thus far, no empirical evidence has been presented to suggest that EEA violations 
are problematic for political behavior, and the findings of twin studies have been buttressed by 
research that does not rely solely on twins (Hatemi et al. 2010).     
 The essential aim of the methods employed in twin studies is to take the variance of an 
observed trait and partition it into three latent (unobserved) variance components. These are all 
variance attributed to broad sense heritability (technically additive genetic effects or A), all non-
genetic variance that makes twins similar to each other (seen as the influence of common 
environments, or C), and all variance that makes twins dissimilar to each other (seen as the 
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influence of unique environmental experiences, this variance component also includes all error 
and is termed E). There are a number of methods that can be employed to achieve ACE variance 
partitioning, though the most commonly employed are structural equations models (SEM). In 
simple terms, a classic twin design SEM is just a set of equations with a set of known or assumed 
values (e.g. observed variance-covariances, the degree of genetic relationship between MZs and 
DZs) and a set of unknown values (the latent ACE terms). The known values are used to estimate 
the unknowns; mainstream approaches do this iteratively using maximum likelihood techniques 
that converge on the most probable ACE values given the known elements in the equations (for a 
comprehensive introduction to twin study methodology see Medland and Hatemi 2009).     
 Table 2.1 displays the bivariate correlations for personality traits between twins, divided 
into MZ and DZ pairs.  When the correlations of MZs are higher than the comparable correlation 
for DZs it provides preliminary evidence of genetic influence. Specific ACE estimates generated 
from the structural equations procedure described above, along with their associated confidence 
limits, are shown in the last three columns of Table 2.1.  Consistent with past research these 
results show that the shared environment does not play a significant role in shaping personality 
traits.  The heritable component is somewhat smaller in this data than I would expect from past 
research for two traits:  agreeableness (0.22) and conscientiousness (0.25).  However, the 
heritable components for both are still significant, and the heritable components for the other 
three Big Five traits are in line with past findings.  
 Shifting from personality traits to political behavior, this dataset contains a number of 
indicators of political participation.  As a measure of voting behavior, respondents were asked 
the following question:  “Think about all of the presidential elections since you were old enough 
to vote, have you voted in all of them, in most of them, in some of them, rarely voted in them, or 
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have you never voted in a presidential election.”  In addition to this question about voting, 
respondents were provided with a number of other participatory behaviors and asked if they had 
ever engaged in any of the activities listed.  The activities were:  attending a political meeting or 
rally; working in a political campaign in any capacity (including unpaid volunteer work); 
contributing money to a political party, candidate, or any other political cause; holding any 
government office (no matter how minor); or communicating thoughts or requests to a 
government official.  Each of these items was answered simply yes or no, but all of the items 
were also combined into a 0-5 participation scale (alpha=0.70). 
 Beyond these standard participation items the survey also included a question asking if 
the respondent was a member of any political groups such as Democratic or Republican clubs or 
a political interest group such as the Sierra Club or the National Rifle Association.  Respondents 
had three response options.  They could claim to be an active group member; a non-active group 
member or they could indicate that they were not a member of any political group.  The survey 
also included an item of identical (3-response option) format which asked about membership in 
community groups or clubs (such as hobby clubs, unions, fraternal organizations, neighborhood 
associations, or church groups).  Also included were items asking respondents to assess how 
often they discussed politics with others and how often they discussed politics with people who 
disagree with their views.  Both items provided four response options:  very often, somewhat 
often, not too often, or never. 
 Finally, I also examined measures of self-reported political interest and objective political 
knowledge.  While these are not strictly measures of political “behavior,” they are of interest to 
scholars of behavior and they have not been examined in twin designs, unlike measures of 
political attitudes and ideology.  The political interest item asks:  “How interested are you in 
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politics and public affairs?”  Respondents have four response options ranging from “very 
interested” to “not at all interested.”  The political knowledge scale is constructed from five 
civics questions asking who is responsible for deciding whether a law is constitutional, who is 
responsible for nominating judges to the federal court, which political party is more conservative 
at the national level, how much of a majority is needed in Congress to override a presidential 
veto, and what is the main duty of the U.S. Congress. 
 Table 2.2 compares the MZ and DZ correlations for all of the political measures just 
described.  Again, when correlations are higher for MZs compared to DZs it provides 
preliminary evidence of a genetic influence on the trait.  The last three columns of Table 2.2 
presents ACE estimates and associated confidence levels using the same structural equations 
approach described above.  The findings are fairly consistent.  For almost all of the measures 
examined genes account for between one third and one half of the variance, with the rest being 
attributable to unshared environment.  For all of the measures examined the variance attributable 
to common environment is substantively miniscule and statistically insignificant.  Of the five 
yes/no participation items, all have a significant heritable component of 0.46 to 0.54 except for 
attendance at a political rally which had an insignificant heritability estimate of 0.27.  The 
overall participation index has a heritability score of 0.44.  The highest heritability estimate 
among the other significant measures is political knowledge (0.52) and the lowest is frequency of 
political disagreement (0.26).  The only measures with insignificant heritable components 
(besides attendance at a politically meeting or rally) were the questions asking about membership 
in political and community groups.  Though these were insignificant, the heritability estimates 
for both were right in line with the other findings (estimates of 0.32 and 0.36 respectively). 
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 There are two key points to take away from the univariate results.  First, I find that a host 
of political dependent variables, including participation measures beyond voting, have significant 
heritable components.  Independent of my interest in personality these findings are important 
because they reinforce the point that traditional models of political attitudes and behaviors that 
are strictly environmental are missing a substantial source of variance (Alford, Funk, and 
Hibbing 2005; Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008).  The estimates from my data suggest that 
almost 40% of the variance in voting is accounted for by genes, with 44% of non-voting 
participation accounted for by genes.  Over half of the variance in political knowledge was 
accounted for by genetics.  Until very recently, our explanations of political behavior have 
attempted to explain political action exclusively environmental factors.  If we want our 
explanations to improve we must account for the 40-50% of the variance that we have 
traditionally ignored. 
 The second point to take away from these findings is that in addition to the political 
variables just discussed, the personality indicators also show significant genetic heritability.  This 
is in keeping with the extensive body of literature discussed above that found a sizable heritable 
component for personality traits.  Because both sets of variables are correlated, we can 
investigate whether the covariation between personality traits and political behavior can be 
explained in part by genetics.  Conceptually this is a logical extension of the classic twin design 
and its associated assumptions to more than one trait. A univariate analysis essentially tries to 
answer this question: How much of the observed variance in trait X is attributable to A, how 
much to C and how much to E? A multivariate analyis asks the same question about the 
covariance between two (or more) traits: How much of the observed covariance between trait X 
and trait Y is attributable to A, how much to C and how much to E? Thus if we think of a 
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standardized covariance measure between two variables—i.e. a simple correlation—the purpose 
of a multivariate analysis is to take that correlation and partition it into three parts representing 
A, C and E. A common approach to doing this is to employ a simple factor model within the 
structural equations framework to identify the common sources of covariance in two or more 
traits (this basic approach is called a Cholesky decomposition (see Medland and Hatemi 2009 for 
an in-depth description of the Cholesky decomposition).  If a significant heritable component is 
found, i.e. the proportion of covariance between two traits attributable to A is non-trivial and 
non-zero, it would provide evidence that the heritability of politics and the heritability of 
personality operate through common genetic pathways. 
 
Bivariate Models 
 My expectations for the bivariate ACE models are derived from past work on the links 
between personality traits and political participation.  From this work, my primary expectations 
revolve around openness to experience and extraversion.  Both of these traits have been 
consistently found to be significantly related to a variety of participatory behaviors.  Openness to 
experience is positively related to virtually all forms of political participation, as well as a 
number of other variables related to political information-seeking such as political interest and 
knowledge (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010).  Extraversion’s links to politics are somewhat 
more nuanced.  For the most part, extraversion has been found to be related to social forms of 
political engagement, but it has not been consistently associated with non-social forms of 
participation such as voting or putting up a political yard sign (Mondak et al. 2010).  Nor has 
extraversion been linked with political interest or knowledge (Mondak 2010).  For the remaining 
three Big 5 traits my expectations are mixed.  For most forms of political activity, 
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conscientiousness has negative signs (meaning conscientiousness is generally de-politicizing), 
and neuroticism has positive signs but these relationships are significant and insignificant in 
roughly equal proportion (Mondak et al. 2010).  It should also be added that some scholars have 
found neuroticism to be negatively related to political activity (Gerber et al. N.D.).  These 
ambiguous results suggest that I might not find much of a relationship between 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and political activity at the genetic level.  Finally, agreeableness 
consistently fails to produce any semblance of a relationship with any of the political dependent 
variables examined here.  As a consequence I have no expectations regarding agreeableness. 
 The results of the multivariate models are reported in Table 2.3.  The first column in 
Table 2.3 presents the bivariate correlations between each of the Big Five traits and the political 
variable.  If the correlation is significant then the subsequent columns present the standardized 
ACE decomposition of this covariance.  Table 2.3 is divided into four sections, with each 
corresponding to a political variable.  Table 2.3a decomposes the variance between the Big Five 
and voting behavior.  As expected, openness to experience has a large and highly significant 
correlation with voting.  The bivarate correlation between openness and voting is .10. The A 
estimate of .84 next to the correlation indicates that 84 percent of this covariance is attributable 
to common genetic influences. In other words the correlation between openness and voting due 
solely to genetic influences would be .084. The C estimate is negative—which makes 
mathematical but not substantive sense—thus the remaining source of covariance should be seen 
as E. Reducing to an AE model, i.e. treating C as zero has no impact on the model’s fit to the 
data. The results of the AE model in the first row of Table 2.3a estimate the proportion of the 
correlation between openness and voting due to A is .77 and to E .23 (i.e. the .10 correlation can 
be thought of as the product of a correlation of .077 due to genetic sources of covariance and a 
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correlation of .023 due to unique environmental sources of covariance and error). There is also 
an unexpected, but relatively modest significant correlation between voting and agreeableness 
for which I have no theoretical explanation.  The other Big Five traits are insignificant as 
expected.  Recall that voting, as a non-social form of political participation was not expected to 
be related to extraversion.  When the variance in Table 2.3a is decomposed, it is clear that the A 
(genetic) component is sizable for both openness to experience and agreeableness, with the 
shared environment having no impact whatsoever.   
 Next I consider the other political participation items.  Because of the properties of the 
Cholesky model, I focus on the participation scale with each of the individual dichotomous items 
combined.  These results are presented in Table 2.3b.  As expected, the two strongest 
correlations are for openness to experience and extraversion.  The bivariate correlation between 
openness and participation is 0.25, and the correlation between extraversion and participation is 
0.16.  Once again, the C component is negligible for both traits, meaning that an AE model is 
more appropriate than an ACE model.  The 0.25 correlation between openness and participation 
can be broken down into an additive genetic component of approximately 0.19 (0.25*0.77) and 
an unshared environmental component of 0.06 (0.25*0.24).  For extraversion the 0.16 bivariate 
correlation breaks down into a genetic contribution of 0.09 and an unshared environmental 
contribution of 0.07.  In addition to these two, neuroticism also is significantly related to political 
participation, with approximately 80% of the correlation traceable to genetics (0.079 from a 
correlation of 0.10).  As noted above, the existing evidence surrounding neuroticism has been 
somewhat mixed, which tempered my expectations somewhat, but this is not an unexpected 
finding by any means.  As with the voting results, the decomposition reveals a sizable heritable 
component and a miniscule and insignificant role for shared environment. 
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 Next I turn from measures of participation to some indicators of psychological 
engagement to politics.  Table 2.3c presents the results for political interest.  Here we see that 
openness to experience once again has the highest correlation, with a large extraversion 
correlation and a more modest correlation for neuroticism.  The strong extraversion result is 
somewhat surprising given that extraversion has not been linked with psychological engagement 
in past work.  In examining the decomposition, it is clear that neuroticism shows no significant 
heritable component.  Both extraversion and openness, on the other hand, have significant 
heritable components when we examine the AE model.  For almost all of the models studied, the 
AE model fits as well as the ACE, and therefore is the more appropriate choice.  The only 
exceptions are the voting behavior models in Table 2.3a, where the ACE is the more appropriate 
model.   
 Table 2.3d contains the results for political knowledge.  Here we see substantial 
correlations between knowledge and two traits:  openness to experience neuroticism.  The sizable 
correlation for openness to experience is expected, but the high correlation between neuroticism 
and political knowledge is not.  Past research has linked openness to experience and 
conscientiousness with knowledge, but no such relationship has been found for neuroticism 
(Mondak 2010).  Once again, both correlations show large and significant heritable components 
with no role for shared environment.     
 
Conclusion 
 Over the last few years, a stream of research has accumulated suggesting that a solely 
environmental account of political behavior is inadequate.  This work has demonstrated that 
political behavior has a strong genetic component (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008), but what 
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remains to be determined is how genes influence politics.  One popular speculation has been that 
genes may influence political behavior by influencing personality traits that are relevant to that 
behavior (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008; Mondak et al. 2010).  Though intuitively appealing, 
this expectation has not been investigated empirically.   
This chapter set out to address this shortcoming.  Using a new twin study focused on 
political behavior, I examined personality traits and political behavior in one genetically-
informative research design.  In doing so, I uncovered several important findings.  Before 
discussing those further, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of the present study.  
First, my data set provides unprecedented precision in the measurement of concepts relevant to 
political behavior, but it suffers from a relatively small sample size.  This limitation manifests 
itself most directly for the measures of personality traits.  Correlations between MZ and DZ 
twins are supposed to be significant.  Not surprisingly, in my data all of the MZ correlations are 
highly significant (p<0.001), but the DZ are somewhat more problematic.  The DZ correlation 
for agreeableness is not significant, and the DZ correlations for openness and conscientiousness 
are borderline (p<.10 and p<.07 respectively).  The lack of findings for agreeableness should not 
be taken as strong evidence of no relationship.  The quality of the data is such that no firm 
conclusion for this trait can be drawn. 
The second limitation of my study is that they are drawn from only one survey.  
Replication is an important part of any research agenda, and particularly so for twin studies, 
which are often specific to a narrower population (in this case twins in Minnesota).  There is no 
theoretical reason to think that the findings reported here are artifacts of the research context, but 
the possibility should be kept in mind.  Replication in this instance is difficult because this data is 
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unique in terms of the breadth of political content, but it will be important to obtain more 
politically rich twin surveys in the future. 
With those caveats noted, I can turn to a discussion of the findings of this study.  First, 
and most importantly, I found that a substantial portion of the correlation (usually over 50%) 
between personality traits and political behavior could be traced to genetics.  Personality traits 
play an important role in explaining political behavior and much of their explanatory power can 
be traced back to a common genetic source.  A second crucial finding was that shared 
environment played almost no role in the correlations between personality traits and political 
behavior.  Personality traits and political behavior are correlated, but this correlation is not the 
result of parents socializing their children to hold certain traits and behave in certain ways 
politically.  This finding fits nicely with past work which has found no significant role for shared 
environment in explaining variation in political participation or personality traits.  Political 
scientists have traditionally emphasized the importance of parental socialization, but we are 
finding increasing evidence to question this traditional framework. 
 As research on biology and politics has progressed, scholars have speculated that 
personality traits act as important mediators between genes and political behavior.  At the same 
time, scholars studying the links between personality and politics have noted that personality 
traits are largely rooted in genetics.  My results, which examine genetics, personality traits, and 
political behavior within the same research design, support both of these notions.  Our 
understanding of personality effects is enriched when those effects are considered as part of a 
theoretical framework that places genes, personality traits, and political behavior into a larger 
context.   
   44 
Chapter Three:  Personality and Political Discussion2
I now turn from an examination of the biological basis of politics, and the role of 
personality as a mediator between genes and political behavior, to an investigation of how 
personality traits interact with the environment.  Traditional political behavior research has long 
recognized the importance of environmental factors, but when we consider the environment 
without also taking into account the innate characteristics of the individual, we risk overlooking 
important individual-level variation.  A parallel lesson also applies to early work on personality 
and political behavior, which has generally considered the influence of personality traits 
generally, with little consideration of the environment.  Our traits influence our behavior by 
shaping how we respond to the environment around us.  Depending on their personalities, two 
individuals will react to the same environmental stimuli in different ways.  At the same time, 
depending on their personalities, those same two individuals are likely to select into different 
environments.  This ongoing and reciprocal interaction between people’s innate dispositions and 
their environmental circumstances represents a promising but understudied research area.  In this 
chapter, I seek to explore these relationships more fully by examining a research agenda that has 
been heavily focused on the influence of the environment.   
 
Most forms of political participation require a conscious decision to break from the 
routine of our everyday life to engage with the political world.  We choose to stop off at our 
polling place after work to cast a vote.  We go outside to pound a candidate’s sign into our yard.  
Or, we miss spending a Saturday afternoon at home to attend a political rally.  Most participation 
then can be seen as a series of deliberate choices about how much time to devote to political 
                                                 
2 Material from this chapter appears in Mondak, Jeffery J., Matthew V. Hibbing, Damarys Canache, Mitchell A. 
Seligson, and Mary R. Anderson. 2010. “Personality and Civic Engagement:  An Integrative Framework for the 
Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior.” American Political Science Review 104: 85-110 and Hibbing, Matthew 
V., Melinda Ritchie, and Mary R. Anderson. 2011. “Personality and Political Discussion.” Political Behavior, 
forthcoming. 
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matters, operating within a clearly defined context.  Consequently, most studies of political 
participation focus on the role played by the individual citizen in choosing whether to participate 
and how much time to spend on political matters. 
One important form of political participation does not seem to fit neatly into this view of 
atomized individual citizens making deliberate choices:  political discussion.  People’s political 
views are constrained by the information and ideas to which they are exposed through discussion 
with individuals in their social networks.  It is partly through political discourse that our political 
beliefs, values, and identities are molded and our ideas about current events are influenced.  
These conversations are held with our families, neighbors, co-workers, friends, and even casual 
acquaintances, and occur in the everyday settings of our lives.  Political discussion can reaffirm 
our original beliefs or cause us to question what we thought we knew.  Either way, talking 
politics with those in our social networks affects our ideas and behavior.  Scholarship in this area 
has shown that social communication matters for a wide array of other political phenomena such 
as attitude formation, electoral choice, other forms of participation, levels of political expertise, 
and tolerance.  Thus far, research on the underpinnings of political discussion has focused on 
social and contextual forces such as the nature and origin of the relationship between 
conversation partners (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2006; Walsh 2004), as well as 
features of the national political context (e.g., Anderson and Paskeviciute 2005; Gibson 2003; 
Iglic 2003; Mondak and Gearing 2003).   
Despite this clear evidence of contextual influences on patterns of discussion, I believe 
that too little attention has been devoted to individual-level factors beyond basic demographic 
considerations such as sex, age, education levels, income, and the like.  Where and with whom 
we discuss politics influences how we think and what we do, but perhaps a more fundamental 
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question is whether people’s introduction into these contextual situations and their responses to 
them differ based on the individual.  Specifically, I contend that psychological predispositions 
captured by individual personality traits play an important role in shaping the kinds of 
conversations citizens engage in, the setting for those conversations, and the influence discussion 
may or may not have on the individual.  It is my thesis that many of the social and contextual 
factors listed above are the result of the interplay between individual predispositions and the 
social context.  Individuals may be constrained by their social settings, but they can choose how 
to behave in the situations presented to them.  When a co-worker tries to start a political 
conversation over a current hot-button issue, one type of person might jump headlong into a 
heated argument; another might politely downplay any disagreement; while another might 
simply refuse to discuss controversial political matters. Individuals differ in their reactions to 
political discussions, and one reason they do so is based in their own personalities.  
 Establishing the connection between psychological predispositions and political 
discussion is important for several reasons.  First, given the many significant consequences of 
discussion, it is crucial that we develop a strong understanding of the antecedents of political 
conversations.  If personality traits affect where and with whom people talk about politics and 
the consequences of those discussions, we cannot simply think of the effects of discussion being 
universally accessed across the entire population.  Some people could be absorbing more from 
discussion than others, and this variation might be politically consequential.  Second, because 
political discussion is a social activity, and one constrained by other social influences, I see it as 
an especially rigorous test case for research on the political consequences of personality. If 
micro-level psychological differences are shown to matter for patterns in the most social of 
political activities, this should be viewed as highly promising regarding the prospects for 
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personality to influence more individualistic phenomena such as attitude formation, information 
acquisition, and the like. Third, by applying the Big Five personality framework in research on 
political discussion, I will generate evidence regarding the framework’s breadth. Much of the 
early work on five-factor personality models sought to explore the content of the factors 
themselves and to provide evidence on reliability and validity in measurement. Only recently 
have scholars begun conducting widespread assessments of the impact of the Big Five traits on 
human behavior. Hence, this effort may shed new light on the tangible value of five-factor 
approaches. 
In this chapter I build on recent research demonstrating the importance of personality 
traits for various aspects of political behavior.  This work has made use of the Big Five trait 
taxonomy (described further below) and I follow a similar approach.  Political discussion has not 
been a particular focus of this research, but several findings are of direct relevance to my 
examination of personality, political discussion, and social influence.  In the next section I will 
highlight those findings, and discuss some literature from outside of political science which has 
examined the role played by personality traits and other predispositions on social (but not 
necessarily political) interaction.  Next I will outline the empirical tests, present my expectations 
based on trait theory and the existing research that touches on traits and political discussion, and 
present the results of the analyses.  Finally, I will discuss the implications of these findings for 
research on political discussion. 
 
Psychological Predispositions and Social Interaction 
 Research on political discussion has generally focused on contextual factors.  This does 
not mean individual factors have not been considered at all, but when they have, inquiry 
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typically has centered on the importance of demographic characteristics.  Huckfeldt and Sprague 
(1995) address the ways that individuals tend to discuss politics with people who resemble 
themselves, and how men and women differ in the kinds of discussion networks they create.  
Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) demonstrate that income, education, age, and race are all significant 
predictors of the size of a respondent’s political discussion network, and that wealthier and more 
educated individuals are more likely to have higher levels of political expertise within their 
networks.  There is also a substantial body of research on the influence of demographic variables 
on network characteristics outside of political science (see Roberts et al. 2009).  These studies 
demonstrate that scholars of social influence recognize the importance of individual factors.  
However, this research has not generally accounted for psychological predispositions such as 
personality traits.  This is understandable considering that personality traits have only made their 
way into most other aspects of political behavior research within the last three or four years. 
 Outside of political science, research on social influence has taken personality traits and 
other psychological predispositions into account more often, but certainly not with regularity.  
Mehra et al. (2001) note that social networks research rarely includes psychological factors, and 
then proceed to analyze the role of self-monitoring (a psychological construct relating to how 
much people respond to social cues) in network behavior in the workplace.  They find that high 
self-monitors are more likely to build relationships that cross group lines.  Swickert et al. (2002) 
find that among a sample of undergraduates, extraverts are more likely to have larger social 
networks and more contact with those networks.  Kalish and Robins (2006) find effects for both 
extraversion and emotional stability on the structure and closeness of networks.  Klein et al. 
(2004) examine how personality traits influence the role people play in their social networks.  
They find that individuals who are high in emotional stability are more likely to occupy a central 
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role in their networks.  Finally, Roberts et al. (2008) find that extraversion is positively related to 
the size of an individual’s most intimate social contacts (the “support clique” in their 
terminology), but they find that this effect disappears when respondent age is taken into account. 
 Within the last few years, political science studies have started to incorporate personality 
traits into the study of political behavior.  These studies have included variables that are pertinent 
to research on political discussion, but they have generally not been explicitly focused on 
discussion.  The one exception is a study by Klofstad (2009) which seeks to determine if political 
discussion leads to civic engagement or if it is just a biproduct of that engagement.  Using a 
quasi-experimental design, Klofstad is able to show that political discussion does have a positive 
effect on civic engagement in his undergraduate sample.  Most importantly for my purposes, 
Klofstad attempts to account for psychological predisposition to participate as measured by 
political interest prior to arrival at college.  This is obviously not a personality measure, but it 
represents an attempt to incorporate psychological predispositions into a model of political 
discussion.  Not surprisingly, Klofstad found that the positive effect of political discussion on 
participation was weaker among those individuals who were predisposed against civic 
engagement. 
 I now turn to the recent research that directly examines the influence of Big Five traits on 
political discussion.  Mondak and Halperin (2008) examine the possible effects of personality 
traits on a host of political attitudes and behaviors.  Included in this broad examination were 
variables on the number of days in the past week the respondent had discussed politics 
(measured across two different surveys) and measures of national and local political discussion 
frequency (measured on a four-point scale from 0=never to 3=very often).  Their results show 
that openness to experience and extraversion are both positively related to political discussion for 
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three of the four survey indicators.  Conscientiousness also seems to be related to political 
discussion with a significant positive effect for two of the four indicators.  Both agreeableness 
and emotional stability have consistently negative coefficients for all four discussion indicators, 
but only one reaches significance for each, so conclusions for those two traits should be made 
with caution. 
 In this chapter I build upon this burgeoning literature with several contributions.  First, I 
examine the role played by personality traits on basic features of discussion, such as the size of 
respondents’ social networks and respondents’ willingness to try and convince others to vote for 
or against a particular candidate.  I also investigate the frequency of political discussion broken 
down by the setting for that discussion.  Specifically, I examine how much people talk about 
local politics with their families, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and members of their clubs and 
churches.  Past research demonstrates that social interaction at church can play an important role 
in shaping the political attitudes of church members (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Huckfeldt, 
Plutzer, and Sprague 1993), that neighborhood conversations can be an important source of 
information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Grober and Schram 2006; Walsh 2004), and that 
workplaces are unique in their potential for exposing citizens to disagreement (Mutz and 
Mondak 2006).  Clearly, the setting in which discussion occurs can be important for the kinds of 
behavioral outcomes discussion can engender, and it is possible that personality traits influence 
the settings where citizens choose to engage in political discussions. 
 The second contribution is to examine the influence of personality on the nature of 
citizens’ relationships with their discussion partners.  The form of relationship linking 
discussants has been found to have a significant impact on the type of information that is 
transmitted by discussion.  In classifying individuals’ interpersonal contacts, a common tactic in 
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the literature entails distinction between close friends or relatives and more casual acquaintances.  
Discussions with more casual acquaintances are thought to be more beneficial because they are 
associated with such interrelated phenomena as the improved diffusion of information 
(Granovetter 1973), the presence of bridging forms of social capital (Putnam 2000), and 
exposure to disagreement in social communication (Mutz 2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006).  The 
closer and more insulated a person’s discussion network is, the less likely the individual is to be 
exposed to novel information (Huckfeldt et al. 1995). Little is known regarding any possible 
systematic tendencies of the individual to seek to confine political discussion to close ties, a 
situation that prompts me to consider whether the nature of the relationships between 
respondents and their discussion partners vary with personality. 
Next, I investigate how respondents’ personality traits influence their exposure to 
disagreement in social communication.  A chief attribute of political discussion is its capacity to 
expose participants to new information and differing points of view.  Conversations with like-
minded others may offer a person reassurance and support, but such conversations do nothing to 
broaden the person’s perspectives.  In contrast, when political discussion crosses lines of 
difference, it brings the potential to foster beneficial effects such as political tolerance and the 
awareness of the rationales underlying opposing viewpoints (e.g., Mutz 2006; Mutz and Mondak 
2006). 
 Finally, I examine the influence discussion partners have on respondents to see whether 
this influence could be enhanced or inhibited by the personality traits of the respondent.  There is 
ample evidence to suggest that citizens are influenced by the people with whom they discuss 
politics.  These tangible consequences of discussion represent one of the major reasons why the 
study of political discussion has flourished so much over the last thirty years.  Huckfeldt and 
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Sprague (1991) found that the political preferences of discussants influenced respondent vote 
choice, even when partisanship and demographic characteristics of the respondent were 
accounted for.  When this finding is combined with the inherent heterogeneity of most political 
contexts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987) it makes a powerful case for the persuasive influence of 
political discussion.  I test to see whether personality traits play a role in determining how 
influential discussion can be. 
 
Data and Personality Measures 
 In this chapter, I draw on data from two surveys that included ten-item Big Five batteries, 
a community survey fielded in 2004 and a national survey administered in 2006.  The 
community survey was conducted within a single medium-sized metropolitan area in late 2004. 
Interviews were completed by 822 respondents. Most of the items on the survey concerned the 
topic of sense of community, along with corresponding measures of respondents’ levels of 
involvement in various social and political settings in the local area.  A number of general 
questions regarding patterns of political discussion were included, along with a battery regarding 
the one individual with whom each respondent most often discusses local political matters.  I 
make use of both types of discussion items below. 
The national survey I use is the 2006 Congressional Elections Study (CES), administered 
at Indiana University (for further discussion of these data, see Mitchell and Mondak 2009).  The 
survey was designed with primary focus on the 2006 midterm elections. There were 1,023 
interviews completed before the November elections, with 766 of these respondents 
reinterviewed after Election Day and an additional 400 respondents interviewed in a 
supplemental post-election survey.  Respondents are drawn from 155 congressional districts, 
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with districts including a mix of some that were selected randomly and some that were 
determined to be either open seats or competitive contests.3
 On both surveys, respondents were asked to rate themselves on ten bipolar personality 
items. On the national survey, for instance, interviewers read this introduction to respondents: 
  The post-election instrument 
included a brief discussant generator that asked respondents to identify up to four political 
discussion partners, along with information regarding how each discussant voted in the 2006 
House election.  The ten-item personality battery also was included on the post-election 
instrument.  
The following section contains pairs of words. On a scale of zero to ten, please tell us 
which word best describes you. For example, the number zero means “relaxed,” the 
number ten means “tense,” and the number five is exactly in the middle—neither relaxed 
nor tense. On this scale, what number best describes you? You can use any number from 
zero to ten. 
 
A very similar introduction was employed on the 2004 survey. On both surveys, subsequent 
items were asked in quick succession, with interviewers saying, for example, “next, zero is kind 
and ten is unkind.” 
 Because some trait items are susceptible to social desirability biases, with people tending 
to view themselves as kind, responsible, open-minded, etc., I erred on the side of caution and 
used a logarithmic transformation in the construction of all final scales as a means to minimize 
the possible impact of skewed distributions on individual items, and to maximize comparability 
across the trait measures.  Specifically, each item initially was recoded so that a value of one 
represents the highest possible value on the trait in question.  These recoded variables then were 
logged.  Final trait scales were constructed by averaging the logged indicators for the two items 
asked for each trait, and then recoding the resulting values to range from zero (lowest observed 
                                                 
3 Roughly half of respondents were drawn via the random sample and half via the oversample of competitive 
districts. In analyses using these data, the data are weighted to recapture the properties of a national probability 
sample.  
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value) to one (highest observed value).  Data on the item pairs and resulting Big Five measures 
are depicted in Table 3.14
 
.   
The Context of Discussion 
 The first empirical question I address is a simple one:  Is the size of a person’s political 
discussion network influenced by the individual’s personality traits?  As discussed earlier, past 
research (Swickert et al. 2002) has demonstrated that, unsurprisingly, more extraverted 
individuals have larger social networks.  In addition to this positive extraversion effect, I expect 
openness to be positively related to political discussion network size, in large part because 
openness has been associated with information seeking and incidental exposure to information 
(Heinstrom 2003).  I have weaker expectations for the other three traits.  All three have generally 
had negative effects on political behavior (Mondak and Halperin 2008), so if they show effects 
on discussion network size, it is most likely that those effects will be negative. 
 The 2006 national survey contains a discussant name-generator that allows respondents 
to identify up to four people with whom they discuss politics.  This measure of discussion 
network size (0 to 4 discussion partners) is the dependent variable in an ordered logistic 
regression model presented in the first column of Table 3.2.  In this model and all of the others 
that follow, I include four basic control variables:  age (Mean=55.66, SD=15.47), race 
                                                 
4 Note that the number of cases on the community survey always equals 822, which is the number of respondents on 
this survey. In working on the present study, I discovered that due to a combination of coding and software errors on 
the part of the company contracted to conduct this survey, I am not able to identify and exclude missing cases on the 
Big Five items. Interviewers used specific key strokes to indicate “don’t know” and “refuse” responses, but these 
responses were coded to have values of 8 and 9, respectively, which also are valid values on the 0 to 10 personality 
scales. The survey company was able to report to us how many “don’t know” and “refuse” responses there were for 
each item, but, despite repeated attempts, it was not able to recode these cases so that they could be differentiated 
from cases with substantive responses of 8 or 9. For the ten individual personality items, there are between four and 
eighteen “don’t know” and “refuse” responses, with a mean of 9.9, among the 822 respondents. Thus, I know the 
actual average “don’t know” and “refuse” rate to be 1.2 percent. I have no definitive means to identify and remove 
these cases, and thus my analyses are hampered by the slight decreases in reliability that accompany treating all 
answers of “8” and “9” as genuine substantive replies. 
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(1=African American), gender (1=female), and education (a scale ranging from 1 to 8; 
Mean=4.70, SD=1.92).  I find that more educated respondents have larger political discussion 
networks and that African Americans have somewhat smaller networks than respondents of other 
races.  Turning to personality traits, I find that openness to experience and extraversion are both 
strongly associated with larger discussion networks exactly as expected, and that emotional 
stability is inversely related to network size.  These findings comport with past research (e.g. 
Mondak and Halperin 2008) which shows that openness and extraversion are positively related 
to most political activity.  
 The 2006 data also includes an item asking if respondents have tried to convince other 
people to vote for or against a candidate (1=yes).  This is an interesting item because it allows 
me to investigate how personality traits are related to a willingness to influence others.  I predict 
that openness and extraversion will be positively related to trying to influence others, while I 
expect emotional stability and agreeableness to be negatively associated with attempts to 
influence other.  Individuals with high levels of emotional stability are likely to be comfortable 
with disagreement and thus not feel the need to try and persuade others, while agreeable people 
will not attempt to convince others of their position because such conversations naturally come 
with a certain amount of conflict.  The results of the binomial logistic regression model are in the 
second column of Table 3.2.  Openness to experience has a remarkably large effect on a person’s 
willingness to try and convince another person to vote for or against a candidate.  Emotional 
stability has a significant negative effect, but the expected negative agreeableness effect is not 
apparent.  Surprisingly, extraversion is not significantly related to trying to influence the vote of 
others, although the coefficient is in the expected direction (p<0.18).           
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Next, I turn my attention to the influence of personality traits on the setting for 
discussion.  The 2004 community survey includes items asking respondents to assess the 
frequency of their discussions of local politics in six different settings.  These settings are:  at 
church, in their neighborhood, in the workplace, with family, with friends, and with members of 
clubs or other associations.  For each item, respondents answer on a four point scale ranging 
from zero, indicating that they never discuss local politics in that setting, to 3 if they discuss 
local politics in that setting “very often.”  Past research demonstrates that political discussions in 
these contexts differ in several ways, including their propensity to expose citizens to 
disagreement.  The workplace is particularly notable for fostering disagreement in conversation 
(Mutz and Mondak 2006); conversation with friends and neighbors and is also more likely to 
expose people to disagreement than discussions in places of worship, clubs or within families 
(Mutz 2006, 28).  These features help to guide my expectations regarding personality traits and 
frequency of discussion across contexts.  First, we know from past research (Mondak and 
Halperin 2008) that extraversion and openness to experience are generally associated with more 
frequent political talk, and I demonstrated earlier in the chapter that those traits are also 
associated with larger discussion networks.  I do not have strong expectations that these traits 
will predispose citizens to strongly favor one discussion context over another.  It seems likely 
that extraversion could predispose individuals to be particularly active in more formal settings 
where their natural sociability helps them to overcome institutional constraints.  As a 
consequence I expect extraversion to be associated with discussion at work, at church, and in 
clubs and associations.  Openness to experience has been linked to both incidental information 
exposure and the expenditure of effort in information seeking (Heinstrom 2003).  Therefore, I 
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expect openness to be particularly important for discussions in contexts that foster disagreement 
such as the workplace and among friends. 
 Predictions regarding conscientiousness are complicated by the somewhat mixed 
empirical record.  On the one hand, this trait dimension has been found to be generally associated 
with lower levels of political participation (Mondak and Halperin 2008).  However, these effects 
have generally not been significant when considering political discussion, and there is some 
evidence to suggest that conscientiousness may be positively associated with frequency of local 
political discussion (Mondak and Halperin 2008).  Consequently, I expect conscientiousness to 
be positively linked with discussion of local politics in those contexts that are most likely to be 
directly affected by local issues.  Specifically, I expect more conscientious individuals to discuss 
local politics more frequently with their neighbors, in church, and with members of their clubs 
and associations.  Finally, I have fewer expectations for the remaining traits, emotional stability 
and agreeableness.  There is little in the empirical record to lead me to any strong conclusions, 
although intuition might lead me to expect agreeableness to be negatively associated with 
discussion in contexts that foster disagreement such as among friends and in the workplace. 
 Table 3.3 presents ordered logistic regression models for each of the six contexts.  As 
discussed above, the dependent variable in each of these models is a four point scale measuring 
how frequently the respondent discusses local politics in that context.  For each context Table 3.3 
contains two models, and I begin the discussion of these results with a focus on the odd-
numbered columns.  Similar to the earlier models, controls are included for respondent age 
(Mean=46.09, SD=17.37), education (measured on a seven-point scale; Mean=3.69, SD=1.89), 
sex (1=female), and race (1=black).  Age is associated with more frequent discussion with 
family, in the neighborhood, and at work.  African Americans discuss local politics more 
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frequently in their clubs and associations, at work, and especially in their churches and places of 
worship.  There does not appear to be a relationship between gender and discussion context 
except for the marginally significant (p<.07) finding that women discuss politics less frequently 
at work than do men.  And perhaps surprisingly, education is not consistently related to more 
frequent political discussion.  More educated individuals discuss politics more frequently only at 
work and in their clubs and associations. 
 Turning to the Big Five, I find that conscientiousness affects frequency of discussion in 
the expected manner.  Conscientious individuals discuss politics more frequently in their 
neighborhoods and clubs.  I also find that higher conscientiousness is associated with more 
frequent discussion with family members.  Though this was not one of my hypotheses, it is not 
difficult to imagine that conscientious people would be more inclined to discuss issues of local 
importance with their families.  Extraversion also influences discussion patterns in the manner I 
expected, with all positive coefficients and significant effects for the most formal settings:  clubs, 
churches, and the workplace.  In these contexts, the outgoing nature of the extravert helps 
overcome institutional constraints that might discourage political discussion.  Openness to 
experience is significantly related to discussing politics with friends, but not with any other 
contexts.  I expected this relationship, but I also thought openness might be related to workplace 
discussion because those conversations are most likely to foster disagreement.  My weakest 
expectations were for agreeableness and emotional stability, and not surprisingly, those two traits 
are not significantly related to discussion in any of the six contexts I examine. 
 One potential concern with these results is that personality traits might be influencing a 
general tendency to discuss politics regardless of context.  Past research demonstrates that 
openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion have been found to positively 
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influence general patterns of discussion.  While some may argue that there is no reason to 
examine discussion on a context by context basis, I contend the opposite is the case.  It is 
important to establish that trait effects matter over and above a general tendency to talk politics 
and that individuals approach contexts differently, thus the extent to which trait effects matter 
will be influenced by the context. To pursue this matter, I replicate the six context models, but 
this time including a variable that captures how frequently the respondent discusses politics 
generally (coded on the same four-point scale as the dependent variables).  These models are 
reported in the even numbered columns of Table 3.2.  The first thing to notice when examining 
these models is that general frequency of political discussion is a large and highly significant 
predictor of discussion within each distinct context.  This makes sense given that, regardless of 
context, one would expect a general tendency to talk about politics to be important.  For my 
purposes, the most important thing to note is that, for the most part, the personality effects 
remain even when general discussion is included as a control.  This is particularly true for 
conscientiousness which is again positively related to discussion with family and neighbors.  The 
conscientiousness effect for discussion with club members is strengthened, and with general 
discussion included, there is evidence of a marginally significant (p<.07) positive effect for 
discussions in church.  In contrast with conscientiousness, when general discussion is included 
the effect of openness to experience on discussion with friends vanishes and the extraversion 
effects are all diminished.  The significant links between extraversion and discussions at work 
and with friends drop to insignificance.  However, it should be noted that even with the 
diminishing of the effects, significant relationships remain for discussion in clubs (p<.01) and 
church (p<.06). 
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 Taken together, these results make sense.  Openness to experience and extraversion are 
both strongly related to a general tendency to discuss politics (Mondak and Halperin 2008).  
Naturally, the context-specific effects will diminish when general discussion is included as a 
control.  Even accounting for general discussion, extraversion produces significant positive 
effects on frequency of discussion in formal settings such as in clubs and at church, and 
conscientiousness is a significant predictor of discussion in four of the six contexts. 
 In order to provide a sense of the magnitude of these personality effects, I calculate 
predicted probabilities for the conscientiousness and extraversion effects on frequency of 
discussion in clubs and other associations (model 8 in Table 3.2).  I do this by varying each trait 
from zero to one while holding all other values constant (non-black female of average age and 
education).  The predicted probability of a respondent discussing politics either somewhat or 
very often (the top two values on the scale) rises fifteen points, from 0.41 to 0.56, as 
conscientiousness goes from zero to one.  The probability rises 21 points, 0.39 to 0.60, when 
comparing an extreme introvert to an extreme extravert.  Clearly, these results demonstrate that 
variation in personality traits can have a substantial impact on frequency of discussion across a 
range of contexts. 
 
The Respondent-Discussant Relationship 
 Up to this point, my analysis has been centered on respondents’ general discussion habits.  
For the remaining investigations I will focus on the individual with whom the respondent most 
commonly discusses politics.  The community survey prompts consideration of this person by 
stating the following:   
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Of all the people you discuss these local issues with, think about the one whom you have 
discussed these with the most.  We are going to refer to this person as your discussion 
partner for the set of questions that follow.   
 
After this prompt, the respondents answer a series of questions on the nature of their 
relationships with their discussion partner and their discussants’ political views.  These questions 
are the basis for the analyses that follow.       
The survey asks respondents to characterize the nature of their relationship with their 
discussion partner.  For my purposes, those respondents who talk politics most frequently with a 
family member or a “close friend” are classified as having an intimate tie.  Approximately 68 
percent of respondents named an intimate tie as their discussion partner.  Those respondents who 
characterized their discussion partner as “just a friend,” or “just someone they came in contact 
with” were classified as discussing politics with a casual tie.  Approximately 21 percent of 
respondents have a casual tie, with the remaining 11 percent not naming a discussion partner at 
all.  In examining these data, I retain all three categories by estimating a model via multinomial 
logistic regression, with “casual tie” functioning as the contrast category.  Plausible effects can 
be foreseen for several of the Big Five traits.  First, individuals with low scores on emotional 
stability typically have a heightened psychological need for social reassurance, and thus they 
should be relatively likely to seek out conversations with close relations who are unlikely to 
challenge their views.  Respondents scoring high in agreeableness and conscientiousness also are 
predicted to avoid political discussion with casual acquaintances. Introverts also are expected to 
limit conversations to close associates. 
Coefficient estimates for the full multinomial logistic model are displayed in the first two 
columns of Table 3.4.  The first column contrasts having no discussant versus discussing politics 
with a casual acquaintance.  Here, we see that none of the personality variables is significant, 
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although agreeableness comes the closest (p<.12), with an effect as expected.  Educated 
individuals and African Americans are more likely to discuss politics with a casual tie.  The 
second column, contrasting discussing politics with a casual tie versus an intimate one, provides 
support for one of my hypotheses.  Emotionally stable people are more likely to name a casual 
acquaintance as their discussion partner.  Once again, I speculate that this finding is driven by 
emotionally stable individuals’ levels of self-confidence.  Political discussions with casual ties 
are likely to lead to disagreement, but respondents scoring high in emotional stability appear to 
be comfortable enough with their own views to have such conversations. 
To test this line of thinking further, I carry out a follow-up analysis.  The survey asks 
respondents to estimate the level of congruence between their own views and those of their 
discussion partner on a three-point scale ranging from zero (respondent and discussant’s views 
are “much the same”) to two (respondent and discussant hold “very different” views).  An 
ordered logistic model with this dependent variable is presented in the third column of Table 3.4.  
If my view of emotional stability is correct, high scores for that trait should be associated with a 
larger disparity between respondents’ views and the views of their discussion partners.  
Examining the results, this is exactly what I find.  The strong positive emotional stability effect 
indicates that respondents with higher emotional stability scores were more likely to have a 
discussion partner with different political views.  To demonstrate the substantive significance of 
this effect I calculate the predicted probability that a respondent would have a discussion partner 
with views that were either “somewhat different” from the respondent or “very different” (62 
percent of respondents discuss politics with someone whose views are “much the same”).  With 
all other variables held constant as before, the probability of discussing politics with someone 
who holds different views rises from 0.26 to 0.45 as emotional stability rises from zero to one.  
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There is also a moderately significant (p<.08) negative relationship between openness to 
experience and discussant disagreement, suggesting that individuals high in openness are good at 
self-selecting into discussions with likeminded individuals.  But the real story from these results 
is the sizable emotional stability effect.  The natural tendency of most people is to discuss 
politics with close friends and relatives who generally agree with them.  Emotional stability 
plays an important role in overcoming this tendency and exposing those individuals who possess 
the trait to novel and divergent views. 
 
Exposure to Disagreement 
A chief attribute of political discussion is its capacity to expose participants to new 
information and differing points of view.  Conversations with like-minded others may offer a 
person reassurance and support, but such conversations do nothing to broaden the person’s 
perspectives.  In contrast, when political discussion crosses lines of difference, it brings the 
potential to foster beneficial effects such as political tolerance and the awareness of the rationales 
underlying opposing viewpoints (e.g., Mutz 2006; Mutz and Mondak 2006). 
Much of the research on political discussion in recent years has examined communication 
that yields exposure to disagreement (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague 2004; McClurg 
2006; Mutz 2006).  These works have excelled in documenting the effects, mostly positive, of 
cross-cutting political discourse, and they also have shed light on the social and contextual 
factors that give rise to such conversations.  We know, for instance, that weak ties and 
discussants met via contexts such as the workplace are more likely to expose a person to 
different points of view than are strong ties and discussants drawn from contexts such as the 
church or the voluntary association (Mutz 2006).  Likewise, we know that there is an 
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interdependence linking the members of a given individual’s network such that the presence of 
like-minded discussants facilitates the retention of non-like-minded discussion partners within 
the network (Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague 2004). 
One point of dispute in this literature concerns the impact of network size.  As networks 
grow, the likelihood that they will include at least one person with a differing point of view rises 
(Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague 2004), but it also appears that aggregate homogeneity increases 
as networks expand (Mutz 2006).  Here, I again suspect that personality may be relevant.  Strong 
personality effects were observed above for network size, suggesting the presence of indirect 
effects on exposure to disagreement.  Building on this logic, I propose that the impact of network 
size on a person’s exposure to disagreement may be conditional on personality.  The key point is 
this: as network size increases, any tendency toward homogeneity or heterogeneity should not be 
assumed to be constant for all individuals.  Instead, I posit that the person’s enduring 
psychological tendencies may predispose the person to prefer homogeneity within the network, 
or to accept heterogeneity. 
For the moment, I treat network size as an environmental factor fully exogenous to 
individual choice.  I know from findings earlier in the chapter that this assumption is at least 
partly incorrect.  Table 3.2 shows that several of the Big Five traits influence network size.  
However, environmental forces obviously also play an important role in shaping an individual’s 
network.  What is important for my present purpose is that, however a network came to be of a 
given size, the impact of that network on exposure to disagreement may be contingent on 
personality. 
On the 2006 survey, respondents were asked to indicate which way their discussion 
partners had voted in the local U.S. House race.  I operationalize exposure to disagreement 
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within the network with a dummy variable coded 1 if at least one of the respondent’s discussion 
partners cast a House vote at odds with the respondent’s partisan affiliation, and 0 if otherwise.5
In Table 3.5 I report the results of two binomial logistic regression models.  In the first, 
personality is omitted.  Noteworthy effects are observed for strength of partisanship and network 
size.  Specifically, strong partisans exhibit homogeneity in their discussion networks, but, as 
 
With the analysis limited to the more than five hundred post-election respondents who named at 
least one discussant, a score of 1 is recorded in just over 41 percent of cases. The chief 
independent variable is network size, one of the dependent variables from Table 3.2.  Four of the 
Big Five variables stand as strong candidates to moderate the impact of network size on exposure 
to disagreement.  First, the rigidity of thought associated with conscientiousness suggests that 
individuals scoring high on this trait will strive to maintain homogeneity irrespective of network 
size.  Second, the free-wheeling sociability of the extravert supports the hypothesis that 
extraverts will be relatively undiscriminating in their political conversations, in which case larger 
networks should magnify the odds of exposure to disagreement.  Third, because people high in 
agreeableness tend to avoid conflict, I predict that the agreeable will surround themselves with 
like-minded discussion partners.  Conversely, exposure to disagreement should be less 
disconcerting for individuals who are themselves disagreeable.  Lastly, owing to their minimal 
need for social acceptance, I expect that individuals with high levels of emotional stability will 
tend to have heterogeneous discussion networks. 
                                                 
5 Exposure to disagreement occurs under this operationalization if a respondent who is a Democrat (or leans toward 
the Democrats) has at least one discussion partner who voted Republican in a 2006 House race, or if a respondent 
who is a Republican (or leans toward the Republicans) has at least one discussion partner who voted Democratic in a 
2006 House race.  For discussants, I only have vote data for the House vote, not partisanship.  I opted to use 
partisanship rather than the House vote as my indicator for the respondents to avoid two shortcomings associated 
with use of the vote.  First, many respondents did not vote.  I lose 21 cases because respondents who are pure 
independents are omitted from my model, but more would have been lost had I excluded nonvoters.  Second, by 
focusing on partisanship rather than vote choice among the respondents, I avoid uncertainty regarding whether 
respondents and discussants live in the same congressional districts—a point for which data are unavailable. 
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expected, the likelihood of exposure to diversity increases with network size.  The second model 
in Table 3.5 adds the Big Five indicators, along with interactions between the Big Five and 
network size.  Apart from the null findings for emotional stability, results are consistent with my 
expectations.  A negative coefficient emerges for the interaction between conscientiousness and 
network size, although the effect falls short of statistical significance (p < .12).  However, a 
significant positive interaction is observed for extraversion, along with a significant negative 
interaction for agreeableness.  The likelihood of exposure to cross-cutting views may increase 
with network size, but the magnitude of this effect hinges on the individual’s personality traits. 
Predicted probabilities derived from the extraversion and agreeableness interactions are 
depicted in Figure 3.1.  The two patterns bear a strong resemblance to one another.  First, the 
positive effect of network size on exposure to differing political preferences is quite modest for 
introverts (a 10-point swing as network size increases from one to four) and for individuals 
scoring high in agreeableness (a 9-point swing).  But second, much more dramatic effects are 
seen for extraverts and those with low marks on agreeableness, with a 50-point swing found for 
the former and a 58-point swing for the latter.  The link between network size and exposure to 
disagreement represents more than the occurrence of a simple stochastic process.  By their 
nature, some people are accepting of exposure to differing political views, whereas other people 
seek to surround themselves with like-minded conversation partners.  Consequently, the extent to 
which an expansion in the size of a person’s political discussion network translates into a higher 
probability of exposure to disagreement depends to a substantial extent on the individual’s 
personality. 
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The Influence of Discussion Partners 
 Thus far, I have established that personality traits play a role in influencing where people 
discuss politics and with whom they converse.  For my final empirical step, I consider the 
possibility that the influence of political discussion is contingent on personality traits.  If traits 
can affect the kinds of political discussions we have, it is reasonable to expect that traits might 
also help to determine who is most responsive to information and argumentation provided by a 
discussion partner.  The hypothesis for which I expect the strongest results posits that individuals 
high in openness to experience will be more influenced by political discussion.  People who are 
very open to experience are more receptive to new information and ideas (Heinstrom 2003) and 
would therefore be more likely to reassess their own original political ideas in the face of 
divergent views.  Extraverts value social interaction and have been described as “loyal 
followers” (Winter 2003).  Because of these characteristics I expect those who score high on 
extraversion to be more likely to be influenced by political discussion.  I have a similar 
expectation for agreeableness.  Agreeable individuals are uncomfortable with conflict and 
therefore might feel compelled to bring their views into alignment with those of their discussion 
partner.  Finally, I expect that individuals who are high in emotional stability will be resistant to 
the influence of political discussion.  I have already demonstrated that emotionally stable people 
are comfortable discussing politics with people who hold different views, and it seems plausible 
that they would be similarly comfortable maintaining their views in face of disagreement. 
 To test these hypotheses I model respondents’ approval of President Bush using the 2004 
community survey.  The dependent variables is a four-point scale ranging from zero (“strongly 
disapprove”) to three (“strongly approve”), so once again I use ordered logistic regression.  I first 
present a baseline model which excludes personality traits.  This model includes the four control 
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variables used in earlier models (age, sex, race, and education) as well as the respondents’ 
partisanship, ideology, and trust in others.  The baseline model also includes a dummy variable 
for whether the respondent names a discussion partner (1=no named discussant) and a summary 
of the respondents’ assessment of the political preferences of their discussion partner constructed 
from two items, discussant partisanship and discussant Bush approval. This variable is coded -2 
(discussant is a Democrat who disapproves of Bush) to 2 (discussant is a Republican who 
approves of Bush). The results of this model are displayed in the first column of Table 3.6.  Not 
surprisingly, the respondents’ party identification is the most important predictor of approval of 
President Bush, with ideology also serving as an important influence.  The political views of the 
discussant are comparable to ideology in their influence on respondent approval of President 
Bush.  Social influence does seem to be at work in the data. 
 Next I expand this baseline model by including personality traits.  I include the five traits, 
as well as interactions between each of the traits and the discussant-views variable.  If an 
interaction term is significant it indicates that the influence of a discussant is contingent on the 
respondent possessing that particular personality trait.  The results make up the second column of 
Table 3.6.  Contrary to my expectations, I find no evidence that discussant influence is 
conditional on extraversion, agreeableness, or emotional stability.  However, I do find a 
substantial support for the hypothesis which states that openness to experience is significantly 
related to discussant influence.  To illustrate the effect, I use the model to predict respondents’ 
approval of President Bush as a function of their openness and the views of their discussion 
partner.  The results are presented in the first panel of Figure 3.2.  The dependent variable 
(respondents’ approval of President Bush) is represented along the y-axis.  The x-axis represents 
the discussants’ political views, with higher scores indicating greater sympathy for President 
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Bush (discussant as more Republican and more approving of President Bush).  The two lines 
represent the maximum and minimum levels of openness to experience.  All other variables, 
including the respondents’ party identification, are held constant.  As discussant favorability 
toward President Bush rises, a low-openness individual’s Bush approval rises 50 points, from 
0.22 to 0.72.  Conversely, Bush approval rises fifty percent more steeply, from 0.09 to 0.84, for 
respondents receiving the maximum score on openness to experience.  
 Finally, I replicated the models just described with data from the 2006 national survey.  
Just as I did in my analysis of the community survey I utilize a four-point measure of presidential 
approval.  The measure of discussant views is different, because the community survey only 
asked about one discussion partner while the national survey allowed respondents to name up to 
four.  For the national data I constructed the discussant views measure by using the respondent’s 
belief about the partisanship of his or her discussion partners.  Each Republican discussant added 
one point to a respondent’s score, while a Democratic partner subtracted a point.  For example, if 
a respondent said she had two Democratic discussants and two Republican discussants she would 
receive a score of zero. The possible combined score ranges from negative four to positive four.  
In the analysis I also control for the overall size of the network. 
 As before, I begin with a baseline ordered logistic regression model of discussant 
influence that does not include personality traits.  The results for this model can be found in the 
third column of Table 3.6.  Predictably, I find large effects for respondent partisanship and 
ideology on their approval of President Bush.  I also find that the partisanship of the respondents’ 
discussion networks has a substantial influence on presidential approval.  In the fourth column of 
Table 3.6 I add personality traits to the mix as well as interactions between the five traits and the 
partisanship of the discussion network.  I find a significant effect for the interaction between 
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openness to experience and discussion influence.  Individuals with high scores on openness to 
experience are more influenced by the partisan makeup of their network.  Once again, I calculate 
predicted levels of respondent Bush approval as a function of openness to experience and 
discussion influence (this time network partisan composition).  The results here are more 
pronounced than they were for the community survey.  As a discussion network shifts from 
overwhelmingly Democrat to overwhelmingly Republican, an individual with the lowest score 
on openness becomes only 2 points more positive in the assessment of President Bush, shifting 
from 0.33 to 0.35. For an individual with maximum openness, the shift is a staggering 83 points, 
from 0.03 to 0.86, as the network changes from totally Democrat to totally Republican.  The 
influence of discussion networks clearly hinges on the openness of the individual at the center of 
the network.    
 
Conclusions 
At the outset of this chapter, I outlined why I believe it is important for research on 
political to account for personality traits.  The results presented here strongly support the notion 
that research on political discussion and social influence should consider dispositional 
characteristics such as the Big Five along with the demographic and environmental variables that 
are most frequently studied.  Personality traits consistently influence the nature of political 
discussions.  Perhaps more importantly, the way personality shapes discussion follows logically 
from our theoretical understanding of both the traits and political discussion.  Extraversion leads 
to larger social networks and encourages more frequent discussion, particularly in more formal 
contexts.  Extraverts are also exposed to more disagreement than introverts as network size 
increases.  Conscientiousness, though not associated with a greater general tendency towards 
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discussion, does lead citizens to more actively talk about local issues with the people who share 
those concerns such as family members, neighbors, and members of their church and local 
associations.  Emotional stability helps individuals overcome a natural tendency towards 
discussing politics with likeminded people and leads to more conversations with casual 
acquaintances and people holding differing viewpoints, but discourages attempts to persuade 
others and leads to smaller discussion networks.  Agreeable individuals are exposed to 
substantially less disagreement as network size increases.  And openness to experience not only 
leads people to have larger discussion networks, but it also increases the likelihood that those 
individuals will try to influence the people with whom they discuss politics and it leads them to 
be more influenced by their discussion partners.   
It seems clear that personality traits play an important role in shaping patterns of political 
discussion.  Moreover, I contended at the start of the chapter that the social nature of discussion 
made it an especially rigorous test for the Big Five.  The strong results presented should provide 
reassurance that personality traits are likely to influence most facets of political behavior, even 
those such as discussion, which are also constrained by contextual forces.  The question is no 
longer whether personality matters but how exactly it matters.  The role personality traits play in 
shaping political behavior is complex and conditional.  Such relationships are more difficult to 
study, but ultimately more rewarding because they bring us closer to a rich and full explanation 
of why people do what they do politically.  Not all of my hypotheses were confirmed, but for 
personality to truly enrich our understanding of political behavior we must know much more 
about how these traits operate in political situations.  In that respect, the hypotheses that missed 
are just as informative as those that were confirmed by the data.  
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I hope that these findings will help to spur greater interest in individual-level 
predispositions among scholars of political discussion and social influence.  Work in this area 
has done an excellent job of demonstrating the limitations of an atomized and isolated view of 
the average citizen.  People do not exist in isolation until the moment they are called for a 
randomized national survey.  Every day citizens mingle together, influencing and being 
influenced by their friends at work, their neighbors, or by family members.  It does not 
undermine the importance of context if we also acknowledge that people will try to influence 
their context in whatever way they can.  Accounting for personality traits allows us to push our 
understanding beyond where we can go with demographics.  With a sophisticated understanding 
of individual predispositions we can begin to untangle the complicated interconnection between 
context and individual. 
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Chapter 4:  Individual Choice, Economic Utility, and Personality Traits 
 In this final empirical chapter, I turn my attention to how individuals make decisions.  
When presented with two choices, what leads a person to choose x instead of y?  On its face, this 
seems like it should be a relatively straightforward area of study, but the nature of how people 
choose has actually presented a puzzle to social scientists for many years.  Much of this puzzling 
has boiled down to a debate over whether humans are rational actors or not.  This debate has 
ebbed and flowed over the years as researchers started from a basic idea of utility maximization 
and then adjusted it to fit the realities of imperfect information, cognitive limitations, and biases 
regarding risk and the timing of payoffs. 
 I believe that our knowledge of individual decision making could be enhanced by 
acknowledging two points.  First, individuals differ in terms of their personalities, and these 
personality differences are likely to have an impact on what different people value.  Second, 
people face environments that are characterized by different sorts of incentives.  If both of these 
points are recognized simultaneously, it becomes clear that the model I have developed in this 
dissertation could be quite enlightening for the study of decision making.  An individual choice 
will represent the interaction of a person’s individual traits and the specific environmental 
features surrounding that choice.     
 The popularity of a utility-based approach to human decision making largely stems from 
our desire to make sense of individual choices that otherwise would appear to be idiosyncratic.  
If people are weighing the costs and benefits of each of their choices (consciously or 
unconsciously) and selecting according to whichever action has the greater benefit, we as 
researchers have a fighting chance at understanding and predicting the decisions people make.  
On the other hand, if choices are the product of highly variable individual and contextual factors, 
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an understanding of the choices people make is likely to remain elusive.  The true nature of 
individual decision making most likely rests somewhere in between these two extreme views.  
Idiosyncratic factors will always make prediction difficult, but we can try to isolate and 
understand the component of decision making that is consistent and systematic.   
 The utility approach has its roots in classical economics and rational choice theory.  
There are several assumptions that typically underlie the approach.  First, individuals are 
expected to follow some kind of consistent decision rule.  The most widely accepted decision 
rule in the extant literature is that people maximize utility.  This simply means that for any given 
choice a person will choose the option that provides the most benefit or best serves her objectives 
(e.g. Arrow 1951; Downs 1957; Olson 1965 among many, many others).  There are other 
decision rules that could be utilized, including finding the first available option that is “good 
enough.”  This concept is known as “satisficing” and it is most closely associated with Herbert 
Simon (1955, 1956).  It should be noted that with a sufficiently broad conception of utility, 
satisficing can be seen as a form of maximizing behavior.  It simply means that people are 
factoring in the value of their time and effort in addition to more tangible features of utility such 
as money, power, pleasure, and so on. 
 A second assumption holds that people can rank order their preferences.  Being able to 
rank preferences simply means that if Jim prefers choice A to choice B and choice B to choice C, 
then he will also prefer A to C.  It is also possible for two options to be preferred equally, but in 
this case Jim would be indifferent to the outcome between the two options.  This allows people 
to have what Arrow (1951) called a “weak ordering of preferences.” 
 From these two simple requirements, we could construct a very simple model of decision 
making that would do pretty well at predicting very straightforward decisions.  For example such 
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a model would predict that a person would accept $50 instead of refusing it and receiving $0.  
We do not need to test such a proposition empirically to know that it is going to be highly 
accurate.  However, scholars of decision making have quickly identified a host of complicating 
factors that make predicting behavior more difficult.   
People often make mistakes because they lack all of the information necessary to make 
correct choices.  In addition to a lack of information, some problems are of sufficient cognitive 
complexity that we will choose wrongly because we cannot calculate our expected payoff 
accurately.  Millions of people play the lottery, even when doing so has a negative expected 
value.  It is likely that many people do not understand the probabilities involved sufficiently, but 
they believe that the chance of a payoff outweighs the cost.  Examples such as this have led 
scholars to see individuals as possessing rationality within the limits of certain cognitive and 
emotional biases and deficiencies, or “bounded rationality” (Simon 1947, 1957; for a review of 
literature on bounded rationality, see Jones 1999). 
In addition to recognition of the fallibility of human decision makers, scholars have also 
recognized that context plays an important role in shaping choices.  A wine connoisseur might 
choose a fine vintage bottle of Merlot over substantial financial compensation.  But that same 
person would gladly trade the fine wine for a bottle of water when stranded in the desert.  When I 
am ravenously hungry, food is worth much more to me than when I have just eaten.  Economists 
have recognized these ideas for years, and adjusted their models accordingly.  For my purposes, I 
want to highlight that there has been ready acknowledgement and correction made for contextual 
influences which shape preferences. 
Another crucial development in the broader decision making literature blends work on 
cognitive limitations with research that examines the context in which choices are made.  
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Prospect theory (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) 
developed in response to the empirical failings of classical subjective expected utility.  The 
traditional models, while theoretically clean and precise, consistently failed to predict the 
behavior of individuals in laboratory settings.  Much of this difficulty can be traced to how 
expected utility theory dealt with risk.  In classical theory decisions are made based on expected 
outcome values, with no regard for the risk involved.  In other words, if given the choice 
between receiving $5 and a 10% chance of winning $50, classical theory (in its most basic form) 
would suggest that people would be completely indifferent.  Even before Kahneman and 
Tversky, a sufficient body of evidence had built up suggesting that decision makers are not risk-
neutral.  This led scholars to build in a slight risk aversion into their models of decision making.  
By the time Kahneman and Tversky began their work, classical theory recognized that when 
given the choice between a sure payoff and a small chance for a bigger return, people generally 
prefer the sure thing. 
Kahneman and Tversky pushed things even further when they found that how choices 
were framed could have a huge impact on decision making.  For example, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) presented respondents with a scenario in which a disease was expected to 
sweep through the area and kill 600 people.  Two treatment options were available, one of which 
would be guaranteed to save 200 people, but which also meant that 400 people were guaranteed 
to die.  The other treatment option had a 1 in 3 chance of saving all 600 people, but a 2/3rd’s 
chance that all 600 would die.  When respondents were given the choice of saving 200 people 
versus a 1/3rd chance of saving nobody, 72% of respondents chose to save 200 (the risk-averse 
choice).  However, when the choice was framed so that either 400 people would die, or a 1/3rd 
chance that nobody would die, only 22% of respondents chose the risk-averse option.   
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This sharp reversal is not a fluke or an artifact of this particular choice, as similar patterns 
have been identified with a number of different scenarios.  Risk-seeking or risk-aversion can be 
fairly easily folded into a classic expected utility model of decision making.  There is nothing 
irrational about a preference for sure things (or risk), even though a strict utility maximizer 
would be indifferent to such things.  The real problem for expected utility theory comes from 
massive preference swings based on logically equivalent changes in question framing.  It is 
difficult to interpret total preference reversal based on the switch from 200 lives saved to 400 
deaths, within the framework of classic expected utility theory.  Kahneman and Tversky 
addressed this problem by developing prospect theory, which conceptualizes decisions 
differently depending on how decision makers perceives their situation.  When the decision is 
perceived to be in the domain of gains, people will make risk-averse choices, while decisions in 
the domain of losses lead to more risk-seeking choices.        
One dimension that receives relatively little attention from either classical expected 
utility theory or prospect theory is the notion of individual variation in terms of tastes, values, 
and goals.  It is widely recognized that there is variation in what people value (e.g. money versus 
leisure time) and that tastes play an important role in determining which movies people watch, 
which clothes they buy and where they go to eat.  Despite this widespread recognition, the 
existing research strikes a somewhat uneasy truce with individual preferences.  On the one hand, 
it is extremely difficult to deny the importance of individual differences, and the fact that the 
prevailing economic theory on utility-based decision making is “subjective expected utility 
theory” suggests that scholars recognize the need to acknowledge the “subjective” element in 
play.  However, it is difficult to determine how best to account for tastes in a model that has any 
hopes of generalizability.  Many scholars (at least within the rational choice field) have 
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minimized the importance of individual differences by arguing that preferences and tastes are 
relatively consistent across individuals, and that what differences do exist are better ignored in 
the name of parsimony (e.g. Stigler and Becker 1977; Goetze and Galderisi 1989).  This tradeoff 
between explanatory power and parsimony is an important issue to keep in mind while 
considering the role of individual variation in decision making.  With enough information, we 
could create the perfect decision making model for an individual, that was woefully inadequate 
for predicting the behavior of any other person.  Unique utility curves for each person would not 
be a very satisfying approach to social science, but we should be careful about erring too far in 
the other direction.  Some recognition of individual differences could be extremely useful in 
understanding variation in the choices people make, provided we are careful in how we 
conceptualize individual difference.  
One way of dealing with the problem of individual difference that avoids the need for 
measurement of those differences is to place such concerns outside the scope of the research 
question.  This method has been most popular among some rational choice scholars who seek to 
model the process of decision making with less of a priority placed on the substance of those 
decisions.  Ferejohn (1991) makes a useful distinction between two different conceptions of 
rational choice theorizing.  “Thin-rational” accounts posit rational preferences (rank-ordering, 
transitivity, etc.) but otherwise place no requirements on individuals.  For thin-rational accounts, 
the substance of individual preference is irrelevant as long as preferences can be understood to 
follow the axioms of rationality.  The danger of such approach comes from identifying a sensible 
and consistent preference ordering in the absence of additional assumptions about goals and 
preferences.  If we trust revealed preferences, where behavior demonstrates what option a person 
preferred, all behavior can be characterized as rational because if it was not the preferred 
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outcome the person would not have done it.  This tautology, where all behavior is rational by 
construction, and the difficulty in specifying the unique, internal preference ordering of 
individuals has led most empirical work on rational choice and decision making to adopt a 
“thick-rational” perspective (Green and Shapiro 1994).  These thick-rational accounts make 
assumptions about human goals and preferences that stretch beyond the minimal requirements of 
thin-rationality.  Usually, this stretching involves making fairly uncontroversial assumptions 
about the general desire for greater material wealth and power.      
Making general assumptions about human goals is defensible, but it becomes much more 
problematic when paired with an assumption that individual differences are insignificant.  If the 
choice being studied is very narrowly concerned with the acquisition of money or economic 
goods, or the decision is being made in a highly restricted institutional context, we may be safe 
treating individual variation as inconsequential.  But when the choice involves trade-offs 
between different kinds of goods and/or values, it becomes increasingly problematic to assume 
that everyone will operate in the same way.  Almost all people would prefer to have more 
money, more power, or more prestige, but we differ dramatically in the trade offs we would 
make to acquire more.   
In the past, most research on individual differences in decision making has focused 
primarily on group identity or values.  A group identity approach posits that psychological 
attachments to various reference groups will influence decision making either in addition to, or 
in place of, self interest.  In this way, actions that appear to be irrational at the level of individual 
utility can be explained based on the well-being of a group.  Of course, as a general theory of 
decision making, group identification is problematic.  It is not clear how people make decisions 
when a particular group identity is not activated, and it is similarly uncertain how individuals 
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adjudicate between circumstances in which their identities are at cross-purposes or when their 
group identity clashes strongly with their individual interest.  Most group-based theorizing seems 
to view pursuit of group interest as disengaged from individual utility calculations. 
Research on individual values has a somewhat similar flavor to the work on group 
identification.  Like the group-based work, research on values has generally seen individual 
values as stemming from psychological conditioning during childhood.  In a values framework, 
decisions are made with an eye towards satisfying psychological needs.  This view is not at all 
incompatible with a more rational choice influenced utility model, provided that the 
psychological needs can be meaningfully ranked along with more tangible material interests.  
However, most scholars of values-based decision making set their frameworks as opposing 
rational choice theorizing by arguing that values learned in youth often are held even after they 
cease to align with individual interests.  This is unfortunate because without some form of utility-
based calculation, it is extremely difficult to see how values can be used to predict behavior, 
instead of simply to rationalize that behavior post hoc.   
One notable exception to the view that values represent a challenge to more rational 
choice style theorizing was Chong’s (2000) book on opinion and value formation.  Chong 
creatively added values and group identifications into an instrumental, utility based theory of 
decision making and opinion formation.  By combining approaches that had previously been 
seen as mutually exclusive, Chong demonstrated that a utility based theory of decision making 
could include highly subjective, psychological elements (something proponents of thin-rational 
accounts would never question).  He also demonstrated that values-based accounts do not have to 
be centered on expressive and noninstrumental considerations.  
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Though undoubtedly a major contribution, Chong (2000) also highlights the weakness of 
any approach which relies on values as a crucial component.  Though values are conceptualized 
as longstanding dispositions about what considerations are most important, they are often 
measured with reference to current attitudes and preferences.  Such an approach may be 
defensible as a measurement strategy, but it becomes problematic when values are then used to 
explain attitudes or decisions with similar properties.  For example, Chong points out that 
measures of “racial resentment” used to explain attitudes about school desegregation bear a 
striking resemblance to the dependent variable they purport to explain (Chong 2000, 36).  In 
order for values to have empirical use they must be clearly causally prior to the phenomenon 
being explained.  They also must be sufficiently broad as to provide meaningful explanation.  In 
the end, our explanations cannot simply be made up of values explaining other values or as 
attitudes labeled as values and then used to predict similar attitudes.  Such thinking does little to 
advance our understanding of decision making. 
My proposal falls in line with Chong’s belief that a utility-based approach is necessary 
for us to gain any systematic understanding of individual decision making.  Expressive 
motivations are extremely difficult to test empirically because a different expressive goal can 
always be substituted if the first one chosen fails to adequately explain the behavior in question.  
At the same time, the traditional assumption made by rational choice scholars (though not a part 
of rational choice theory) that individuals do not have meaningful differences in terms of their 
individual preferences is also empirically suspect.  We need a way to account for individual 
differences that is instrumental, but also that is exogenous to the decision making we seek to 
explain.  I believe that incorporating personality traits can provide us with the means to achieve 
this. 
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Personality Traits and Decision Making 
 Incorporating personality traits can provide several advantages over existing models of 
decision making which either ignore individual differences or focus on values as the primary 
source of individual variation.  The first benefit that attention to personality traits can provide is 
that they allow us to measure meaningful individual differences in a parsimonious fashion.  One 
of the major problems with trying to use values to explain variation is that there is no widely 
agreed upon universe of relevant values to draw upon.  Researchers are forced to select the 
values they think are relevant in a somewhat ad hoc manner.  This can lead to an accumulation of 
research that cannot be directly compared because different researchers use different values.  
Even more troubling is if a model of behavior is lacking, additional values can be added in order 
to buttress the model’s explanatory power.  If a whole universe of potential values is available to 
the researcher, the temptation (conscious or otherwise) will always be there to create a “value” 
that is customized to explain the behavior of interest.  This leads to the tautology of values 
explaining values discussed earlier.  Additionally, it thwarts efforts to develop cumulative 
scientific progress, because connections among individual values, and therefore among 
individual studies, would not be developed. 
 Personality traits do not suffer from this same limitation.  Over the course of many years, 
trait psychologists have worked to identify a finite set of personality traits that can explain 
behavior.  There are literally thousands of potential trait descriptors in the English language—
Allport and Odbert (1936) identified nearly 18,000 trait terms in an unabridged dictionary—but 
not all of these represent meaningful and distinct traits.  Factor analysis has been the most 
commonly employed technique for determining which traits “hang together” empirically.  Early 
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work found that the bulk of meaningful personality variation could be accounted for using 
models of trait structure that included between 12 and 16 factors (e.g. Cattell 1943, 1944, 1956).  
Subsequent reexamination of this data (Fiske 1949) and later work along similar lines (Tupes 
1957; Tupes and Christal 1958, 1961) found that five factors consistently explained the vast 
majority of the variance.  For a variety of reasons this finding failed to make a significant 
influence until the research agenda was picked up again in the early 1980s.  During this time, 
Goldberg (e.g. 1990, 1992, 1993) and Costa and McCrae (e.g. Costa and McCrae 1988; McCrae 
and Costa 1987; 2003; 2008) rediscovered the earlier findings regarding five basic personality 
factors.  This time, the notion of five-factor models of trait structure took hold and an explosion 
of research building on the Big Five soon followed—more than 2000 publications on the Big 
Five between 1999 and 2006 according to John, Naumann, and Soto (2008).  All of this drives 
home the point that we know which traits to study, and that any move to expand our models 
beyond the Big Five should be accompanied by a compelling case for the inclusion of additional 
traits. 
 In addition to being widely agreed upon, the trait dimensions of the Big Five also can be 
measured using relatively few items, which makes the Big Five extremely useful for survey 
research.  Traits can be measured using either lexical survey items (as advocated by Goldberg) or 
using Likert-style items where respondents assess their level of agreement with various 
statements (e.g. McCrae and Costa’s NEO-PI), with both techniques producing valid results.  As 
with most concepts, measurement reliability is greater with more items, but scholars have found 
that the Big Five dimensions can be measured using as few as 1-2 items per trait (e.g. Gosling, 
Rentfrow, and Swann 2003; Woods and Hampson 2005; Rammstedt and John 2007; Mondak 
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2010).  Widespread agreement at both the conceptual and empirical level makes the Big Five 
exceedingly valuable as a means to understand individual differences.    
 A third major advantage of personality traits is that they are largely exogenous to the 
decisions we want to explain.  We can be confident of this because of a couple of related strands 
of research.  One research agenda has examined the source of personality traits to try and 
determine the degree to which traits are biologically instantiated.  This research (summarized 
more thoroughly in Chapter 2) has used twin studies, extended family studies, and adoption 
studies in order to parse out the relative contributions of genetics and environment on personality 
traits.  The consistent finding from this research is that approximately 50% of the variance in 
personality is attributable to genetics (see Matthews and Deary 1998; McCrae and Costa 2003; or 
Pervin 2003 for reviews of this literature), with a few studies (Heath et al. 1992; Riemann et al. 
1997; McCrae et al. 2001) suggesting a greater role for genetics. 
 The remaining variance can be attributed to environmental factors, but importantly, a 
different strand of research has found that personality traits are extremely stable in adulthood 
(e.g. Costa and McCrae 1988; Caspi 2000).  With the exception of minor life-cycle changes as 
people age (Costa and McCrae 1994), personality traits change very little.  The combined insight 
of the sizable genetic component to personality traits and the stability of those traits in adulthood 
mean that we can be fairly confident that traits will be influencing decision making and not the 
reverse.  This allows us to direct our attention to the traits themselves and how those traits can 
shape decision making.  In the next section I will briefly describe each of the Big Five trait 
dimensions.  I will also describe how I measured these traits in my data and I will discuss how I 
believe the traits can be expected to influence the choices people make. 
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The Big Five 
 In my survey each trait is measured with five lexical, bipolar items.  At the outset of the 
survey, respondents read the following introductory paragraph:   
Now we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.  The following section 
contains pairs of words.  On a scale of zero to ten, which word best describes you?  For 
example, on the first pair of words, the number zero means "unimaginative," the number 
10 means "imaginative," and the number 5 is exactly the middle-neither unimaginative 
nor imaginative.  On this scale, what number best represents you?  You can use any 
number from zero to ten. 
 
After reading that prompt, respondents gave their self-assessments on the series of 25 items.  
Each of the Big Five traits will play a role in shaping decision making, but their influence will 
likely be conditional on the details of the choice at hand.  Choice situations will activate different 
traits depending on the specific details of the decision.  In other words, not all five traits will be 
relevant for any given decision.  Below I describe each of the Big Five trait dimensions and 
provide some expectations regarding when they are likely to influence decision making (for a 
more in-depth description of the traits see McCrae and Costa 2003; Mondak 2010).   
Openness to experience.  People who are high in openness to experience are more 
exposed to information, both incidental exposure and through their own efforts (Heinstrom 2003) 
and they are more exposed to culture and literature (Kraaykamp and van Eijck 2005).  They also 
are more likely to engage in risky behaviors such as drinking and driving (Booth-Kewley and 
Vickers 1994).  In terms of general decision making then, I would expect that choices involving 
the opportunity to take risks or engage in novel activities will be most likely to activate openness 
to experience, with individuals high in openness being more likely to take chances, try new 
things, and generally be open-minded when presented with those novel situations. 
Extraversion.  Individuals who are high in extraversion tend to be sociable, active, and 
outgoing.  On the other side of the trait dimension, people who have low extraversion scores 
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(introverts) are generally quiet, shy, and introspective.  Extraversion has been linked to 
networking behavior in the workplace (Forret and Dougherty 2001), and to the development of 
friendships among adolescents (Jensen-Campbell et al. 2002).  It is easy to envision extraversion 
influencing decision making behavior.  Many decisions involve choosing between social or non-
social options (e.g. going it alone versus asking for help, voicing a complaint versus just living 
with the status quo).  In these instances the possibility of social interaction is likely to serve as 
additional incentive for extraverts, in addition to any material benefits of a choice.  At the same 
time introverts are unlikely to be swayed by social benefits and may even view social interaction 
as one of the costs in their utility calculation.   
Agreeableness.  This trait is associated with concern for the happiness and well being of 
others in social interactions.  Agreeable people are described using terms such as:  “warm,” 
“generous,” and “kind,” and individuals high in agreeableness are risk averse (Markey et al. 
2006), and successful working in groups (Barrick and Mount 1991).  As with extraversion, it 
seems likely that agreeableness is relevant to decisions that involve social situations and 
interactions.  I suspect that agreeable people will give greater consideration to how their 
decisions influence others, and they will factor the happiness of others more directly into their 
calculations of utility.  There is also some evidence that agreeable people are more submissive or 
compliant to authority (Digman 1990).  This suggests that agreeable people may be more likely 
to make “sub-optimal” choices based on their desire to please others. 
Emotional stability.  People who are high in emotional stability are calm, and relaxed.  
On the flipside, people who are low in emotional stability are nervous, easily stressed, and prone 
to worry.  In the extant research, emotional stability has been linked with risk seeking behavior 
(Nicholson 2005), self-efficacy (Thoms, Moore, and Scott 1996), and satisfaction with personal 
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relationships (White, Hendrick, and Hendrick 2004).  My expectation is that individuals low in 
emotional stability will seek to avoid high stress situations and that they will be willing to forgo 
some material benefit if they can maintain a comfortable status and avoid risk.   
Conscientiousness.  The final Big Five trait, conscientiousness focuses on an individual’s 
sense of obligation, dependability and willingness to work hard.  It is measured based on 
responses to terms like “organized,” “punctual,” and “industrious.”  Conscientiousness has been 
linked to honest behavior (Horn, Nelson, and Brannick 2004), risk aversion (Arthur and 
Graziano 1996; Kowert and Hermann 1997), and academic achievement (Wagerman and Funder 
2007).  More so than any of the other trait dimensions, I expect conscientiousness to be relevant 
to decision making across a wide variety of situations.  Conscientious individuals feel a need to 
meet their obligations and responsibilities.  This means that any decision where one choice 
evokes duty, responsibility or a norm of proper behavior is likely to activate conscientiousness.  
This will apply broadly, regardless of whether the situation is novel, social, or anxiety-inducing.  
In this way, conscientiousness will be influential across a number of scenarios where the other 
traits are simply not activated.  An extravert may prefer activities that are social, and a person 
high in openness may like to try new things, but these are merely general preferences.  For the 
conscientious person there is a real value at stake.  Commitment to conscientiousness would 
seem to run deeper, entailing a deeply held attachment to hard work and meeting obligations. 
 
Data and Results 
 In order to examine the effects of personality traits on decision making processes, I 
administered pencil-and-paper surveys to undergraduates at the University of Illinois.  These 
students were drawn from introductory level political science courses (two sections of 
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Introduction to American Politics and one section of Introduction to Political Behavior) and 
offered extra credit in return for their cooperation.  Surveys were completed during class 
meetings.  The survey was conducted in two segments.  First, respondents answered the 
personality survey described in the previous section and reproduced in its entirety in Appendix 
A.  Then, one or two weeks later (depending on availability) they were administered the decision 
making survey, which can be found in Appendix B.  The decision making survey presented 
respondents with hypothetical scenarios and asked them to choose between two possible courses 
of action.  A total of 355 students completed both the personality survey and the decision making 
survey and they are the subjects of analysis here. 
 It is important to note that respondents were not aware that the two surveys were related.  
The students were told that they would be able to participate in research being conducted by 
graduate students in political science.  As far as the students knew then, my two surveys were 
two distinct research projects.  The long (1-2 week) gap between administration of the 
personality survey and the decision making survey provides reassurance that respondents did not 
have their personality responses in mind when they were answering questions about how they 
would make decisions in hypothetical scenarios.  Also, it is impossible in this case that how 
respondents answered the decision making items shaped how they answered the personality 
questions. Thus, reverse causality can be ruled out definitively. 
 The first five scenarios presented respondents with subjective choices between courses of 
action.  For these first five choices, there is no clear way to set an objective dollar value to the 
different choice options.  However, the scenarios were written in a manner that was intended to 
evoke competing values.  For each scenario the respondent’s answer was regressed on the two 
personality traits I expected to have the greatest impact using binomial logistic regression. 
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 Before proceeding with a discussion of the scenarios and my findings, it is important to 
note that, while most of the scenarios on the survey were not explicitly political, they encompass 
a number of ideas that are important to the study of political behavior, such as willingness to 
obey authority, feelings of self-reliance, willingness to express dissatisfaction with unsatisfactory 
situations, and openness to conflict.  For the present study, I found it necessary to keep the 
scenarios simple so they could directly test decision making processes, but in the future 
additional layers of political complication could be incorporated into this framework. 
 In the first scenario respondents were supposed to imagine that they were driving on the 
highway late at night when they realize they have left their cell phone at a restaurant they had 
stopped at earlier.  Their travelling companion calls the phone and finds that the restaurant 
manager is holding the phone for them back at the restaurant.  The respondents must then decide 
whether to proceed to the next exit (for a total driving time of 1 hour), or to make an immediate 
U-turn by using a path marked “Emergency Vehicles Only.”  The U-Turn would save a half hour 
of driving, but it would mean violating a rule and taking a small (1% chance) risk that they 
would be caught and ticketed.   
I expected conscientiousness to be most directly activated by this scenario.  Individuals 
who are high in conscientiousness are more inclined to follow rules and obey norms of behavior, 
and they also tend to be more risk-averse.  Therefore, I expected that individuals who were high 
in conscientiousness would be less likely to make the immediate, illegal U-turn.  Given the risk 
involved, I also thought that openness to experience could be related to this decision.  Individuals 
high in openness tend to be more risk-seeking in their behavior, so I hypothesized that openness 
would be positively related to making the immediate U-turn.  Overall, 69% of respondents chose 
to make the U-turn immediately.  The results for the personality traits are displayed graphically 
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in Figure 4.1, which shows the predicted probability that a respondent would choose to make a 
U-turn immediately as the trait is varied from one standard deviation below the mean to one 
standard deviation above.  Openness had no effect on respondents’ choice of whether to make 
the U-turn or drive on to the next exit.  This is likely because the risk in this scenario was not all 
that great, or maybe people high in openness are willing to take risks as a means to try new 
things, but they’re not willing to when the situation isn’t particularly novel.  On the other hand, 
conscientiousness had a strong, significant effect (p<0.03).  As conscientiousness ranged from 
one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above, the probability of 
making the immediate U-turn dropped from 0.74 to 0.60.  Clearly, conscientiousness was 
playing an important role in shaping how respondents made this choice. 
 The second scenario asked respondents to imagine that they had received a speeding 
ticket and gave them the choice of attending a four hour driving safety course at a nearby 
community college, or taking a six hour online version of the course.  I hypothesized that 
respondents’ level of extraversion would be a consideration here, as the community college 
option involved social interaction with instructors and classmates, while the online version was 
inherently solitary.  Given the social nature of the extravert, I hypothesized that they would 
gravitate towards the in-person class.  Or, looked at from the other direction, introverts would 
jump at the opportunity to meet their obligation without having to meet and interact with a host 
of new people.  I also speculated that individuals high in conscientiousness would be more 
inclined to choose community college course, both because the shorter (by two hours) time 
commitment would allow them to get on with their other responsibilities, and because the in-
person course was likely to be the better learning experience.  
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Turning to the results, just under 52% of respondents chose to take the in-person course 
at the community college.  The personality results are displayed in Figure 4.2.  Extraversion did 
not have the expected effect, with the coefficient in the opposite direction of my hypothesis, 
though the result was insignificant.  On the other hand, conscientiousness had a very strong 
(p<0.01) effect.  Moving from low conscientiousness to high conscientiousness led to a 22 point 
shift in likelihood of choosing the in-person course (0.43 to 0.65).   
 The third scenario asked respondents to imagine they were at a school orientation 
program where they had to sign up for how they would spend an hour of time.  The two choices 
they were given were “Picnic Games,” which explicitly included games like badminton, lawn 
bowling, bag toss, and flag football.  The other alternative was to sign up for “Mystery Games.”  
My expectation was that openness to experience would be positively associated with choosing 
“Mystery Games,” as they implied the possibility of a novel experience.  I also expected 
extraversion to be associated with choosing “Picnic Games” because all of the games listed were 
social and group-based, and would allow for a great deal of interaction.  “Mystery Games” for all 
the respondent knew could have involved games played alone.  Judging from the overall results, 
the picnic games discussed in the prompt are very popular (at least among college students) 
because over two thirds of the respondents chose “Picnic Games.”  Results for the personality 
traits are displayed in Figure 4.3.  The openness to experience effect is in the expected direction, 
but it is not significant (p<0.20).  The effect for extraversion, however, does reach an acceptable 
level of significance for a sample this small (p<0.06).  Individuals who were low in extraversion 
had a 0.38 probability of selecting “Mystery Games.”  This low likelihood dropped ten points (to 
0.28) for high extraversion individuals. 
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 The fourth scenario had respondents imagine they were working on a class research 
project with another student who did poor quality work that would have ensured a poor grade for 
the respondent.  Respondents also knew that any attempt to force improvement from the partner 
would lead to an argument.  The choice then was between confronting the partner and forcing 
him to improve his work or the respondents could choose to just do the revisions themselves.  
Overall, respondents were fairly evenly split on the question, with 53% deciding to confront the 
student.  I expected that respondents high in agreeableness would be more likely to choose to fix 
the report themselves and avoid the argument, while extraverted individuals would be more 
likely to be willing to confront the student.  The results are displayed in Figure 4.4, but there is 
not much of a story to be told.  Both the agreeableness and extraversion coefficients were in the 
correct direction, but only extraversion even approached conventional levels of significance 
(p<0.16).  It also occurred to me that conscientiousness could be related to this decision, 
although it was unclear to me in which direction conscientiousness should be expected to work.  
On the one hand, conscientiousness has been associated with academic achievement, and also 
with job performance.  Seen through this light, I might have expected high levels of 
conscientiousness to be associated with avoiding the fight and simply fixing the report alone (the 
surest way to good performance).  On the other hand, individuals high in conscientiousness value 
rules and personal responsibility.  They might have been particularly galled by propping up the 
shoddy work of a classmate and been more rigid about making the other student finish.  With 
these uncertain expectations in mind, I performed a supplemental analysis that included 
conscientiousness.  The coefficient suggested that conscientious respondents were more likely to 
finish the report themselves, but as with the other two traits, the result was insignificant. 
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 Scenario five asked respondents to imagine a future where they were successful lawyers 
given the opportunity to be appointed to a judgeship.  In the scenario, the governor gave them the 
choice between appointment as a criminal court judge, a position that would entail a great deal of 
stress, and a position as a judge on small-claims court.  The small-claims court position would 
entail less stress (i.e. no life or death-type decisions), but would also be somewhat boring.  My 
expectation was that individuals high in emotional stability would be more likely to choose 
criminal court.  Neurotic individuals (those low in emotional stability) would seem likely to be 
uncomfortable with the kind of angst that would be associated with sentencing people to life in 
prison.  I also expected that openness to experience would be associated with choosing criminal 
court.  The stimulation that would come from being involved in criminal trials would seem likely 
to be powerfully felt by those high in openness, just as the boredom of small-claims court could 
repel them.  Overall, more than two thirds of respondents chose criminal court.  The personality 
results displayed in Figure 4.5 show that both emotional stability (p<0.04) and openness to 
experience (p<0.02) play important roles in shaping the choice.  As emotional stability rises from 
low to high, the probability of choosing small-claims court drops from 0.38 to 0.26.  Openness 
shows a similar effect, dropping the probability of choosing small-claims court from 0.39 to 
0.25. 
 These first five scenarios demonstrate that personality traits influence how people make 
decisions.  Of the Big Five, only agreeableness did not have a significant effect on how 
respondents chose.  One important point to note is that, while a variety of traits influenced 
decision making, which traits were significant varied widely across the different types of 
decisions.  This reinforces the broader notion that the influence of personality traits is best 
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studied in conjunction with consideration of the environmental circumstances surrounding the 
choice.   
 However, establishing that personality traits influence decision making behavior on 
totally subjective choices represents an easy test.  The idea that long-standing dispositions will 
influence behavior is both intuitive, and well-supported by the literature discussed above.  For 
the next set of scenarios, I put personality traits to a stiffer test by examining their influence on a 
series of scenarios in which economic considerations are made explicit.  In each of the following 
scenarios there was an explicit, expected dollar value for each choice and that expected value 
was varied so that a random half of respondents received one configuration of expected values, 
and the other half had a different configuration.  If personality traits matter, even in the face of a 
clear, “best” choice in terms of dollars and cents, it would have important implications for the 
study of rational decision making.  This is not to say that I am attempting to identify the traits 
most associated with rational decisions and irrational decisions.  My contention is that the 
considerations that are important to a person differ across personality traits.  For an extreme 
introvert, avoiding social interaction may be worth accepting a lower monetary payout.  For an 
extremely open individual, the chance to try something new and exciting could trump a greater 
dollar reward for something typical and boring.  We have long recognized that individuals differ 
in their preferences, but personality traits provide us with an opportunity to study the sources of 
these preferences systematically.  In addition to the hypotheses discussed below, here it is 
important to reiterate my expectation that conscientiousness will be of special relevance.  When 
money is at stake, a general preference for social situations or novel experiences may take a back 
seat for the extravert and the open individual respectively, but I expect that the conscientious 
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individual will be much more reluctant to deviate from their values regardless of the economic 
incentive. 
 The first scenario asked respondents to imagine that their community was considering 
implementing a new tax to which they were opposed.  By expressing opposition to the tax they 
may be able to convince the city council to reject the tax.  The respondents’ choice was in how 
they would express their opposition, either by attending and speaking at a council meeting, or by 
writing a letter to the council.  For half of the sample, the expected value of speaking at the city 
council meeting was higher than the expected value of writing a letter.  For this half of the 
sample, the expected value of speaking at the meeting was a loss of $720, while the expected 
value of writing a letter was a loss of $900.  Not surprisingly, given this discrepancy, most 
respondents decided to speak at the meeting (around 80%).  For the other half of the sample, the 
values were reversed, so that writing a letter had an expected loss of only $720 and speaking had 
an expected loss of $900.  Here again, most respondents made the economically “better” choice, 
with 75% choosing to write the letter.   
Obviously, the monetary payout was playing a major role in which method of contact 
was chosen.  However, a substantial subset (20% in Version 1 and 25% in Version 2) of 
respondents chose the method with the lower payout.  Why might this be the case?  Traditional 
accounts might dismiss the behavior of these individuals as irrational, or suggest that they did not 
grasp which choice had the higher expected value.  A personality approach, however, can 
provide us with an alternative view of what constitutes rational behavior in this instance.  
Perhaps for an extraverted individual, the expressive benefits that come from speaking out at a 
meeting are worth a lower monetary payoff.  Or, viewed from another direction, perhaps the 
introvert is willing to accept a lower expected dollar value for the psychic comfort of not having 
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to stand in front of a crowd of people to voice his opinion.  Using a similar logic, it is easy to 
imagine that agreeable individuals might prefer to express their displeasure in writing in order to 
avoid any direct confrontation.  
To test these hypotheses, I ran logit models identical in form to the ones used for the first 
five scenarios except that these models included a variable indicating which version of the 
question the respondent received in addition to the two personality traits.  As a reference, Figure 
4.6 shows the likelihood that an average respondent (mean values for extraversion and 
agreeableness) would choose to write the letter.  The only thing varying from the first bar to the 
second is whether they received Version 1 (higher payoff for speaking) or Version 2 (higher 
payoff for writing a letter).  As noted above, the economic payoff was a major factor in decision 
making as we would expect.  The probability of writing the letter rises from 0.19 when it pays 
less to 0.75 when it pays more.   
I had no expectation that the personality traits would trump the economic outcome.  
Instead, I expected that extraversion and agreeableness would moderate the effect of the 
monetary payoff.  That is exactly what the results in Figure 4.7 show.  The extraversion 
coefficient was highly significant (p<0.03) and the agreeableness coefficient was right at the 
cusp of significance (p=0.102).  As extraversion rose from one standard deviation below the 
mean to one standard deviation above, the probability of writing a letter dropped from 0.24 to 
0.15 for Version 1 and from 0.80 to 0.69 for Version 2.  Agreeableness showed the opposite 
pattern, rising from 0.16 to 0.23 for Version 1 and 0.71 to 0.79 for Version 2. 
In the second scenario, Version 1, asked respondents to imagine they were out to lunch 
with two food options:  for $12 they can get conventional, but unspectacular fast food, or for $8 
they can try a restaurant that serves Tibetan food (which they have never tasted before).  Version 
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2 was identical, except that fast food was $8 and Tibetan food was $12.  I expected that high 
levels of openness to experience would be related to choosing Tibetan food.  Conscientiousness, 
on the other hand, has been found to be related to traditionalism so I also hypothesized a negative 
relationship between conscientiousness and the novel food option.  Turning to the results in 
Figure 4.8, the version had a significant impact on which food respondents chose.  The 
probability of choosing Tibetan food dropped from 0.54 when it was $8, to 0.25 when the price 
was $12.  Examining the personality results in Figure 4.9, the openness coefficient was in the 
expected direction but not significant.  The conscientiousness coefficient, on the other hand, was 
highly significant (p<0.004).  As conscientiousness rose from low to high, the probability of 
choosing Tibetan food dropped from 0.63 to 0.41 for Version 1 and from 0.32 to 0.16 for 
Version 2.   
In the third scenario, respondents were asked to imagine that they were boarding a plane 
for a two hour flight.  As they entered the plane a flight attendant asked them if they would be 
willing to change seats with another passenger in exchange for a voucher.  The new seat would 
be between a crying child and a person the flight attendant described as a “nervous flyer.”  In 
Version 1, the voucher was for $300, while in Version 2 it was $100.  I expected agreeableness 
to be positively related to changing seats because people high in this trait would be more inclined 
to try to accommodate requests and less willing to refuse.  I also expected that conscientiousness 
would be negatively related to changing seats.  Conscientiousness individuals value order, and 
tend to be somewhat inflexible; thus I expected that they would be less inclined to give up the 
seat they had bought and paid for. 
For this scenario, taking the voucher and changing seats is always the right thing to do 
from a dollars and cents perspective.  The difference in version only alters the magnitude of the 
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financial incentive.  This was reflected in the decision making of the respondents displayed in 
Figure 4.10.  With the $300 voucher, the probability of an average (mean values on 
conscientiousness and agreeableness) person choosing to change seats was 0.85.  For the half of 
the sample that was offered a $100 voucher, the probability of switching seats was 0.70.  Turning 
to the personality results displayed in Figure 4.11, agreeableness was positively related to taking 
the voucher (p<0.08), with the probability of switching seats rising from 0.81 to 0.88 for Version 
1 and 0.65 to 0.76 as agreeableness moved from low to high.  Conscientiousness had an even 
stronger (p<0.007) negative effect.  As conscientiousness moved from low to high, the 
probability of switching seats dropped from 0.90 to 0.76 for Version 1 ($300 voucher) and from 
0.78 to 0.56 for Version 2 ($100 voucher). 
The fourth scenario asked respondents to imagine they were driving to a concert when 
they witnessed an automobile accident.  They were the only witness to the incident, and they can 
attest to the fault of one of the drivers, but nobody saw that they witnessed the accident.  The 
choice put to the respondents was whether to wait at the scene and tell the police what happened 
and miss the first half of the concert, or just to leave and go on to the concert immediately.  The 
price paid for the concert ticket was varied across versions, $90 in Version 1 and $45 in Version 
2.  I expected conscientiousness to be the personality trait most relevant to this decision.  A 
conscientious individual would be more likely to feel a sense of obligation to stay and provide a 
report to the police.  I also expected that extraversion would play a part, with more extraverted 
individuals being more willing to shrug off the situation and go straight to the concert.   
In this case, the monetary value of the concert ticket played no role in decision making.  
As shown in Figure 4.12, approximately two thirds of respondents chose to go straight to the 
concert without waiting for the police, regardless of whether the ticket cost them $45 or $90.  
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With regards to the personality results, displayed in Figure 4.13, the extraversion coefficient was 
in the predicted direction, but it was not significant.  On the other hand, conscientiousness again 
showed a strong (p<0.02) effect.  The effect is virtually identical across the two versions, with 
the probability of going straight to the concert dropping from 0.74 to 0.58 for the $45 ticket as 
conscientiousness ranged from low to high, and from 0.72 to 0.55 for the $90 ticket. 
For the final scenario, respondents were to imagine that they were on a game show where 
they had to carry out certain tasks to earn prize money.  The object of the game was to obtain a 
hotel room from a hotel that had given away the respondent’s original room.  The respondents 
can either adopt a “sweet” approach, by being polite and friendly as they ask for accommodation, 
or they can be “sour” by taking an angry and confrontational approach.  Each approach carried 
different probabilities of succeeding and different prize money payoffs.  For Version 1 
respondents, the expected value of a sweet approach was $1400 and the expected value of a sour 
approach was $900.  For Version 2 respondents, these values were reversed.  My primary 
expectation was that individuals who were high in agreeableness would be less responsive to the 
expected payout and generally unwilling to adopt a sour strategy.  These individuals are 
uncomfortable with conflict, and would struggle to be combative, even when it was 
economically beneficial.  I also expected that individuals high in openness to experience might 
be more willing to adopt a sour approach.  This is not because such individuals are disagreeable, 
but merely that they would be willing to try playacting the part of an angry customer as a novel 
and possibly fun experience.  
Interestingly, as Figure 4.14 demonstrates, the version had no significant effect on how 
respondents made the choice.  The probability of choosing a sour strategy was slightly higher 
when the sweet strategy had the higher expected value than it was when sour was the 
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economically shrewd choice (0.41 to 0.38).  In this case, it is possible that the respondents had 
difficulty figuring out which choice had the larger expected payout.  Be that as it may, we can 
still investigate whether personality traits conditioned respondents’ decisions, and Figure 4.15 
presents the personality results.   
The coefficient for openness to experience was in the expected direction, but the effect 
was not significant.  However, the agreeableness effect was sizeable (p<0.001).  For Version 1, 
as agreeableness rose from low to high, the probability of choosing a sour strategy dropped from 
0.52 to 0.31.  A similar drop (0.48 to 0.28) was in evidence for respondents who received 
Version 2.  Thus, regardless of the financial incentives, agreeable people are substantially less 
likely to behave in a confrontational manner, even when it is all an act.  Whether this is rational 
or not depends on how one conceives of rationality.  From a strictly financial perspective, the 
agreeable person is being irrational.  But if we consider the psychic pain brought on by 
confrontation and conflict as part of their utility calculation, their decisions make much more 
sense.  This is not to argue for post hoc justifications for all decisions as rational.  Instead, 
individual personality traits provide us with a set of factors that shape decision making, but that 
are exogenous to the decisions themselves.  In this way, we can account for differences in tastes 
systematically without resorting to the circular logic of values as explanations for choices. 
 
Conclusion 
 Across the ten decision making scenarios described here, I found evidence that 
personality traits influence all kinds of choices.  Each of the Big Five was relevant for at least 
one decision, and conscientiousness was a significant factor in five scenarios.  This lends support 
to the earlier supposition that conscientiousness would be a particularly important trait for 
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decision making because of the way it structures what people value to a great extent.  In the 
future, as the link between personality traits and decision making is further explored, 
conscientiousness will bear closer examination. 
 There are a number of ways that this work can be extended that are likely to be fruitful.  
First, and most obviously, additional measures should be tested and compared.  This work has 
been largely exploratory, meaning there was little past work on which to build when it came to 
constructing suitable choice scenarios.  I tried to create situations that clearly set values (broadly 
construed) in conflict, both with each other and with financial payoffs.  Overall, I am pleased by 
the fact that many of the results are highly intuitive.  However, there were several relationships 
that I expected to find that did not materialize.  For example, openness was not related to trying 
novel food or picking mystery games.  The possible explanations for these non-findings cannot 
be tested at this point, but my hope is that if more scholars take up the challenge, we can gain a 
better understanding for the mechanisms involved.  
 Once we have stronger ideas about how personality traits affect general decision making, 
we can start to add additional layers of political complexity.  Only one of the scenarios I 
presented here had explicit political content and that was a deliberate choice.  Political content 
carries with it a number of potentially confounding features:  ideology, partisan identification, 
political interest, and knowledge all might interact with how personality traits influence 
judgment.  As we learn more about the role played by traits, the interactions between traits and 
various political variables will need to be disentangled.  
 A final useful avenue of future research would be to test decision making more formally 
by examining how personality traits affect play in economic games such as the dictator game, the 
ultimatum game, and the trust game.  In each of these cases, the conditions could be varied to 
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activate certain traits into the decision making calculus.  For example, recent work in behavioral 
economics has shown that meeting fellow players face-to-face before play increases generosity.  
It seems very likely that such a relationship would be moderated by agreeableness and 
extraversion.  There are a number of other subtle manipulations that could be used to test the 
relationships between personality traits and economic decision making.  
 The essential message of this chapter is that as we consider utility as a model for 
understanding decision making, we can incorporate individual level preferences.  In the past, 
incorporating the individual was often seen as an unnecessary complication.  Better just to 
assume some generally true rule about utility maximizing behavior and leave it at that.  But we 
can incorporate individual level preferences, and we can do so without resorting to tautological 
relationships connecting values with values.  Personality traits are not a panacea, and obviously 
when individuals are considered, there will always be idiosyncrasies, but we can, and should, do 
all we can to enrich the concept of subjective utility. 
 In this chapter I have demonstrated that decisions which go against economic utility are 
not necessarily irrational.  When we account for the essential dispositional characteristics of 
individuals, we see that other considerations are often considered alongside economic utility.  
When a choice that entails public speaking extraverts sought out the opportunity, even when less 
money was available, and introverts were willing to forgo greater monetary gain in order to 
avoid such an experience.  It is difficult to conceive of either mindset as irrational when the 
respondent is making a choice that comports well with the psychological needs associated with 
their disposition.  Rational choice research has generally been reluctant to embrace this type of 
thinking because the concept of utility ceases to be useful if the pursuit of individual tastes 
renders all decisions rational.  However, personality traits offer a means to systematically 
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account for the psychological basis of decision making.  They provide a stable, biologically-
rooted source of preferences that can be incorporated into models of utility. 
 These findings should encourage scholars of personality to broaden their view of how 
personality traits influence behavior.  Up to this point, most research on the role of traits has 
been narrowly focused on establishing that they matter.  My results suggest that, not only do 
traits matter, but they exert an influence even when accounting for economic utility.  This 
represents a truly stern test for the influence of personality traits, and the fact that traits continue 
to matter even when economic utility is factored in should give us confidence about the 
importance of individual psychological dispositions.  It is past time to move beyond research that 
seeks to determine if traits matter.  They do.  We should now turn our attention to understanding 
the conditions under which they matter most.  The results of this chapter represent an early step 
in this process.  The innate dispositions of my respondents condition their choices, but which 
traits were relevant was heavily dependent on the nature of the environmental stimuli.  We must 
know something about the characteristics of the people being studied as well as the 
circumstances in which they find themselves if we truly want to understand the choices they 
make. 
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Chapter Five:  Personality in Context 
 Personality traits matter.  Our traits are rooted in genetics, and they exert substantial 
influence on a wide variety of behaviors.  Even more importantly, traits influence behavior by 
interacting with the world around us.  We select into environments based in part on our 
personality characteristics and our environments influence us differently depending on the traits 
we possess.  Given the strength of personality effects that have been demonstrated here and in 
recent research, a natural questions arises:  what took us so long?  Why are we only now at the 
point where personality traits are being integrated into larger models of behavior?  
At the outset of this dissertation I noted that there is a strong intuitive appeal to the use of 
personality traits in explaining behavior.  We come to terms with the world around us by 
recognizing patterns of thought and behavior, both in ourselves and in the people around us.  As 
we learn more about a person we can better predict how they will respond in a given situation.  If 
one of our friends exhibits calm, even under stressful situations, we will begin to think of them 
as a “calm person.”  We might be more inclined to seek help from our calm friends in moments 
of crisis, knowing that they will be more reliable than a friend who folds under pressure. 
 But what happens when our calm friend loses her cool in a stressful situation?  Does one 
incident of incongruent behavior undermine our classification?  For most people the clear answer 
to this question is no.  We can recognize that a calm person will occasionally get nervous, or 
overreact to a situation without our entire understanding of that person’s character being thrown 
into disarray.  One instance will be unlikely to shake our conviction that we understand our 
friend’s temperament.  On the other hand, a series of nervous reactions from our “calm” friend 
might lead us to reevaluate our assessment.  We may come to the conclusion that our earlier 
assessment had been wrong, or we could speculate that our friend has changed.  In some ways, 
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our intuitive judgment can resemble an inductive scientific process:  data are collected and 
analyzed, hypotheses are drawn, new data are collected, and hypotheses are reevaluated as 
necessary. 
 As social scientists we value intuitive appeal, and we know that a certain measure of 
faced validity is important.  However, intuition can only take us so far.  The scenario described 
above illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of human intuition.  It is rather remarkable 
that we can evaluate our friends along numerous dispositional dimensions, and that we use and 
adjust these assessments on a daily basis.  On the other hand, intuition often falls prey to an 
assortment of biases that can undermine the whole endeavor.  Selective attention, motivated 
reasoning, primacy bias, recency bias, attribution bias and a host of other potential biases make it 
difficult for us to trust any of our perceptions.  This leaves us with an interesting dilemma 
because intuition tells us that dispositional traits matter.  But can we trust our assessments of 
other people’s traits?  Can we trust our self-assessments, or are we merely representing ourselves 
the way we want to be seen? 
 Over the last seventy years or so, these questions have largely been answered.  This pace 
may seem slow, but personality researchers could not just trust their intuition.  Personality 
scholars had to find the relevant trait dimensions, establish valid and reliable measures, confirm 
the validity of self-reports, determine the stability of trait responses over time, ascertain the 
cross-situational stability of trait responses, and examine the cross-cultural replication of 
personality constructs.  Each task in this list was a daunting research agenda, and the 
development of the Big Five is rich in triumphs and setbacks. 
 In developing a framework for understanding political behavior that accounts for 
individual differences I am standing on the shoulders of all of the scholars who have developed 
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and refined our conception of personality traits.  The Big Five is unlikely to be the endpoint of 
personality research, but it represents the first point at which we have been able to conceptualize 
personality in a manner that political behavior scholars can use.  We should jump at the chance 
to do so because an incorporation of personality traits can help us to address some of the 
weaknesses in our field.  In this dissertation I have laid out a framework for incorporating 
personality into our existing models of political behavior.  This framework suggests clear paths 
for future research while also remaining flexible enough to be adapted to different research 
agendas. 
 
Personality in Context 
 What does it mean when we identify a “personality effect”?  Over the last few years, a 
number of articles have been published that demonstrate “direct” effects of personality traits on 
political variables of interest.  Despite demonstration of such effects, personality does not seem 
to have gained much of a foothold in mainstream political behavior work.  One reason for this 
might be that, in the absence of context, a personality effect is difficult to understand or apply.  A 
direct effect implies something static or absolute.  It suggests a relationship that is inherently not 
dynamic and thus, for many people, not interesting.  What I have attempted to show over the last 
three chapters is that personality traits themselves are stable, and that stability allows us to better 
understand a political world that is constantly in flux. 
 To illustrate this, consider again the figure I presented in Chapter One (Figure 1.1) and 
recall that each of the bold lines in the figure represent a key path in understanding the role 
personality traits play in shaping political behavior.  A study of the direct effects of personality 
traits on political behavior would be using a model that drew a straight line between traits and 
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behavior.  In this “framework,” the personality traits are simply disembodied causal forces which 
constantly operate to influence political behavior.  We have no means of understanding how 
traits are formed, and the environment is inconsequential.  To be clear, as far as I am aware no 
personality scholar is proposing such a simplified model, and most scholars who test direct 
effects for traits are likely to be open to the idea that there is more to the story.  Sometimes data 
limitations restrict testing to direct effects, but that does not mean we should keep our theorizing 
at that simplistic level. 
 A similar simplifying exercise can be used to illustrate the larger need for contextual 
thinking in political behavior research.  Different research agendas capture aspects of Figure 1.1, 
but they also leave large areas unspecified.  One of the major criticisms of traditional political 
behavior research that has been leveled by biology and politics scholars is that the traditional 
work is guilty of environmental determinism.  Direct effects of environmental stimuli are tested 
with no accounting for biological variation that seems to play an important role.  At the same 
time, though their theorizing has been clear that both genes and the environment matter, biology 
and politics research using twin studies has generally been unable to explain the mechanisms 
through which genes affect behavior.   
 In Chapter Two I made use of a rich twin dataset which contained an unprecedented set 
of political variables as well as an extensive Big Five battery.  Using this data I was able to 
estimate the degree to which correlations between traits and political variables were genetically 
heritable.  A substantial amount of the variance shared between traits and political behavior was 
heritable.  These findings comport well with a theory of influence in which personality traits act 
as a mediator between genes and politics.  The link between genes and politics is complex, and 
personality traits are only of the explanation, but they are a significant part to be sure. 
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 In Chapter Three I sought to illuminate the interaction between traits and environmental 
factors as they apply to political behavior.  Personality traits play an important role in shaping 
political discussion behavior, but that role is subtle and conditional.  Extraverts are more likely to 
engage in politics, but only when that engagement is social in nature.  Openness to experience 
and extraversion are both related to frequency of political discussion and the size of respondents’ 
social networks, but conscientiousness and emotional stability also influence discussion behavior 
in subtle ways.  Agreeableness inhibits exposure to cross-cutting views and individuals high in 
openness to experience are more readily persuaded by their discussion partners. 
 Chapter Four showed how different environmental circumstances could trigger different 
personality traits, and the preferences and values that accompany those traits.  When choices 
highlighted a sense of responsibility, duty, or obligation, conscientious individuals were more 
likely to do what they thought was the “right thing” even when that meant sacrificing monetary 
gain.  Similarly, introverted people were reluctant to stand up in front of a crowd for a greater 
economic payoff, but they would happily take action that did not require them to be placed in a 
psychologically uncomfortable situation.  The environment in these scenarios activates 
considerations that differ based on the personality characteristics of the individual. 
 Taken together, my goal has been to show that personality traits are stable, biologically-
based dispositions.  We can use these dispositions to form a better understanding of 
heterogeneous environmental effects.  People experience the political world differently.  A get-
out-the-vote strategy that works on me might do nothing to sway my friend.  Negative 
advertising might turn my friend off, but it could stimulate my interest.  The notion that our 
environment will affect us differently depending on our traits is a simple and intuitive one, but it 
is built on a solid theoretical foundation that goes far beyond simple intuition.                           
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Moving Forward 
The Big Five has emerged as a highly influential personality trait taxonomy in 
psychology over the last twenty five years, and with political scientists beginning to incorporate 
personality into their research designs, the opportunity is there to make significant advances in 
our knowledge.  At the same time, we must be cautious as we proceed, and mindful of what 
could go wrong.  Psychologists were studying trait taxonomies that closely resembled the Big 
Five long before Costa, McCrae, and Goldberg brought their models into the mainstream.  
Research stalled because scholars became entrenched in their ideas and unwilling to maintain 
dialogue with those who disagreed with them.  It would be unfortunate if personality research in 
political science fell into the same trap.  We should recognize that the Big Five may be more 
helpful in some fields than in others, and that knowing when personality does not matter can be 
just as informative as understanding when it does.   
Another possibility is that political scientists may find that a narrower view of traits is 
useful for some questions.  For example, the concepts of need for cognition and need to evaluate 
both made their marks in political science before the Big Five.  It may be that in a broad sense, 
these psychological predispositions do not qualify as “traits” and they may even be encompassed 
by one or more Big Five traits, but that does not mean there is not a place for them in our 
understanding of political behavior.  I see no reason for rigid adherence to the Big Five if there 
are instances where application of an alternate framework can help us to produce greater insight 
regarding the substantive matter in question.  However, the Big Five should be our starting point, 
and more specific indicators of personality should be situated within a Big Five framework 
before they are used widely.  We need to have a common understanding of personality if 
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researchers are to communicate readily, and, at present, the Big Five seems to be the best 
candidate for such an understanding. 
 The contributions I have outlined in the previous chapters advance our understanding of 
political behavior in several important ways, but there are other advances that also will be 
important.  A scholar could construct a research agenda from an exploration of the various sub-
facets of the Big Five.  As we learn more about which trait effects appear consistently, and which 
do not, the ability to move to the facet level could prove valuable.  For example, we could start 
from a question such as:  what is it about openness to experience that leads to greater political 
participation?  An examination of the facets of openness could help us to understand on a more 
basic level which aspects of the trait are driving the relationship.  Is it the attraction to ideas?  Or 
perhaps the drive to be placed in novel situations is the strongest part of the relationship.  
Examining traits at the facet level has the potential to improve our theorizing because we can be 
even more specific about the mechanisms most relevant to the question of interest.   
Another way that the facets of the Big Five could prove to be useful is in helping to 
clarify inconsistent findings at the trait level.  For example, openness to experience and 
conscientiousness are consistently found to be associated with liberal and conservative 
ideologies, respectively.  At the same time, extraversion is generally not found to be associated 
with either ideological pole.  Agreeableness and emotional stability have been much less 
consistent in terms of their relationship with ideology.  Some studies find relationships 
suggesting that agreeableness is associated with liberalism.  Some studies find relationships 
suggesting that emotional stability is associated with conservatism.  But just as many studies find 
no relationship at all.  One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that different facets of 
the traits are moving in opposite directions.  Hirsh et al. (2010) present evidence suggesting that 
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one aspect of agreeableness, “compassion,” was associated with liberalism, while another, 
“politeness” was associated with conservatism.  If this is the case, mixed findings for 
agreeableness are much easier to understand and interpret. 
Going too far down this road is dangerous because we do not want to become bogged 
down in debates over the relative importance of sub-scales within a trait dimension.  The facets 
of the Big Five can be useful if deployed for theoretically sound purposes, but it should be kept 
in mind that the Big Five were derived empirically, and a five factor model represents a more 
accurate description of individual difference than the thirty trait structure that would be implied 
by treating the facets as totally distinct.  At all times we will have to strike a balance between the 
greater precision that is available to us and the parsimony provided by the Big Five.  Any move 
towards precision should be made based on sound theoretical expectations. 
Utilizing the Big Five in comparative research also has the potential to lead to a number 
of important advances.  As evidence for the cross-cultural similarity of trait structure continues 
to accumulate, we can begin to leverage this similarity across different political contexts.  In 
examining the effects of personality traits in different countries, we should expect to see broad 
similarities to the degree that politics is similar from country to country.  Extraversion, as an 
example, should positively predict political activity in most democratic countries, because the 
connection between sociability and political engagement would seem to be fairly constant across 
contexts.  With broad similarities established, the next step would be to try and theorize about 
how personality effects might manifest differently depending on the political context.  For 
example, perhaps the link between openness and political engagement is weaker in systems with 
traditional one-party dominance because politics in those contexts does not provide opportunities 
for engagement with new ideas. 
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In addition to the broad directions suggested above, each of the three empirical chapters 
here could be extended in meaningful ways, and I hope to be able to carry out these extensions 
soon.  For the short term, the most pressing need in research on the heritability of personality and 
politics is replication of the findings reported in Chapter Two.  This is especially important 
considering that my data has limitations relating to the reliability of some of the personality 
traits.  Fortunately, this problem should be rectified shortly.  A replication will be possible using 
data collected from Danish twins, hopefully by the end of 2011.  The Danish dataset will have a 
much larger sample size, which will help to ensure the reliability of the personality measures.  
By collaborating with scholars from the University of Southern Denmark, I hope to be able to 
obtain much stronger empirical support for the findings in Chapter Two.  
The study of political discussion in recent years has become focused on questions 
surrounding disagreement.  In general, people talk with those who are most like them 
(McPherson et al. 2001), and thus, exposure to disagreement is the exception not the rule.  This 
pattern holds true for politics (Mutz 2006, but see Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2002).  A 
lack of exposure to cross-cutting views is problematic because exposure to disagreement has 
been linked to a number of positive consequences including greater understanding of the larger 
issue environment (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), higher levels of tolerance (Mutz 2002), and 
better understanding of the rationales supporting opposing viewpoints (Barabas 2004).  On the 
other hand, Mutz (2006) also has shown that exposure to disagreement can lead to lower levels 
of political participation.   
In Chapter Three, I discussed how extraversion and agreeableness conditioned the impact 
of network size on exposure to disagreement and that high levels of openness to experience were 
associated with greater discussion partner influence.  This work could be extended in several 
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ways to further strengthen our understanding of the importance of disagreement.  One possibility 
is that the nature of disagreement varies based on personality traits, and this variation, in turn, is 
likely to be important for the kinds of effects of disagreement we observe.  Some people are 
likely to really enjoy disagreements and engage in them readily and recreationally.  For others, 
disagreements are likely to be intense, confrontational experiences.  It is easy to imagine that the 
kind of disagreement will be important in determining the consequences of that cross-cutting 
discussion.  An angry debate is likely to produce different consequences when compared to 
friendly banter, but political scientists have generally not measured the nature of the 
disagreement with this kind of precision.  The personalities of the participants are likely to 
moderate several aspects of this dynamic, including the frequency of disagreement, the nature of 
the dispute, and effects that result from different types of disagreements. 
Along similar lines, the findings in Chapter Three provide insights into the personality of 
an individual likely to be persuaded.  Chapter Three also provided evidence that individuals who 
were more open to experience and more neurotic were more likely to try and persuade others.  
However, we know little about which personality traits are associated with the individual who is 
actually successful in persuading their discussion partner.  The best data for addressing this issue 
would have information on both conversation partners, which would require a snowball sample.  
With such data, we could learn who is more likely to be successful at persuading their discussion 
partner.  We could also learn if certain personality traits were associated with overconfidence in 
thinking they had persuaded their discussion partner when in truth they had not been effective.  
In collaboration with Paul Testa and Melinda Ritchie, I hope to have a pilot survey administered 
to University of Illinois undergraduates this fall.  Our goal is then to use the results of the pilot 
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study to seek funding for a full survey that could be administered to a more representative 
sample of the population. 
Finally, I hope to extend the findings of Chapter Four by moving to a more formalized 
experimental test of differing conceptions of utility.  One way to do this is to analyze how 
variation in personality traits affects the way people play economic games.  I expect that people 
will play differently depending on their personality traits, and I expect that subtle manipulations 
in the way the game is set up will affect people with different traits in predictable ways.  At the 
moment, I envision having subjects play variations on dictator, ultimatum, and trust games.  
There is already some limited evidence to suggest that two traits, agreeableness and extraversion, 
play an important role in determining the extent of cooperative behavior, with agreeableness 
being positively related to cooperation and extraversion negatively related (Koole et a. 2001; 
Ben-Ner et al. 2008) In the dictator game, Player 1 has $10.  Player 1 can choose to send some 
amount to Player 2 and keep whatever they do not send.  Player 2 has no action.  The ultimatum 
game is the same as the dictator game, except Player 2 can choose to accept Player 1’s offer, or 
Player 2 can choose to void the deal in which case both players receive $0.  In the trust game, 
Player 1 can choose to keep $10 or send some amount of it to Player 2.  Whatever money is sent 
to Player 2 triples, and then Player 2 can decide what to do with the money.  Player 2 is under no 
obligation to send any of the money back to Player 1, hence the name of the game.   
People who play these games consistently defy the predictions of classic economic 
theories.  In the ultimatum game for example, the modal decision is to offer a 50-50 split of the 
money, even though the “rational” action would be to keep $9 and give only $1.  When people 
do make “unfair” offers like this ($8-$2, or $9-$1) a significant portion of subjects reject these 
offers, even though they would still be benefiting by accepting.  All of this suggests that for 
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many people, there is more to utility than what yields the most money.  I think personality traits 
could be helpful in explaining variation in how people play these games.  Further, I believe we 
can learn more about how people make utility judgments by manipulating the decision-making 
conditions.  For example, the decision of an extravert might be very different if he has met the 
person with whom he is playing. 
Testing individual variation in perceptions of utility using this framework would seem to 
complement the approach I utilized in Chapter Four.  Economic games lack some measure of 
realism, as people are very rarely placed in situations where they are forced to distribute money 
under such rigid conditions.  On the other hand, the scenarios used in Chapter Four were meant 
to feel like real decisions that people faced in their day-to-day lives.  What the economic games 
lack in realism, they make up for in internal validity as the experimenter has total control over 
any manipulations in how the game is played.  Taken together, these two research strategies can 
provide a framework for understanding how personality traits shape evaluations of utility.  My 
hope is that this work will help bring proponents and opponents of rational choice into a 
compromise of sorts.  Rational choice scholars are correct when they assert that utility 
maximization is a useful model that can in certain circumstances closely approximate real world 
behavior.  Similarly, critics of rational choice are correct in pointing out the limitations of such 
an approach, and the empirical irregularities left unexplained.  Instead of repeating the same 
debates ad nauseum, we should be seeking a better understanding of how people conceptualize 
personal utility and how variation in these conceptions influences decision-making.  An 
approach that incorporates personality traits could provide us with some real insights. 
I believe the course that I have advocated will help push the goals of personality research 
beyond simply showing that personality matters.  Establishing the links between the heritability 
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of personality and political participation should have an impact in providing us a mechanism 
through which genes influence political behavior.  Incorporating predispositions into our studies 
of social interaction provides us a richer picture of how people respond differently to the political 
environment in which they live.  And systematic influences of personality traits on perceptions 
of utility help to provide us with a rational choice framework that appeals to psychologists as 
well as economists.  All of these are exciting steps forward, and I hope they make a significant 
contribution, not just with what I have found, but by suggesting fruitful new avenues of study. 
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Table 2.1 
 rMZ (p value) n 
rDZ 
(p value) n 
A 
(95% CI) 
C 
(95% CI) 
E 
(95% CI) 
Openness to 
Experience 
0.51 
(<0.001) 
351 0.11 
(0.10) 
234 0.49 
(0.40-
0.57) 
0 
(0-0) 
0.51 
(0.43-
0.60) 
Conscientiousness 0.25 
(<0.001) 
351 0.11 
(0.07) 
234 0.25 
(0.07-
0.37) 
0 
(0-0.08) 
0.75 
(0.65-
0.85) 
Extraversion 0.51 
(<0.001) 
351 0.17 
(<0.001) 
234 0.50 
(0.40-
0.57) 
0 
(0-0.22) 
0.50 
(0.42-
0.59) 
Agreeableness 0.23 
(<0.001) 
350 0.06 
(0.44) 
234 0.22 
(0.02-
0.33) 
0 
(0-0.24) 
0.78 
(0.68-
0.87) 
Neuroticism 0.40 
(<0.001) 
351 0.15 
(0.02) 
234 0.39 
(0.29-
0.49) 
0 
(0-0) 
0.61 
(0.51-
0.71) 
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Table 2.2 
 rMZ (p value) n 
rDZ 
(p value) n 
A 
(95% CI) 
C 
(95% CI) 
E 
(95% CI) 
Vote in Past 
Presidential 
Elections 
0.52 
(<0.001) 
356 0.32 
(<0.001) 
239 0.39 
(0.06-0.61) 
0.12 
(0-0.38) 
0.48 
(0.37-0.60) 
Political 
Interest 
0.39 
(<0.001) 
356 0.22 
(0.002) 
239 0.35 
(0.08-0.48) 
0.04 
(0-0.32) 
0.61 
(0.51-0.70) 
Political 
Knowledge 
0.53 
(<0.001) 
356 0.21 
(0.002) 
240 0.52 
(0.42-0.60) 
0 
(0-0.41) 
0.48 
(0.40-0.56) 
Discuss 
Politics with 
Others 
0.36 
(<0.001) 
356 0.20 
(0.003) 
239 0.32 
(0.06-0.45) 
0.03 
(0-0.28) 
0.64 
(0.54-0.73) 
Discuss 
Politics with 
People who 
Disagree 
0.28 
(<0.001) 
356 0.08 
(0.25) 
239 0.26 
(0.16-0.36) 
0 
(0-0) 
0.74 
(0.65-0.83) 
Member of a 
Political 
Group 
0.49 
(<0.001) 
356 0.34 
(0.003) 
239 0.32 
(0-0.60) 
0.18 
(0-0.48) 
0.51 
(0.36-0.67) 
Member of a 
Community 
Group 
0.45 
(<0.001) 
356 0.27 
(0.003) 
239 0.36 
(0-0.55) 
0.09 
(0-0.39) 
0.55 
(0.43-0.66) 
Attend a Rally 0.50 
(<0.001) 
356 0.37 
(<0.001) 
239 0.27 
(0-0.58) 
0.23 
(0-0.50) 
0.50 
(0.38-0.62) 
Work in a 
Campaign 
0.48 
(<0.001) 
356 0.14 
(0.29) 
239 0.46 
(0.22-0.64) 
0 
(0-0) 
0.54 
(0.39-0.71) 
Contribute 
Money 
0.54 
(<0.001) 
356 0.20 
(0.06) 
239 0.53 
(0.33-0.66) 
0 
(0-0.40) 
0.47 
(0.35-0.60) 
Held Office 0.53 
(<0.001) 
356 -0.01 
(0.98) 
239 0.46 
(0.04-0.67) 
0 
(0-0.12) 
0.54 
(0.33-0.92) 
Contacted 
Official 
0.54 
(<0.001) 
356 0.22 
(0.04) 
239 0.54 
(0.30-0.69) 
0 
(0-0.37) 
0.47 
(0.34-0.60) 
Overall 
Participation 
Scale 
0.45 
(<0.001) 
356 0.23 
(<0.001) 
239 0.44 
(0.26-0.56) 
0.01 
(0-0.27) 
0.55 
(0.46-0.63) 
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Table 2.3 Voter Turnout 
 Bivariate Correlation 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
C 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
Difference 
in Model Fit 
(Chi Square 
Test p-value 
Openness 0.10*** 0.84 
(0.26-
1.87) 
-0.06 
(-1.19-
0.56) 
0.23 
(-0.34-
0.88) 
0.77 
(0.13-
1.32) 
0.23 
(-0.33-
0.86) 
0.77 
Conscientiousness 0.05       
Extraversion 0.02       
Agreeableness 0.08* 1.56 
(-0.31-
5.74) 
-0.57 
(-4.64-
1.08) 
0.02 
(-1.62-
0.96) 
0.94 
(-0.02-
2.50) 
0.06 
(-1.54-
1.01) 
0.69 
Neuroticism 0.04       
 
Correlations are significant at * p<0.05, ** p<.01, and *** p<0.001 
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Table 2.4 Participation 
 Bivariate Correlation 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
C 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
Difference 
in Model Fit 
(Chi Square 
Test p-value 
Openness 0.25*** 0.73 
(0.37-
1.01) 
0.03 
(-0.06-
0.38) 
0.24 
(0.01-
0.47) 
0.77 
(0.53-
0.98) 
0.24 
(0.02-
0.47) 
0.99 
Conscientiousness -0.05       
Extraversion 0.16*** 0.51 
(-0.20-
1.01) 
0.06 
(-0.19-
0.89) 
0.43 
(0.05-
0.84) 
0.57 
(0.14-
0.92) 
0.43 
(0.08-
0.85) 
0.99 
Agreeableness 0.03       
Neuroticism 0.10** 0.01 
(-2.35-
1.56) 
0.05 
(-1.03-
2.10) 
0.94 
(0.12-
2.45) 
0.07 
(-1.51-
0.79) 
0.93 
(0.20-
2.50) 
0.99 
 
Correlations are significant at * p<0.05, ** p<.01, and *** p<0.001 
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Table 2.5 Political Interest 
 Bivariate Correlation 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
C 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
Difference 
in Model Fit 
(Chi Square 
Test p-value 
Openness 0.25** 0.44 
(-0.04-
0.80) 
0.13 
(-0.03-
0.54) 
0.43 
(0.18-
0.65) 
0.58 
(0.35-
0.83) 
0.42 
(0.17-
0.65) 
0.96 
Conscientiousness        
Extraversion 0.17*** 0.28 
(-0.70-
0.81) 
0.14 
(-0.09-
1.07) 
0.59 
(0.23-
0.99) 
0.43 
(0.02-
0.75) 
0.57 
(0.24-
0.98) 
0.98 
Agreeableness        
Neuroticism 0.07* -0.21 
(-3.54-
2.29) 
-0.01 
(-3.28-
1.47) 
1.21 
(0.28-
4.32) 
-0.20 
(-4.18-
0.66) 
1.20 
(0.33-
5.18) 
0.99 
 
Correlations are significant at * p<0.05, ** p<.01, and *** p<0.001 
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Table 2.6 Political Knowledge 
 Bivariate Correlation 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
C 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
A 
(95% 
CI) 
E 
(95% 
CI) 
Difference 
in Model Fit 
(Chi Square 
Test p-value 
Openness 0.18*** 0.75 
(0.30-
1.14) 
0 
(-0.34-
0.13) 
0.25 
(-0.10-
0.62) 
0.75 
(0.40-
1.10) 
0.20 
(-0.35-
0.73) 
1.00 
Conscientiousness 0.01       
Extraversion -0.01       
Agreeableness -0.02       
Neuroticism 0.13*** 0.79 
(-0.12-
1.91) 
0 
(-1.21-
0.56) 
0.21 
(-0.47-
0.73) 
0.79 
(0.21-
1.36) 
0.21 
(-0.36-
0.77) 
1.00 
 
Correlations are significant at * p<0.05, ** p<.01, and *** p<0.001
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Table 3.1 Indicators of the Big Five 
Personality factor Component terms 
Scale 
Mean 
(s.d.) 
Pearson’s R Number of Cases 
A. 2004 Community Survey    
Openness to Experience Confident - unconfident Intelligent – unintelligent  
0.62 
(0.27) 0.41 822 
Conscientiousness Organized – disorganized Neat – sloppy 
0.54 
(0.29) 0.52 822 
Extraversion Extraverted – introverted Outgoing – reserved 
0.46 
(0.28) 0.57 822 
Agreeableness Kind – unkind Sympathetic – unsympathetic 
0.68 
(0.27) 0.39 822 
Emotional Stability Calm – tense Relaxed – nervous 
0.52 
(0.28) 0.57 822 
B. 2006 National Survey    
Openness to Experience 
An intellectual – not an 
intellectual 
Philosophical – unreflective 
0.46 
(0.22) 0.28 1,098 
Conscientiousness Sloppy – neat Hard working – lazy 
0.57 
(0.25) 0.29 1,132 
Extraversion Outgoing – shy Introverted – extraverted 
0.41 
(0.26) 0.53 1,102 
Agreeableness Sympathetic – unsympathetic Unkind – kind 
0.63 
(0.25) 0.47 1,128 
Emotional Stability Relaxed –tense Nervous – calm 
0.40 
(0.22) 0.43 1,131 
Note: Scales are constructed using logged data and scale values range from 0 (lowest observed value on the trait) to 1  
 (highest observed value). 
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Table 3.2 Personality, Network Size and Attempts to Persuade Others  
 
 Network Size Persuade Others 
Variable Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Openness to Experience 1.00** (0.30) 
2.01*** 
(0.36) 
Conscientiousness -0.46# (0.26) 
-0.27 
(0.31) 
Extraversion 1.03*** (0.24) 
0.38 
(0.29) 
Agreeableness 0.24 (0.27) 
-0.08 
(0.33) 
Emotional Stability -0.80** (0.28) 
-0.78* 
(0.35) 
Age -0.00 (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Race -0.59# (0.30) 
-0.78# 
(0.42) 
Sex 0.12 (0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
Education 0.12*** (0.03) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
Constant   
-1.27** 
(0.37) 
Cut-Point #1 -0.92** (0.31)  
Cut-Point #2 0.16 (0.31)  
Cut-Point #3 0.93** (0.31)  
Cut-Point #4 1.61*** (0.31)  
Model χ2 81.62 65.81 
Number of Cases 1018 1036 
Note: Cell entries for Column 1 are ordered logistic regression coefficients.  Cell entries for Column 2 are binomial logistic regression 
coefficients. . *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05, # p< 0.10; Source: 2006 National Survey
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Table 3.3 Personality and the Context of Discussion 
 Family Friends Neighborhood Clubs Church Work 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Openness 0.00 (0.34) 
-0.20 
(0.34) 
0.92** 
(0.34) 
0.48 
(0.35) 
0.50 
(0.33) 
0.33 
(0.33) 
0.57 
(0.35) 
0.14 
(0.36) 
0.04 
(0.35) 
-0.010 
(0.35) 
0.40 
(0.34) 
-0.05 
(0.35) 
Conscientiousness 0.63* (0.28) 
0.66* 
(0.29) 
0.37 
(0.29) 
0.43 
(0.29) 
0.56* 
(0.28) 
0.58* 
(0.28) 
0.58# 
(0.30) 
0.62* 
(0.31) 
0.54 
(0.30) 
0.55# 
(0.30) 
0.19 
(0.30) 
0.20 
(0.30) 
Extraversion 0.33 (0.27) 
0.17 
(0.28) 
0.51# 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.28) 
0.14 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
1.05*** 
(0.29) 
0.84** 
(0.29) 
0.62* 
(0.28) 
0.54# 
(0.28) 
0.57* 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.28) 
Agreeableness 0.10 (0.32) 
0.05 
(0.32) 
-0.05 
(0.32) 
-0.19 
(0.33) 
-0.23 
(0.31) 
-0.29 
(0.32) 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
-0.20 
(0.34) 
-0.07 
(0.34) 
-0.11 
(0.34) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.00 
(0.34) 
Emotional Stability 0.20 (0.30) 
0.28 
(0.30) 
-0.02 
(0.30) 
0.14 
(0.31) 
-0.23 
(0.29) 
-0.18 
(0.29) 
-0.36 
(0.31) 
-0.21 
(0.32) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
-0.17 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
Age 0.03*** (0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Race 0.21 (0.20) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.21) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
0.55** 
(0.21) 
0.58** 
(0.21) 
0.73*** 
(0.20) 
0.72*** 
(0.20) 
0.38# 
(0.20) 
0.37# 
(0.21) 
Sex 0.11 (0.16) 
0.15 
(0.16) 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
-0.00 
(0.16) 
-0.17 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.21 
(0.16) 
-0.18 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
-0.29# 
(0.16) 
-0.22 
(0.16) 
Education 0.03 (0.04) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.11* 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Frequency of 
Discussion  
0.49*** 
(0.10)  
1.16*** 
(0.11)  
0.37*** 
(0.10)  
0.74*** 
(0.11)  
0.32** 
(0.10)  
0.88*** 
(0.11) 
Cut-point #1 -0.45 (0.37) 
0.27 
(0.40) 
-2.33*** 
(0.42) 
-.081# 
(0.44) 
-0.30 
(0.35) 
0.28 
(0.38) 
-0.41 
(0.38) 
0.62 
(0.41) 
-0.21 
(0.37) 
0.23 
(0.40) 
-1.82*** 
(0.37) 
-0.70# 
(0.40) 
Cut-point #2 0.94** (0.36) 
1.69*** 
(0.39) 
-0.13 
(0.36) 
1.57*** 
(0.40) 
1.33*** 
(0.35) 
1.93*** 
(0.39) 
1.09** 
(0.38) 
2.21*** 
(0.42) 
1.17** 
(0.37) 
1.63*** 
(0.41) 
-0.66# 
(0.36) 
0.54 
(0.40) 
Cut-point #3 2.42*** (0.37) 
3.21*** 
(0.41) 
1.95*** 
(0.37) 
3.99*** 
(0.43) 
3.02*** 
(0.37) 
3.65*** 
(0.41) 
2.81*** 
(0.39) 
4.04*** 
(0.44) 
2.62*** 
(0.39) 
3.10*** 
(0.42) 
0.89* 
(0.37) 
2.26*** 
(0.41) 
Model χ2 47.30 72.18 27.40 149.33 33.20 48.28 41.41 90.32 31.82 41.75 44.81 114.18 
Number of Cases 649 649 649 649 650 650 563 563 574 574 577 577 
Note: Cell entries are ordered logistic regression coefficients. *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05, # p< 0.10. Source: 2004 Community Survey 
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Table 3.4 Personality and the Nature of Ties and Differing Political Views among Political 
Discussants 
 No Discussant Close Tie Discussant Holds Different Views 
Variable 
 Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Openness to Experience -0.49 (0.60) 
-0.11 
(0.43) 
-0.66# 
(0.37) 
Conscientiousness 0.06 (0.52) 
0.46 
(0.37) 
0.20 
(0.31) 
Extraversion 0.45 (0.49) 
0.43 
(0.35) 
-0.17 
(0.30) 
Agreeableness 0.96 (0.61) 
0.48 
(0.42) 
-0.44 
(0.36) 
Emotional Stability -0.07 (0.54) 
-0.81* 
(0.38) 
0.86* 
(0.33) 
Age 0.00 (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Race -0.59# (0.33) 
-0.80** 
(0.23) 
-0.09 
(0.22) 
Sex 0.19 (0.29) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
-0.21 
(0.17) 
Education -0.29*** (0.08) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
Constant -0.29 (0.65) 
0.53 
(0.45)  
Cut-Point #1    
-0.04 
(0.39) 
Cut-Point #2    
1.98*** 
(0.41) 
Model χ2 60.86  15.34 
Number of Cases 732  643 
Note: Cell entries for Column 1 and Column 2 are multinomial logistic regression coefficients, with “distant/casual tie” as the contrast category.  
Cell entries for Column 3 are ordered logistic regression coefficients. 
 ** p< .01, * p < .05,  # p < .10; Source: 2004 Community Survey 
  143 
 
Table 3.5 Personality, Network Size and Exposure to Cross-Cutting Political 
Discourse  
 Baseline Personality 
Variable Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Openness to Experience -0.88* (0.41) 
     0.25 
     (1.03) 
Conscientiousness 0.15 (0.35) 
      -0.12 
     (0.95) 
Extraversion -0.01 (0.32) 
     -2.28* 
     (1.03) 
Agreeableness -0.45 (0.37) 
      2.03* 
     (0.98) 
Emotional Stability 0.17 (0.39) 
      0.08  
     (0.96) 
Age 0.00 (0.01) 
      0.00 
     (0.01) 
Race -1.43* (0.66) 
     -1.61* 
     (0.67) 
Sex -0.49** (0.05) 
      -0.51** 
     (0.17) 
Education 0.01 (0.04) 
     0.01 
     (0.04) 
Network Size 0.45*** (0.07) 
      0.82** 
     (0.25) 
Openness to Experience x Network Size       -0.40      (0.33) 
Conscientiousness x Network Size       0.06      (0.30) 
Extraversion x Network Size        0.75*      (0.31) 
Agreeableness x Network Size       -0.85**      (0.31) 
Emotional Stability x Network Size       0.04      (0.32) 
Constant -0.96* (0.48) 
      -1.90* 
     (0.85) 
Model χ2     68.85     83.08 
Number of Cases 785 785 
Note:  Cell entries are binomial logistic regression coefficients. *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05, # p< 0.10; Source: 2006 National Survey 
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Table 3.6 Personality and Discussant Influence 
 2004 Community Survey 2006 National Survey 
 Baseline Model 
(1) 
Full Model 
(2) 
Baseline Model 
(3) 
Full Model 
(4) 
Variable Coefficient (s.e.) 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.01# 
(0.01) 
Race -0.35# (0.21) 
-0.33 
(0.23) 
-0.60 
(0.42) 
-0.92# 
(0.49) 
Sex -0.15 (0.15) 
-0.22 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
Education -0.10* (0.04) 
-0.09# 
(0.05) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
-0.07# 
(0.04) 
Party Identification 0.57*** (0.05) 
0.58*** 
(0.05) 
0.56*** 
(0.04) 
0.55*** 
(0.05) 
Ideology 0.72*** (0.09) 
0.75*** 
(0.10) 
0.42*** 
(0.05) 
0.42*** 
(0.05) 
Trust in Others 0.12# (0.07) 
0.13# 
(0.07)   
No Discussant -0.00 (0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.24) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
Discussant Political View 0.47*** (0.06) 
0.19 
(0.17) 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16 
(0.18) 
Openness to Experience   
-0.19 
(0.35) 
 
 
-0.23 
(0.39) 
Conscientiousness   
0.31 
(0.31) 
 
 
0.17 
(0.32) 
Extraversion   
-0.07 
(0.30) 
 
 
-0.27 
(0.32) 
Agreeableness   
0.31 
(0.36) 
 
 
-0.20 
(0.34) 
Emotional Stability   
-0.09 
(0.33) 
 
 
-0.25 
(0.34) 
Influence-Openness Interaction   
0.45* 
(0.23)  
0.66* 
(0.28) 
Influence-Conscientiousness 
Interaction 
 
 
0.29 
(0.19)  
0.27 
(0.20) 
Influence-Extraversion 
Interaction  
0.06 
(0.19)  
-0.22 
(0.20) 
Influence-Agreeableness 
Interaction  
-0.28 
(0.22)  
-0.06 
(0.21) 
Influence-Emotional Stability 
Interaction  
-0.02 
(0.20)  
0.36 
(0.24) 
Cut-Point #1 1.13** (0.36) 
1.40** 
(0.44) 
1.44*** 
(0.35) 
1.35** 
(0.44) 
Cut-Point #2 2.91*** (0.38) 
3.22*** 
(0.45) 
2.55*** 
(0.36) 
2.44*** 
(0.44) 
Cut-Point #3 5.75*** (0.44) 
6.02*** 
(0.51) 
5.01*** 
(0.39) 
4.89*** 
(0.47) 
Model χ2 618.101 568.57 842.67 813.77 
Number of Cases 768 705 1056 1003 
Note:  Cell entries are ordered logistic regression coefficients. *** p< 0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05, # p< 0.10 
Source: 2004 Community Survey and 2006 National Survey 
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 Figure 1.1 Traditional View of the Antecedents of Political Behavior 
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 Figure 1.2 Simplistic View of Biological Influence on Political Behavior 
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 Figure 1.3 Simplistic View of Personality Influence on Political Behavior 
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Figure 1.4 Personality in Context 
Note: Lines in bold represent the central paths by which personality traits are hypothesized to affect political 
behavior. Additional solid lines represent other known antecedents of political behavior and dashed lines represent 
additional plausible antecedents of political behavior. 
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Figure 3.1 The Conditional Impact of Network Size on Exposure to Disagreement 
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Figure 3.2. Discussant political preferences, openness to experience, and approval of 
George Bush as president 
Discussant is a Democrat,  
disapproves of Bush 
Discussant is a Republican,  
approves of Bush 
A. Community survey 
B. National survey 
Discussion network is  
homogeneous Democratic 
Discussion network is  
homogeneous Republican 
 High openness 
 
 High openness 
 
Low openness 
Low openness 
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Figure 4.1 Personality Effects for the U-Turn Decision 
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Figure 4.2 Personality Effects for the Traffic Course Decision 
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Figure 4.3 Personality Effects for the Games Decision 
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Figure 4.4 Personality Effects for the School Report Decision 
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Figure 4.5 Personality Effects for the Court Decision
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Figure 4.6 Version Effect for the City Council Decision 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Personality Effects for the City Council Decision 
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Figure 4.8 Version Effect for the Lunch Decision 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Personality Effects for the Lunch Decision 
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Figure 4.10 Version Effect for the Airplane Decision 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Personality Effects for the Airplane Decision 
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Figure 4.12 Version Effect for the Concert Decision 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Personality Effects for the Concert Decision 
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Figure 4.14 Version Effect for the Sweet or Sour Decision 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Personality Effects for the Sweet or Sour Decision 
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Appendix A:  Personality Survey for Chapter 4 
 
Now we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.  The following section contains 
pairs of words.  On a scale of zero to ten, which word best describes you?  For example, on the 
first pair of words, the number zero means "unimaginative," the number 10 means "imaginative," 
and the number 5 is exactly the middle-neither unimaginative nor imaginative.  On this scale, 
what number best represents you?  You can use any number from zero to ten. 
 
Please place yourself on the scale. Please circle one number per item. Please answer every item. 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimaginative            Imaginative 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
    Reserved                Outgoing 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Tense                    Calm 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Reliable               Unreliable 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Uncooperative             Cooperative 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
      Talkative                   Quiet 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         Kind                 Unkind 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Bold                     Shy 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Sloppy                    Neat 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
       Steady                    Moody 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
   Careless                             Careful 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Uninquisitive                             Curious 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
      Relaxed                  Nervous 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Philosophical               Practical 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         Cold                   Warm 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
    Responsible            Irresponsible 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         Creative               Uncreative 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Sympathetic                  Unsympathetic 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Extraverted              Introverted 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
       Simple                  Complex 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
   Insecure                             Secure 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
      Inhibited            Spontaneous 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     Lazy           Hardworking 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
     Harsh                              Gentle 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Content                      Discontented 
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Appendix B:  Decision Making Survey for Chapter 4 
 
We are interested in the choices people make in various hypothetical situations. This survey 
includes descriptions of ten very different types of decision-making situations. We ask that you 
read each one carefully, and indicate your choice. 
 
Decision #1. 
 
Suppose that you are driving on the highway late at night when you realize that you left your cell 
phone at a restaurant a half hour ago. Your friend is with you, so you call your phone and learn 
that the restaurant manager is holding it for you. To retrieve your phone, you can safely make a 
U-turn on the highway, but a sign there says “Emergency Vehicles Only.” Otherwise, you will 
have to continue to the next exit, which is 15 miles ahead, and turn around there. Consider these 
scenarios: 
 
1. If you continue to the next exit before turning back, it will take you one hour to get 
back to the restaurant because it is 15 minutes until the next exit, 15 minutes back to 
your current location, and 30 minutes from your current location back to the 
restaurant. You are delayed an extra 30 minutes. 
 
2. If you make a U-turn, two outcomes are possible: 
a. There is a 99% chance that you will return directly to the restaurant. You 
experience no additional cost or delay. 
b. There is a 1% chance that you will be pulled over by a police officer for 
making an illegal U-turn. The traffic stop will delay you and you will receive 
a ticket. You are delayed an extra 30 minutes and must pay a $125 ticket. 
 
Given these scenarios, which course of action would you choose? (circle one): 
 
 Choice #1: proceed to the next exist before turning around to retrieve your cell phone. 
 
 Choice #2: make a U-turn now and proceed immediately to retrieve your cell phone. 
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Decision #2 
 
You receive a speeding ticket. In order to keep the ticket off of your driving record and avoid an 
increase in your auto insurance rate, you decide to enroll in a safe driving course. The state 
provides two choices. The first choice is to participate in an on-line course. This course takes six 
hours to complete. You can take the course at home on your computer. The second choice is to 
participate in an in-person course where you would listen to live lectures and participate in group 
discussion with the other drivers enrolled in the course. This course takes only four hours to 
complete, but you would have to go to the local community college to take the course. Which 
would you choose (circle one): 
 
 Six-hour on-line course  Four-hour course at the community college 
 
 
 
Decision #3 
 
You are at the freshman orientation a few days before your first semester of college. In one 
activity, from 11:00 to 12:00, all students are required to sign up to play some games. You have 
two choices. Choice #1 includes a variety of what are labeled as “picnic games,” including 
badminton, lawn bowling, bag toss, and flag football. Choice #2 includes a variety of what are 
labeled as “mystery games.” Which would you choose? (circle one): 
 
 Picnic games    Mystery games 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision #4 
 
In one of your classes, you are paired with another student. Together, the two of you have to 
complete a ten-page research project. Two days before the project is due, you receive the other 
student’s part. You are unwilling to hand in the project until the other student’s portion is 
improved. You have two options. First, you could confront the other student and demand that the 
job be done right. The other student has an attitude problem, and this option likely will result in a 
big argument, but it’s the only way to get the student to improve the work. The second option is 
to just do it yourself. The other student will get the same credit as you, but at least you’ll be sure 
the job is done right. Which would you choose? (circle one): 
 
 Choice #1: Confront the other student about the report    
 
Choice #2: Fix the report yourself
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Decision #5. 
 
Twenty years from now, when you have been a successful lawyer for about fifteen years, the 
Governor asks you to accept an appointment as a judge. Two positions are available, and you get 
to choose which one you would like to take. In the first position, a criminal court, you mostly 
would preside over murder trials. You would have to hear a great deal of traumatic testimony, 
and you would be called on to make what are truly life-and-death decisions. In the second 
position, you would preside over civil cases in small claims court. Some of the cases might be 
rather boring, but you would not have to anguish over your decisions. Which court would you 
choose? (circle one): 
 
 Criminal court   Small claims court 
 
 
Decision #6 (Version 1). 
 
Suppose that the local city council is considering passing a new tax that will cost you $1,000 per 
year. You can express your opposition to the new tax in one of two ways: by attending a council 
meeting and speaking out against the tax at the meeting, or by writing a letter to your council 
member stating that you oppose the new tax. Consider these scenarios: 
 
1. If you speak at the council meeting, three outcomes are possible: 
a. There is 60% chance the council will still go ahead and impose the new tax. You 
pay $1,000. 
b. There is a 30% chance the council will agree with you, and vote against the new 
tax. You pay nothing. 
c. There is a 10% chance the council will be angered by public criticism, and raise 
the tax. You pay $1,200. 
 
2. If you send a letter to your council member, two outcomes are possible: 
a. There is a 90% chance the council will still go ahead and impose the new tax. 
You pay $1,000. 
b. There is a 10% chance the council will agree with you, and vote against the new 
tax. You pay nothing. 
 
Given these scenarios, which course of action would you choose? (circle one): 
 
 Choice #1: Speak in opposition to the tax at a council meeting. 
 
 Choice #2: Send a letter in opposition to the tax to your council member. 
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Decision #6 (Version 2). 
 
Suppose that the local city council is considering passing a new tax that will cost you $1,000 per 
year. You can express your opposition to the new tax in one of two ways: by attending a council 
meeting and speaking out against the tax at the meeting, or by writing a letter to your council 
member stating that you oppose the new tax. Consider these scenarios: 
 
3. If you speak at the council meeting, three outcomes are possible: 
a. There is 66% chance the council will still go ahead and impose the new tax. You 
pay $1,000. 
b. There is a 14% chance the council will agree with you, and vote against the new 
tax. You pay nothing. 
c. There is a 20% chance the council will be angered by public criticism, and raise 
the tax. You pay $1,200. 
 
4. If you send a letter to your council member, two outcomes are possible: 
a. There is a 72% chance the council will still go ahead and impose the new tax. 
You pay $1,000. 
b. There is a 28% chance the council will agree with you, and vote against the new 
tax. You pay nothing. 
 
Given these scenarios, which course of action would you choose? Please circle your answer: 
 
 Choice #1: Speak in opposition to the tax at a council meeting. 
 
 Choice #2: Send a letter in opposition to the tax to your council member. 
 
Decision #7 (Version 1). 
 
Suppose that you are with a friend at lunchtime. You have $20 with you, but no credit cards or 
ATM card. You would rather not spend all of your money on lunch because you would like to 
have at least some money left for later. There are two restaurants near where you are. Your 
friend says for you to choose: 
 
Restaurant #1 is a familiar chain restaurant. It is not the greatest food, but you know what you 
would order there. It would cost about $12 for your lunch. 
 
Restaurant #2 serves Tibetan food. You have never eaten Tibetan food, and you have no idea 
what it would be like. The menu is in the window. All of the lunch options are the same price. It 
would cost about $8 for your lunch. 
 
Which would you choose? (circle one) 
 
 Restaurant #1 (chain restaurant)  Restaurant #2 (Tibetan food) 
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Decision #7 (Version 2). 
 
Suppose that you are with a friend at lunchtime. You have $20 with you, but no credit cards or 
ATM card. You would rather not spend all of your money on lunch because you would like to 
have at least some money left for later. There are two restaurants near where you are. Your 
friend says for you to choose: 
 
Restaurant #1 is a familiar fast food restaurant. It is not the greatest food, but you know what you 
would order there. It would cost about $8 for your lunch. 
 
Restaurant #2 serves Tibetan food. You have never eaten Tibetan food, and you have no idea 
what it would be like. The menu is in the window. All of the lunch options are the same price. It 
would cost about $12 for your lunch. 
 
Which would you choose? (circle one) 
 
 Restaurant #1 (fast food)  Restaurant #2 (Tibetan food) 
 
 
Decision #8 (Version 1). 
 
You are flying in coach on a very fully flight. The flight will last two hours. As you go to be 
seated, a flight attendant asks if you would be willing to change seats. He tells you that the seat 
he would like for you to take is a middle seat, between a sobbing eight-year-old who is flying 
alone and a person the flight attendant describes as “a very nervous flyer.” An off-duty pilot has 
been assigned the seat, but he wishes to move so that he can get some rest. The flight attendant 
offers you a $300 voucher toward a future flight if you will change seats. What is your choice? 
(circle one) 
 
 Keep your current seat 
 
 Change seats and accept the $300 voucher. 
 
Decision #8 (Version 2). 
 
You are flying in coach on a very fully flight. The flight will last two hours. As you go to be 
seated, a flight attendant asks if you would be willing to change seats. He tells you that the seat 
he would like for you to take is a middle seat, between a sobbing eight-year-old who is flying 
alone and a person the flight attendant describes as “a very nervous flyer.” An off-duty pilot has 
been assigned the seat, but he wishes to move so that he can get some rest. The flight attendant 
offers you a $100 voucher toward a future flight if you will change seats. What is your choice? 
(circle one) 
 
 Keep your current seat 
 
 Change seats and accept the $100 voucher. 
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Decision #9 (Version 1). 
 
You have paid $90 for a concert ticket. You are driving to the concert, where you will meet up 
with a friend. On the way there, you witness a traffic accident involving a blue car and a white 
car. You saw that the driver of the blue car was at fault. You can tell that no one is hurt, but both 
cars are severely damaged. No one knows that you have witnessed the accident. You can stop 
and wait for the police, and tell them what you observed, but this would mean that you would 
miss the first half of the concert. Or, since no one was hurt, you could just forget about it and go 
on to the concert. Which would you choose? (circle one): 
 
 Stop and wait for the police to tell them what you witnessed 
 
 Forget about it and go on to the concert. 
 
 
Decision #9 (Version 2). 
 
You have paid $45 for a concert ticket. You are driving to the concert, where you will meet up 
with a friend. On the way there, you witness a traffic accident involving a blue car and a white 
car. You saw that the driver of the blue car was at fault. You can tell that no one is hurt, but both 
cars are severely damaged. No one knows that you have witnessed the accident. You can stop 
and wait for the police, and tell them what you observed, but this would mean that you would 
miss the first half of the concert. Or, since no one was hurt, you could just forget about it and go 
on to the concert. Which would you choose? (circle one): 
 
 Stop and wait for the police to tell them what you witnessed 
 
 Forget about it and go on to the concert. 
 
 
  170 
Decision #10 (Version 1). 
 
You are a contestant on a reality game show called “Sweet and Sour.” In your challenge, you 
have to go in to a hotel that has given away your room, and speak to the manager. You have to 
choose a “sweet” or “sour” approach. In the sweet approach, you have to act in a polite and 
understanding manner in order to win over the manager. In the sour approach, you have to act in 
an angry and argumentative manner. Based on previous rounds played by other contestants, you 
know the following: 
 
10% who choose “sweet” are given a VIP suite by the manager; if this happens, you win $10,000 
20% who choose “sweet” are found a regular room by the manager; you win $2,000. 
70% who choose “sweet” receive an apology, but no room. You win nothing. 
 
45% who choose “sour” are found a regular room by the manager; if this happens, you win 
$2,000 
55% who choose “sour” receive an apology, but no room. You win nothing. 
 
Which strategy would you choose to play? (circle one) 
 
 Sweet    Sour 
 
Decision #10 (Version 2). 
 
You are a contestant on a reality game show called “Sweet and Sour.” In your challenge, you 
have to go in to a hotel that has given away your room, and speak to the manager. You have to 
choose a “sweet” or “sour” approach. In the sweet approach, you have to act in a polite and 
understanding manner in order to win over the manager. In the sour approach, you have to act in 
an angry and argumentative manner. Based on previous rounds played by other contestants, you 
know the following: 
 
10% who choose “sour” are given a VIP suite by the manager; if this happens, you win $10,000 
20% who choose “sour” are found a regular room by the manager; you win $2,000. 
70% who choose “sour” receive an apology, but no room. You win nothing. 
 
45% who choose “sweet” are found a regular room by the manager; if this happens, you win 
$2,000 
55% who choose “sweet” receive an apology, but no room. You win nothing. 
 
Which strategy would you choose to play? (circle one) 
 
 Sweet    Sour 
 
